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Preface
In the past 30 years the world has witnessed an era of extraordinary globalization. In
addition to a strong increase in goods trade, two important features of this period are
the international fragmentation of production creating complex value chains organized by
multinational firms as well as an increase in the international mobility of labor. Political
and regulatory decision-making, however, has not kept up with economic integration. Its
reference point remains the nation-state, creating substantial problems in an integrated
world economy.
Chapters I and II investigate responses to these novel challenges by firms, consumers,
governments and civil society actors. Chapter I contributes to a better understanding of
the international organization of production in the absence of global regulation and the
presence of externalities in the production process as well as the possibility of consumer
boycotts.1 Chapter II analyzes how increased international labor mobility and decision-
making at the national level can generate instability in arrangements of deep economic
integration like the EU. Chapter III takes a broader perspective and contributes to one of
the most important questions in the field of international economics: How large are the
gains from trade?
Civil society organizations and the media have long accused multinational companies
of exploiting regulatory differences between their home markets and the location of pro-
duction to cut costs at the expense of workers and the environment. The accusations
mostly concern the actions of independent suppliers. These accusations have triggered a
large number of NGO campaigns and consumer boycotts.
In joint work with Sebastian Krautheim, Chapter I addresses the following question:
How do firms organize international production when the global regulatory void allows
for cost savings at the expense of workers and the environment, but when this may
also induce consumer boycotts and advocacy NGO campaigns, threatening reputation
and sales? We introduce North-South differences in regulation, a cost-saving ‘unethical’
technology and consumer boycotts into a standard property rights model of international
1This chapter is also available as CESifo Working Paper No. 6922.
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production following Antràs (2003). While a firm’s headquarter is located in the ‘Global
North’, more lenient regulation and lower enforcement capacity in the ‘Global South’
allows suppliers there to choose a cost-saving technology. The use of this technology
also generates an externality like local pollution or worker rights infringements. Northern
consumers care about these externalities so that an ‘unethical’ firm may face a consumer
boycott and lose demand. Contracts are incomplete, limiting the headquarter’s control
over both investments and (un)ethical technology choices of suppliers along the value
chain.
We show that international outsourcing and ‘unethical’ production are linked through
a novel unethical outsourcing incentive: a high cost advantage of ‘unethical’ production in
an industry and a low regulatory stringency in the supplier’s country favor international
outsourcing (as opposed to vertical FDI).
We test this prediction using U.S. intrafirm trade data at the industry level from the
U.S. Census Bureau and proxy for the incentive to produce unethically with sectoral data
on the importance of expenditure on water treatment and hazardous waste removal in the
production process taken from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures. We find robust
evidence in support of the model’s prediction.
Following the Brexit vote and recent electoral successes of right-wing populist parties
with anti-immigration and anti-EU agendas, the European integration framework is under
severe strain. Immigration from Eastern Europe was a much debated topic in the U.K.
prior to the referendum and political tensions within the EU over immigration concern
refugee reallocation in Eastern Europe as well as pressures from economic migrants from
Africa in Italy and Spain. The danger of a break-up of the European Union is a common
theme in the public debate.
Chapter II studies how international labor market integration can lead to disinte-
grative political pressures in a deep regional integration framework. In particular, I ask:
Considering welfare-maximizing decisions of governments, is international labor market in-
tegration able to cause a country’s endogenous exit from the EU? I combine the Ricardian
multi-country trade model from Eaton and Kortum (2002) with quantitative modeling of
worker migration using individual preference draws from Redding (2016). I add bilateral
utility costs of migration and keep track of worker nationalities. Starting from an equilib-
rium with costly trade, I show that falling migration costs and subsequent worker flows
induce a redistribution of the gains from trade towards the net sending countries through
a terms of trade effect. If the integrating countries are sufficiently dissimilar in their
levels of technology, the redistributive effect can dominate the direct utility gains from
falling migration frictions. While aggregate utility increases, labor market integration can
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generate welfare losses for workers of net receiving countries.
These countries then face a disintegration trade-off. Because of the indivisibility of
the free movement of labor and goods inside the EU Single Market, unilateral migration
policies designed to restrict immigration are only possible outside of it. Exit, however,
entails a rise in mutual tariff levels between the exiting country and the remaining EU
countries, hindering trade.
I assess the quantitative importance of this trade-off by matching the model to data on
trade and migration from before the EU Eastern Enlargement. I confront it with actual
tariff changes and estimated changes in migration costs for the period 2004 to 2007 and
find that aggregate EU welfare rises. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across
countries: workers from Eastern Europe benefit strongly from the accession, while some
Western European workers lose, among them the British. In a counterfactual exercise I
consider the exit decision of the U.K. government involving mutual tariff increases with
the remaining EU countries and a reset of migration costs to pre-Enlargement levels. I
find that U.K. workers are better off outside the EU, but worse off than inside the EU
before the Eastern Enlargement.
In the public debate, the Brexit decision and the government’s determination to follow
through with it have often been portrayed as irrational and populist. Chapter II presents
a rationalization of this decision based on the arguments outlined above which is also
supported quantitatively. These results are an important reference point but need to be
corroborated in future work. In particular, the inclusion of multiple sectors and factors
of production as well as the consideration in the quantitative exercise of the labor market
integration with big European economies like Germany that happened after 2007 is likely
to affect the results.
The quantitative trade model and the techniques to study counterfactual outcomes
used in Chapter II are well established in the field of international economics. Neverthe-
less, there is an ongoing debate - started by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare
(2012) - about the microfoundations that underlie quantitative trade models and the
(identical) size of the gains from trade they predict. This debate is important because it
informs the interpretation of the numbers these models produce when they are applied to
answer policy questions and helps to put them into perspective.
Chapter III of this dissertation contributes to this debate. Using a simple modifica-
tion of the microfoundation to the Eaton-Kortum model, I combine gains from resource
reallocation to the most efficient producers with gains from access to new goods into a
tractable quantitative Ricardian model of trade. In contrast to the Eaton-Kortum model,
I assume that countries randomly draw a country-specific subset of goods from an ex-
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ogenous continuum, which they are able to produce in autarky. Different goods are then
produced by different sets of producer countries who continue to compete perfectly over
market shares.
The gains from trade in this model arise from two sources. First, consumers can buy
goods already available in autarky from the cheapest producer, who may be located in a
foreign country. Second, consumers get access to new goods they were unable to consume
in autarky because their country was not able to produce them. These can now also be
sourced from the lowest-cost supplier. This interaction of specialization and new goods
gains raises the overall gains from trade compared to a standard Eaton-Kortum setup.
On the other hand, the number of possible sourcing locations is reduced compared to the
Eaton-Kortum model because only a small fraction of goods is produced by all countries.
This reduces the gains from specialization.
In a quantitative exercise I determine the net effect of these two forces. I calibrate
the model to match aggregate bilateral trade flows between 26 OECD economies. In the
preferred specification, I find that the gains from trade increase by 43% on average relative
to the Eaton-Kortum model.
The chapters of this dissertation constitute three independent contributions to the
field of international economics. While they are linked by topic or by method as outlined
above, each contribution may be read independently.
Chapter I
The International Organization of
Production in the Regulatory Void
I.1 Introduction
The past three decades have been characterized by an unprecedented fragmentation and
geographical dispersion of production. Value chains span all over the globe and even
firms with a strong national branding have highly segmented international supply chains.
The fact that low trade and information costs allow firms to exploit cross-country differ-
ences in factor prices is well established in the economics literature. But this profound
change in the locus and organization of production also allows firms to exploit differences
in environmental and labor regulation as well as enforcement capacity across countries.
With national regulatory regimes and multinational production, these firms operate in a
regulatory void (Short, 2013).
In this context, multinational firms and their suppliers are frequently accused of us-
ing the regulatory void to cut costs at the expense of the environment, local workers
and future generations. The large number of cases in which allegations of ‘unethical’ or
‘immoral’ practices have led to consumer boycotts and NGO campaigns against global
industry leaders highlights the relevance of this phenomenon. Examples include Nike for
This chapter is joint work with Sebastian Krautheim.
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sweatshops in Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse, 2010); Apple and Samsung for abusive
work conditions and environmental pollution in their supplier factories in China (China
Labor Watch, 2018, Bloomberg, 2018, and China Labor Watch, 2012); McDonalds, Pep-
sico, Nestlé, Unilever and Procter and Gamble for rainforest destruction by their palm oil
suppliers in Indonesia (Rainforest Action Network, 2017, Guardian, 2017); Coca-Cola for
child labor at sugar cane suppliers in El Salvador (Human Rights Watch, 2004, Guardian,
2014); Abercrombie&Fitch, Benetton, C&A, Columbia, Decathlon, Old Navy, Banana
Republic, H&M, Levi’s, Marks&Spencer, Hilfiger and Calvin Klein for abusive work con-
ditions at Indian supplier factories (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2017) and toy producers
Hasbro and Mattel for labor abuse by their suppliers in China (China Labor Watch,
2015, Fortune, 2015). Responding to NGO pressure, the top five apparel brands Nike,
Zara, H&M, Adidas, and Uniqlo have - among many others - agreed to remove hazardous
chemicals from their entire supply chain by 2020 (Greenpeace, 2016).1
These are just a few examples to illustrate that the value chains of leading firms
in a diverse set of industries have come under heavy criticism for reducing costs at the
expense of workers or the environment. That is, in ways that some civil society actors and
consumers consider ‘unethical’. Baron (2012) and Krautheim and Verdier (2016) provide
additional examples. While the benefits for firms on the cost side are obvious, also the
damage on sales, reputation and stock market valuation can be sizable.2
Even the most casual observation of these examples suggests that most criticism con-
cerns ‘unethical’ practices by independent suppliers rather than subsidiaries of multina-
tional firms (although both cases exist). This raises the following questions: Does the
choice between ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ production interact with the international orga-
nization of production? Are independent suppliers more likely to implement ‘unethical’
technologies than affiliates of multinational firms? How does this interact with the estab-
lished views on the international integration vs. outsourcing decision?
Within the field of economics, the literature on the international organization of pro-
duction based on the seminal contribution by Antràs (2003) appears to be the natural
framework to address these questions. It applies the property rights theory of the firm by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to international value chains in
1We take the ranking from KantarMillwardBrown (2017).
2An instructive example is the case of Nike. In 1997, Nike was hit by large-scale protests against work
conditions in supplier factories in Indonesia. The Nike Annual Report for the fiscal year 1998 reports
a 49.8% drop in profits, the stock price on May 31st, 1998, was 20% below its mark one year earlier
and revenue grew only by 4% compared to 42% and 36% in the two years before. In March 1998, Nike
CEO Phil Knight made the following statement: “The Nike product has become synonymous with slave
wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse. I truly believe the American consumer doesn’t want to buy
products made under abusive conditions” (New York Times, 1998). While this is an instructive case,
several studies provide more systematic evidence that activist campaigns against firms negatively impact
their stock market valuation (e.g. King and Soule, 2007, and Flammer, 2013).
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a North-South context. Several determinants of the choice between vertical integration
and international outsourcing have been analyzed both theoretically and empirically, e.g.
capital/headquarter intensity in Antràs (2003), firm heterogeneity in Antràs and Help-
man (2004), contractibility of inputs in Antràs and Helpman (2008), task routineness in
Costinot, Oldenski, and Rauch (2011), and downstreamness of the supplier in the value
chain in Antràs and Chor (2013).
In this paper we introduce North-South differences in regulation, a cost-saving ‘uneth-
ical’ technology and consumer boycotts into this literature. We seek to better understand
how the boundaries of the firm respond when the implementation of possibly legal but
supposedly ‘unethical’ practices in one country can have repercussions on sales and profits
in another country. We find an additional outsourcing incentive that is absent in the pre-
vious literature: the cost savings of ‘unethical’ production alter optimal investments along
the value chain and thereby make outsourcing more attractive. This effect is strongest
in supplier-intensive sectors and implies that sectors with high potential cost savings of
‘unethical’ production are more prone to keeping their suppliers at arm’s length. We also
provide evidence for the empirical relevance of this effect.
We place our analysis in a context where the internationalization of production lets
firms locate parts of their value chain in a jurisdiction (the ‘Global South’) with a more
lenient regulation and/or lower enforcement capacity. This allows firms to implement a
technology, forbidden in the Global North, which saves costs, but generates an externality
on a third party (e.g. local pollution, unsustainable extraction of renewable resources or
poor labor, safety and health standards). The first premise of our analysis is that these
externalities raise ethical concerns on the side of consumers in the Global North potentially
resulting in a consumer boycott of the final product.3 As the production technology
cannot be inferred from the final product, and is difficult or impossible to be verified by
final consumers, it constitutes a credence attribute of the final product (Feddersen and
Gilligan, 2001, and Baron, 2011). In the absence of international regulation addressing
the market failures associated to credence goods, social activists can respond to this
international governance deficit (Gereffi and Mayer, 2006) by initiating consumer boycotts
to influence the production technology of firms along the value chain.4
3We do not take any normative stand on what ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’ practices are. In our analysis,
the defining feature of an ‘unethical’ technology is simply that it saves costs but may trigger a consumer
boycott. There is ample empirical evidence both from surveys (O’Rourke, 2005, and Loureiro and Lotade,
2005) and from field experiments with real purchasing decisions (e.g. Hiscox and Smyth, 2011, and
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2012) that consumers do care about such issues and have a higher willingness to
pay for ethical products. Moreover, Basu and Tzannatos (2003) and Cone (2013) provide evidence that
this awareness has increased over the last decades.
4While most evidence on NGO campaigns rests on case studies, very recently, more systematic evidence
is provided by Hatte and Koenig (2018). They use unique data from Sigwatch, a for-profit consultancy
that provides firms with daily processed information on how NGOs comment on them. For a period
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The second premise of our analysis is that production along international value chains
is characterized by incomplete contracts. This is the central assumption of the property
rights theory of international production introduced by Antràs (2003) and appears very
natural for production in a North-South context. Issues concerning dispute settlement,
place of jurisdiction as well as questions of enforcement across borders arise in this context.
Moreover, relationship-specificity of investments along the value chain aggravates these
problems as it adds dimensions to the product that are hard to specify ex-ante and
difficult to verify by a third party ex-post. In our context, this contractual incompleteness
naturally extends to the implementation of technology: no contract effectively binds the
supplier to implement the ethical or unethical technology type. The massive difficulties
of internationally active firms trying to implement codes of conduct for their suppliers
largely backs this assumption.5
One central result of our analysis is that the headquarter intensity (and therefore also
its counterpart, the supplier intensity) of the production technology is a key determinant
both for the organization of production and for the choice between the unethical and
the ethical technology. We find that, just like in Antràs (2003), a high supplier intensity
favors international outsourcing over vertical integration. In addition, we find that a
high supplier intensity favors unethical production. This implies that in sectors where the
supplier provides an important contribution to the production process one should observe
both more outsourcing and more unethical production.6 Our model therefore implies an
association between international outsourcing and unethical production.
Further analysis of the mechanics of our model reveals a more sophisticated relation
between the two. In our model, outsourcing is an instrument for the headquarter to allevi-
ate the underinvestment of the supplier. Unethical production increases the gap between
the optimal and the actual investment. This aggravated underinvestment under unethical
production magnifies the incentive of the headquarter to choose outsourcing compared to
the ethical (i.e. the Antràs, 2003) case. We label this the unethical outsourcing incentive.
This generates a range of factor intensities for which outsourcing is only chosen because
from 2010–2014, their raw data contain campaigns of 2949 activists, campaigning against a total of
6893 firms headquartered in 130 countries. Using data on the location of the firm’s headquarter, the
NGO’s headquarter as well as the country in which the criticized action takes place, they show that the
international fragmentation of production is also reflected in the activity of advocacy NGO campaigns.
On the one hand, they find a strong international dimension of this activity. On the other hand, their
triadic gravity analysis shows a strong bias for NGOs to campaign against domestic firms. This pattern
is consistent with our modeling approach where a firm from the Global North is confronted by an NGO
from the Global North about an action taking place in the Global South.
5Nike is a well documented case in point (e.g. Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007). Other research docu-
menting difficulties of implementing codes of conduct with independent suppliers includes Egels-Zandén
(2007), Ruwanpura and Wrigley (2011), and Bird, Short, and Toffel (2017).
6Despite this link, our model is rich enough to also feature ethical outsourcing and unethical integration
as equilibrium outcomes.
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the headquarter anticipates unethical production by the supplier. The supplier’s option
to implement the unethical technology therefore biases the organizational decision of
the firm towards outsourcing. This effect is more pronounced for sectors with stronger
incentives for unethical production. Our model therefore implies that sectoral variation
in the incentives for unethical production - in terms of model parameters: high unethical
cost advantage and a low probability of a boycott - is associated with sectoral variation
in the organizational form even after controlling for factor intensities. In Section I.4.6
we provide empirical evidence for this conditional correlation: controlling for all standard
proxies of headquarter intensity, we find that high cost savings from unethical production
in an industry are associated with more outsourcing relative to vertical integration.
The unethical outsourcing incentive also implies an interesting tension between aspi-
rations and reality when it comes to the headquarter’s actions. In the public debate firms
are frequently accused of ‘greenwashing’, i.e. claiming to be in favor of ethical production
but acting differently. We find that the combination of actually wishing to source ethi-
cally but expanding unethical production can be an equilibrium outcome. This is the case
when the headquarter would prefer the ethical technology (which it cannot impose on the
supplier) but anticipates unethical production. The headquarter then has an incentive
to maximize cost savings from unethical production, which is achieved by keeping the
supplier at arm’s length and thereby scaling up unethical production.7
With consumers willing to boycott certain products on ethical grounds, information
about the implemented production technology is crucial. We assume that technology is a
credence attribute of a product - it cannot be inferred from the final product even after
consumption. That said, observable firm choices (like investments, quantities and prices)
may nevertheless contain information about the underlying technology. A deviation from
those investments, quantities or prices that are optimal under ethical production may
then indicate that the unethical technology has been implemented. In the baseline model
we simply impose that any deviation from these observables is interpreted as proof of
unethical production and directly triggers a consumer boycott, leading firms to set ob-
servables like under ethical production. This allows us to focus on the implications of our
model for the international organization of production in the baseline model in Section
I.2. In Section I.3 we provide a microfoundation in which we introduce an activist NGO
screening firms for signs of unethical behavior and organizing consumer boycotts in re-
sponse. We find that - as in the baseline model - in equilibrium unethical firms hide their
type by pooling with ethical firms. We show that both the microfounded and the baseline
model yield qualitatively identical results.
7The model also features cases where the interests of the headquarter and the supplier are aligned and
both prefer the ethical or, notably, both prefer the unethical technology.
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The need to pool with ethical firms implies that in equilibrium unethical firms set
the same investment levels as ethical firms. Given that an unethical supplier faces lower
variable costs, the deviation of the actual from the optimal investment increases. As
outsourcing is the only instrument to mitigate the underinvestment by the supplier, out-
sourcing becomes more attractive under unethical production, generating the unethical
outsourcing incentive.
While the (un)ethical technology choice of the supplier depends on the factor intensity
of production (and, quite intuitively, the cost advantage of unethical production and the
risk of a boycott), it turns out to be independent of the organization of production.
The reason for this is that the organization of production has two countervailing effects
on the attractiveness of unethical production for the supplier, which exactly offset one
another. On the one hand, outsourcing scales up cost savings from unethical production
through increased investments, on the other, it makes the supplier more vulnerable to a
boycott by increasing its share of final revenues. This implies that the headquarter has
no instrument to affect the supplier’s technology choice. Our model therefore remains
very close to the setting in Antràs (2003) and allows us to focus on the prevalent question
in this literature: how can one instrument (organization of production) be used to affect
one variable (investment incentives) under incomplete contracts? Our setting allows us
to analyze how the potentially unethical technology choice of the supplier distorts the
use of the instrument by the headquarter, linking unethical production to outsourcing in
equilibrium.
As outlined above, our model predicts a link between the incentives for unethical
production and outsourcing. To support this prediction empirically, we follow the estab-
lished literature, e.g. Nunn and Trefler (2013), Antràs and Chor (2013) and Antràs and
Yeaple (2014), in using U.S. Census Bureau data on intrafirm trade. We use the standard
measure of vertical integration at the industry level: the share of U.S. intrafirm imports
in total U.S. imports for the years 2007− 2014. We correlate this variable with the cost
advantage of unethical production and analyze if this relation differs systematically across
levels of regulatory stringency of the exporting country.
We suggest a measure of cost savings at the expense of the environment, for which
we draw on data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau. Since 2007 the survey has recorded the industry-level expenditure on water,
sewer, refuse removal, and other non-electric utility payments including the cost of haz-
ardous waste removal. These expenditures are highly sensitive to regulation. We use their
share in total costs to proxy for potential cost savings from operating under more lenient
regulation (with the U.S. as the benchmark). To measure the level of regulation (and
enforcement) in different countries, we use the Environmental Policy Stringency Index
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computed by the OECD for 33 countries for the years 2007 to 2012, including the six
non-member countries Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa. The in-
dex combines information on 14 environmental policy instruments that are mainly related
to air and climate pollution and is suitable for comparisons across countries.
As predicted by our model, we find a statistically and economically significant neg-
ative relationship between our measure of the unethical cost advantage and the share
of intrafirm imports in an industry. The relationship is stronger in countries with more
lenient regulation. These findings are robust to the inclusion of country-year fixed effects
as well as a large number of control variables that the previous literature has found - and
our theory predicts - to affect the prevalence of vertical integration.
Our paper contributes to the large literature on the international organization of pro-
duction pioneered by Antràs (2003). Some of the major contributions are highlighted
above and a recent survey is provided by Antràs and Yeaple (2014). Differences in regula-
tion and institutions are not alien to this literature. Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume
that integration improves the outside option of the headquarter more in the North than
in the South. In Antràs and Helpman (2008), the share of contractible inputs may differ
between production locations. In contrast to those papers, we do not consider institutions
like rule of law and the protection of property rights, but instead consider differences in
environmental regulation and labor rights and their enforcement.
By introducing consumer boycotts and an advocacy NGO into a model of the inter-
national organization of production, our paper contributes to bridging the gap between
the international economics literature and the literature on private politics started by
Baron (2001, 2003). The latter focuses on activists attempting to affect firm behavior not
through lobbying for regulation (public politics) but through campaigns and boycotts of
firms (private politics). This literature takes an industrial organization perspective and
analyzes the interaction of activists, firms and possibly a regulator under different market
structures and allowing for strategic interactions between all parties.8
Brooks (2002) considers the possibility that a loss of control in case of outsourcing also
limits liability in case of infringement (in our wording: unethical production). Fu, Gong,
and Png (2018) extend this approach to continuous production and infringement levels.
They take an industrial organization perspective and focus their analysis on the trade-off
between full control and full liability under integration and limited control and limited
liability under outsourcing. While they do not introduce this trade-off into established
8Some of the main contributions include Innes (2006), Baron and Diermeier (2007), Lyon and Salant
(2013), Baron (2010), as well as Baron (2016), and Egorov and Harstad (2017). Closely related to the
private politics literature, but with a different focus, are works on the private provision of public goods
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) surveyed by Kitzmuller and Shimshack (2012).
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frameworks in international economics, their modeling is consistent with the transaction
cost approach (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002), where integration provides the head-
quarter with full control over the supplier (see Footnote 18 for details). In contrast, we
follow the predominant paradigm in the international economics literature: the property
rights theory of the firm used in Antràs (2003). On the one hand, this allows us to analyze
how the established theoretical insights change when the novel elements and trade-offs are
introduced. On the other hand, we can derive testable implications that can be brought
to the data and neatly tie into the established empirical approaches in the international
economics literature.
Several papers have introduced elements of private politics into international eco-
nomics. Aldashev and Verdier (2009) analyze the international competition for funds
among development-oriented NGOs. Aldashev, Limardi, and Verdier (2015) consider the
impact of NGO campaigns on industry structure in a setting with endogenous mark-ups
and monopolistic competition. Krautheim and Verdier (2016) analyze the endogenous
emergence of a consumer-financed NGO in response to the offshoring decision of a firm.
Kitzmuller (2012) takes the model of Besley and Ghatak (2007), who explicitly model an
NGO as a potential provider of a public good, to the international level.
Issues related to private regulation, social activism and NGO-firm interactions in global
value chains have received much more attention in political sciences and management
studies. This literature finds that social activism is instrumental in the establishment
of codes of conduct in multinational supply chains and analyzes further determinants of
their success in case studies and more recently in large firm-level datasets.9
Our work has some relation to several strands of the international trade literature.
First and foremost, Copeland and Taylor (1994) formalize the idea that differences in
environmental regulation affect the international location of production. This triggered a
large literature on trade (FDI) and the environment which is surveyed in Copeland and
Taylor (2004).10 Our approach has in common with this literature that we view regulatory
differences as a driving force of the internationalization of production. This literature,
however, does not analyze the international organization of production and, importantly,
ignores the feedback effects the implementation of unethical technologies can have on
demand when consumer boycotts are possible.11
9See e.g. Locke, Kochan, Romis, and Qin (2007), Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and Locke (2017), Ouellet,
Short, and Toffel (2015), Distelhorst and Locke (2018) and references therein.
10See Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) and references therein for more recent contributions.
11We identified two other strands of the literature that resonate with some dimension of our analysis.
First, the ‘protection for sale’ literature based on Grossman and Helpman (1994), which considers the
influence of a special interest group on trade policy outcomes. The focus is therefore on public politics
rather than on private politics and on trade policy rather than on the international organization of
production. Second, Eckel and Egger (2009) study the role of trade unions for international investment
and production decisions of firms. There are several important differences between advocacy NGOs and
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section I.2, we present our
baseline model of unethical production and consumer boycotts and analyze the optimal
international organization of production. In Section I.3, we analyze an extension of the
model featuring advocacy NGOs and asymmetric information, thereby microfounding the
relation between consumer boycotts and observables like the organization of production,
investments, quantities, and prices. We describe the empirical specification along with the
data sources and the results of our empirical analysis in Section I.4. Section I.5 concludes.
I.2 A Model of (Un)ethical Sourcing with Incomplete
Contracts
In this section, we outline a property-rights model of the boundaries of the firm in the
context of international differences in labor or environmental regulation and the risk of
consumer boycotts. To facilitate the comparison to the existing literature, we closely
follow Antràs (2003) in our baseline setting.12 Similar to Antràs and Chor (2013), we
focus on the analysis of the organizational choice of the headquarter-supplier pair and
abstract from an analysis of the industry equilibrium.
I.2.1 Baseline Model
We first outline our baseline model.
I.2.1.1 Preferences, Consumer Boycotts and Demand
All consumers are located in the Global North. Their preferences are summarized by the
following CES aggregate over a large number of symmetric varieties indexed by ω,
U =
(∫
ω∈Ω
y(ω)αI(ω)dω
) 1
α
, (I.1)
trade unions. The former affect firms through demand, tend to be indifferent to survival of the firm and
address externalities that usually concern third parties. The latter in turn affect firms on the cost side,
vitally depend on firm survival and maximize the utility of their (nationally segmented) members.
12We do not include firm heterogeneity like in Antràs and Helpman (2004) in our model, but rather
take the original model in Antràs (2003) as a reference point. The reason is that to our knowledge there
are no stylized facts concerning correlations of firm size, productivity or quality to the implementation of
unethical production, that could guide our modeling. We argue that our mechanism is equally general as
the mechanism in Antràs (2003). It should therefore carry over to any extension of the original Antràs
model, but possibly at the expense of tractability. The attentive reader of our microfoundation spelled
out in Section I.3 might think that in a model with heterogeneous firms the link between investment
choices and boycotts may break down. We argue in Footnote 28 that this is not the case in particular if
heterogeneity is modeled as differences in quality rather than productivity.
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with α ∈ (0, 1), Ω being the set of available varieties and y(ω) representing the quan-
tity consumed of variety ω. These preferences are standard with the exception of the
indicator variable I(ω). It reflects the fact that a firm (and its variety) can be hit by a
consumer boycott. In this case the indicator variable takes a value of zero implying that
the representative consumer does not derive any utility from its consumption.
Consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint
E ≤
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)y(ω)dω.
Therefore, in general, demand for each variety ω is given by
y(ω) = Ap(ω)−
1
1−α I(ω)
1
1−α , (I.2)
where A = E
(∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
− α
1−α I(ω)
1
1−αdω
)−1
.
From equation (I.2) we can see how demand responds to a boycott. In this case the
indicator variable takes the value of zero and there is no demand for the product.13 The
value of the preference shifter depends on the choice of the firm and nature (in the baseline
model) or the activity of an advocacy NGO (in the microfounded model). This stylized
assumption allows us to generate the risk of losing final revenues as a consequence of
unethical production in a simple way that preserves tractability of the model.14
I.2.1.2 Production of the Final Good and the Intermediate Input
The final good is produced by the headquarter located in the Global North using an
intermediate good provided by the supplier located in the Global South. The headquarter
can costlessly transform one unit of an intermediate good into final output:
y(ω) = x(ω). (I.3)
The quantity y(ω) produced of the final good is therefore simply given by the quantity
x(ω) of the intermediate good the headquarter has at its disposal. The intermediate good
13Technically, this modeling is a variation of the standard approach in the literature on quality and
international trade with CES preferences, where firms can invest into quality represented by a (usually
continuous) variable which takes the place of our indicator variable. See e.g. Hummels and Klenow
(2005) and Hallak (2006) for early contributions.
14There are interesting microeconomic and behavioral issues related to this, in particular the question
to which extent consumers form expectations about (un)ethical production and adjust consumption ac-
cordingly (as in Krautheim and Verdier, 2016) and to which extent the preference for ethical consumption
is endogenous to NGO activity: Nyborg (2011) shows that consumers can be willing to pay to not receive
information in order to avoid a moral obligation to contribute voluntarily. We do not seek to contribute to
answering these questions and simply model consumer preferences such that we obtain the main features
relevant for our analysis maintaining tractability.
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is in turn produced by a supplier combining a headquarter service and a manufacturing
input according to the following production function:
x(ω) =
(
h(ω)
β
)β (
m(ω)
1− β
)1−β
(I.4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the headquarter intensity of production. The headquarter service
h(ω) is provided to the supplier by the headquarter which then combines it with the man-
ufacturing input m(ω) to produce x(ω) units of the intermediate good. The intermediate
good produced is entirely relationship-specific. Neither can the supplier sell x(ω) to any
third party nor can the headquarter produce any of the final output without the interme-
diate good that is in the possession of the supplier.15 We stress that the manufacturing
input m(ω) stands for a bundle of factors of production used by the supplier. Among
these are labor and physical capital, as well as human capital and materials. In addition,
and crucially for our model, the supplier also incurs other expenditures, such as provisions
for workplace safety and the cost of compliance with local environmental regulation in
the process of providing the input m(ω).
I.2.1.3 Unethical Production and Consumer Boycotts
The central innovation in this paper is that the supplier does not only choose the in-
vestment necessary to produce the manufacturing input, but can also choose between a
high- and a low-cost technology. The low-cost technology produces a (higher) negative
externality on a third party. We can think of such externalities as taking the form of
exploitation of workers with forced overtime, low work safety standards or child labor
as well as pollution of the environment, e.g. by dumping dangerous chemicals in rivers,
emitting substantial quantities of carbon dioxide or harvesting old growth rainforests.
Consumers consider an unnecessarily high (but cost-saving) level of this externality as
unethical. We define the marginal cost of the supplier’s high-cost, ethical technology as
cem and the low-cost, unethical technology by c
u
m = µc
e
m, with µ ∈ (0, 1).
We do not take any normative stand on what an ethical or unethical technology is.
This includes for example the debate on the desirability of a ban of child labor. We
15A setting where the headquarter provides an input to the supplier who can combine it with its own
input and then take the produced output ‘hostage’ may seem a little artificial. The same may be the case
for a final good technology that costlessly transforms the intermediate into the final product. We chose
this modeling approach in order to reproduce the original Antràs (2003) setting. Later contributions
consider settings where headquarter and supplier each produce an intermediate. Both intermediates are
then combined to produce the final output. This setup appears more natural but delivers the same
results and mechanisms as the original setting. To make the comparison to Antràs (2003) as clear as
possible, we stick to the original modeling. Moreover, it is of interest to note that recent work on
factoryless manufacturing points at examples like Apple or Dyson, who do not own any manufacturing
establishments at all (Bernard and Fort, 2015).
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simply start our modeling from the observation that consumer boycotts are triggered by
the perception of (some) consumers that firms act in an unethical way. Clearly, what is
considered ‘unethical’ may depend on the historical context, income, culture, salience of
specific issues in the public debate as well as alternative technologies.
As consumers cannot infer from the final product whether the unethical technology
was used in production, unethical firms can potentially prevent consumers from learning
about the type of the firm. While we assume that the technology used cannot be directly
observed by consumers, some firm choices are observable, potentially leading consumers
to believe that the firm is of the unethical type. In the baseline version of the model we
impose a simple link between observable choices (investments, quantities and prices) of
the firm and the probability of facing a boycott: an unethical firm setting observables
at values that are optimal for an ethical firm (‘mimicking’) has a chance to pass as an
ethical firm and faces a boycott with probability 1− γ < 1. Any firm deviating from the
investments, quantities or prices of ethical firms faces a boycott with probability one.16 In
fact, we only need to impose this for investments, as conditional on identical investments,
the same quantities and prices maximize profits of both firm types.17 This implies that
an unethical firm faces discontinuous demand being positive in expectation if and only if
it chooses investments like an ethical firm. This leads unethical firms to mimic ethical
firms and in equilibrium the levels of investment, quantities and prices do not reveal the
type of the firm.
Using this reduced-form approach in the baseline model allows us to focus on the anal-
ysis of the international organization of production with unethical technologies, to derive
our main results on the integration and technology decision, their interaction as well as
empirical implications. However, the reduced-form approach leaves some questions open:
What is the mechanism/the agent triggering a consumer boycott? Why is it triggered
by a deviation from ethical firm choices? Should ethical firms adjust their investments
in order to signal their type? To address these questions, we provide a microfoundation
in Section I.3, where an NGO observes firm choices (organization of production, invest-
ments, quantities, prices) and can determine the optimal choices of an ethical firm. When
the NGO observes a firm that acts inconsistently with the use of the ethical technology
16It is merely for tractability that we consider a setting where any deviation of the ethical investment
triggers a consumer boycott. Even if this assumption were to be relaxed, the magnification of the
outsourcing incentive through unethical production presented below should remain active as long as the
supplier needs to stay below the level of investment it would optimally choose in the absence of the threat
of a boycott.
17This is because after investments are made, the ‘optimization’ of a firm with respect to quantities and
prices is equivalent to a situation in which all costs are sunk, marginal costs are zero, and the maximum
output is fixed and identical for both firm types as investments are the same. Therefore, when both firms
have set the same investment levels and there is positive demand for the unethical firm, both firms will
set the same quantities and market clearing prices.
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it starts an investigation. If it finds the firm to be of the unethical type it initiates a boy-
cott. We show that all the results of the baseline model remain qualitatively unchanged
when the model is fully microfounded. As all the additional assumptions introduced in
the microfoundation serve the sole purpose of microfounding the link between mimick-
ing and boycotts, but do not add major insights on the role of unethical technology for
the international organization of production, we keep them separated from the baseline
model.
I.2.1.4 Hold-up Problem and the Organization of the Firm
We consider an environment with incomplete contracts. Neither can contracts be written
contingent on choices the parties make, nor on outcomes like revenue. The only con-
tractible items are the lump-sum transfer from the supplier to the headquarter (discussed
in detail below) and the organization of production. This means that investment quan-
tities are not contractible, but also that our new feature, the technology choice of the
supplier, cannot be contracted upon.18
As contracts are incomplete, neither the investments nor the split of the revenues
can be fixed ex-ante. The relationship-specificity of investments then implies that after
investments are sunk and the intermediate input is produced, the two parties face a hold-
up problem. Both parties need the partner to generate (full) revenue and therefore engage
in a bargaining process over the split of final revenues. Following the literature, we model
this ex-post bargaining as generalized Nash bargaining with the headquarter getting a
fraction of the final revenues. This fraction is endogenous and depends on the residual
rights of control, which are in turn affected by the organization of production chosen by
the headquarter.
Before investments take place, the headquarter can choose between integrating the
supplier into the firm or leaving it as an independent party. We index the mode of
organization by k ∈ {O, V }, where O stands for international outsourcing and V for
vertical integration. The key difference between the two is that outsourcing leaves the
supplier with the residual rights of control over the produced intermediate. In this case
the outside options of both parties are zero if bargaining fails: the headquarter has no
input to produce the final product and the supplier cannot transform the intermediate
18Alternatively, one could assume that integration allows the headquarter to impose the technology
on the supplier. This would, however, mix property rights theory (for production) and the transaction
cost approach à la Grossman and Helpman (2002) or Carluccio and Bas (2015) (for technology). In the
latter, all contractual incompleteness is resolved by integration. It appears hard to justify the assumption
that under integration the headquarter can impose the type of technology but cannot impose the level
of investment. More interesting might be the analysis of a setting that fully embraces the logic of the
transaction cost approach where integration allows the headquarter to impose both the investment and
the technology. We leave this alternative model for future research and focus in this paper on the
predominant paradigm in the literature: the property-rights theory of the firm.
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into the final product.19 Integration in turn shifts the residual rights of control to the
headquarter allowing it to recover a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of the intermediates from the
supplier if bargaining fails. The outside option of the headquarter under integration is
therefore better than under outsourcing, implying that the bargaining results in a larger
share of revenues going to the headquarter, i.e. φV > φO, where, as in Antràs (2003),
φV = φO + δ
α (1− φO).
We assume φk >
1
2
. Antràs (2003) shows that this assumption is sufficient to ensure
that the headquarter optimally produces the headquarter service by itself and hands it
over to the supplier for production of intermediate x (ω) while the supplier produces the
manufacturing input.20
I.2.1.5 Match Creation and Transfer Payment
We have now described the situation after a headquarter has been matched to a supplier.
Ex-ante, the headquarter faces a large number of perfectly competitive suppliers available
for a match. Once a match is formed, their relationship is transformed into one of bilateral
monopoly (Williamson, 1985) in that investments are relationship-specific and have no
outside value. Due to incomplete contracts, the production process involving bargaining
over the revenues will leave the supplier with positive profits. The large number of po-
tential suppliers compete for this profitable opportunity by offering a transfer payment to
the headquarter in return for forming the match with them. Perfect competition among
suppliers implies that the headquarter can set a payment that extracts the full expected
surplus from the supplier. Besides the organization of production, the transfer payment
is the only variable the headquarter and supplier can contract on. Both are fixed in the
moment the match is formed.
I.2.1.6 Time Line
Figure I.1 gives an overview of the sequence of events. In t0, the headquarter chooses the
organizational form and the lump-sum transfer. In t1(a), the supplier chooses between
ethical and unethical production. Both parties make their physical investments non-
cooperatively in t1(b). The headquarter hands the headquarter service to the supplier,
who in turn produces intermediate inputs in t2 by combining the headquarter service with
19The assumption that the supplier cannot get anything out of its residual rights of control can easily
be relaxed e.g. by allowing the supplier to sell the intermediate good at a discounted rate on a secondary
market. We do not expect this to affect the results, as it does not do so in related settings either (see
e.g. Antràs and Yeaple, 2014).
20This assumption implies that we are considering a two-sided hold-up problem, where both parties have
sunk an investment in their specific factor. This assumption is therefore key to establish the qualitative
equivalence to setups briefly outlined in Footnote 15 where the respective inputs are only combined after
bargaining was successful.
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its own manufacturing input. In t3, nature determines whether an unethical firm will be
boycotted by consumers. Period t4 features the ex-post bargaining over the division of
the surplus. In t5, if the parties have agreed on a division, intermediates are converted
to final output, sold and revenues distributed to headquarter and supplier if the firm is
not boycotted. In case of a boycott, demand is zero and no final goods are produced and
sold.
Figure I.1: Timing of Events.
t0 t1(a) t2 t1(b) t3 t4 t5 
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final output 
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I.2.2 Equilibrium Firm Choices
We solve the model by backward induction.
I.2.2.1 t5: Revenues of Ethical and Unethical Firms
We denote revenue from selling variety ω as R(ω)lk, where k ∈ {V,O} indicates vertical
integration and outsourcing and l ∈ {e, u} indicates ethical and unethical production. An
ethical firm always faces full demand as it is never targeted by a consumer boycott. Its
revenues are given by R(ω)ek = p(ω)
e
k y(ω)
e
k. h(ω)
e
k and m(ω)
e
k represent the investment
quantities chosen by headquarter and supplier in the case of ethical production. Given
that the quantity x(ω) of the intermediate good produced by the supplier is determined
by investments and given that the headquarter costlessly transforms x(ω) into y(ω), total
revenues of an ethical firm can be expressed as
R(ω)ek = A
1−α
[(
h(ω)ek
β
)β (
m(ω)ek
1− β
)1−β]α
. (I.5)
An unethical firm only faces positive demand in expectation if h(ω)uk = h(ω)
e
k and
m(ω)uk = m(ω)
e
k, its revenues under mimicking and if it does not face an exogenous
boycott in t3 are also given by the above expression.
CHAPTER I. REGULATORY VOID 28
I.2.2.2 t4: Bargaining
Headquarter and supplier bargain over the distribution of revenue. The bargaining power -
and therefore also the share of revenue - of the headquarter is assumed to be φO >
1
2
under
outsourcing. This reflects the fact that in the arm’s length relationship, both parties have
an outside option of zero and the payoff allocation is determined only by the exogenous
assumptions about the distribution of the gains from trade. In the case of integration,
the outside option of the supplier remains at zero because of the relationship-specificity
of the produced intermediates. The headquarter, however, has allocated the residual
rights of control to itself. It is able to continue producing δy(ω) in case bargaining breaks
down. Using equations (I.3), (I.4), and (I.5) this translates into sales of δαR(ω)lk. The
gains from trade are thus reduced to (1− δα)R(ω)lk. With integration, the headquarter
receives its larger outside option plus its exogenous share from the gains from trade, which
is φVR(ω)
l
k, with φV as defined in Section I.2.1.4.
I.2.2.3 t3 and t2: Consumer Boycotts and Production of Intermediates
In period t3 nature decides whether an unethical firm faces a boycott. We assume that
ethical firms never face a boycott, firms that are openly unethical always face a boycott
and firms that mimic ethical firms in terms of prices, output, and investment face a
boycott with a probability 1− γ. Before the boycott uncertainty is resolved, a mimicking
unethical firm therefore has an expected revenue of
E[R(ω)uk ] = γR(ω)
e
k. (I.6)
In period t2, the supplier uses the invested quantities to produce intermediate output
x(ω). As outlined above, provided it mimicked in terms of investments in t1, there is no
reason for an unethical firm to deviate from the optimal quantity of an ethical firm, which
is production according to equation (I.4).
I.2.2.4 t1(b): Investments
Two types of decisions are taken sequentially in period t1. In period t1(a) the supplier
chooses to implement the ethical or unethical technology. In period t1(b) supplier and
headquarter take their investment decisions simultaneously. We first consider the invest-
ment choices conditional on the ethical or unethical technology being implemented.
Ethical Investments: When the supplier implements the ethical technology, the set-
ting is isomorphic to Antràs (2003). The two parties simultaneously and non-cooperatively
CHAPTER I. REGULATORY VOID 29
set investments to maximize their respective shares of final revenue. They take into ac-
count incomplete contracts and the ensuing ex-post bargaining. The headquarter maxi-
mizes
max
h(ω)ek
φkR(ω)
e
k − chh(ω)ek, (I.7)
whereas the supplier solves
max
m(ω)ek
(1− φk)R(ω)ek − cemm(ω)ek. (I.8)
Notice the superscript in the marginal cost of the supplier. With ethical production,
the supplier rewards its factor of production at the ethical rate cem.
The first order conditions deliver the best response functions that give optimal invest-
ment of each party for any positive level of investment of the other party:
h(ω)ek = β
(
φkα
ch
) 1
1−βα
A
1−α
1−αβ
(
m(ω)ek
1− β
) (1−β)α
1−βα
m(ω)ek = (1− β)
(
(1− φk)α
cem
) 1
1−(1−β)α
A
1−α
1−(1−β)α
(
h(ω)ek
β
) βα
1−(1−β)α
.
Curve SV in the left panel of Figure I.2 depicts the supplier’s best response function,
HV the headquarter’s best response function under vertical integration, SO and HO do
the same for outsourcing. S∗ and H∗ show the best responses in the first best case, which
is unattainable because of incomplete contracts.
Figure I.2: Best Response Functions under Ethical and Unethical Production.
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Note: The left panel shows the best response functions when the ethical technology is used. The right
panel shows them for the unethical technology case.
Like in Antràs (2003), the equilibrium of the investment game is at the intersection of
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the best response functions. The standard argument of Pareto-dominance rules out the
other Nash equilibrium at zero-zero. Equilibrium investments are therefore given by
h(ω)ek = βAα
1
1−α
φk
ch
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β] −α1−α
(I.9)
m(ω)ek = (1− β)Aα
1
1−α
1− φk
cem
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β] −α1−α
. (I.10)
We label these investments the baseline ethical investment profile i(ω)∗k = {h(ω)ek,m(ω)ek}.
Plugging (I.9) and (I.10) into revenue from (I.5) gives equilibrium revenue generated by
an ethical firm as
R(ω)ek = Aα
α
1−α
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β] −α1−α
. (I.11)
Unethical Investments: We now turn to the non-cooperative investment game when
the supplier has chosen the unethical technology. Demand is still given by equation (I.2),
but the difference is that the indicator variable I(ω) may also take the value of zero. This
is the case when the unethical firm does not mimic or if it faces an exogenous boycott in
t3. Mimicking involves setting the same price as the ethical firm. Therefore, the demand
function becomes degenerate. When the unethical firm sets the ethical investment and
price, I(ω) = 1 and it gets full demand with probability 1− γ. As soon as it deviates, we
have I(ω) = 0 and therefore zero demand.
An ethical firm faces a continuous demand function, leading to the continuous best
response functions derived above. Consider the case that an unethical supplier would
prefer mimicking over zero production. This is the only relevant case, as otherwise no
supplier would choose unethical production in the first place. In this case the best response
functions for the unethical firm are symmetric for the headquarter and the supplier and
are given by
h(ω)uk =

h(ω)ek if m(ω)
u
k = m(ω)
e
k
undetermined if m(ω)uk = 0
0 otherwise
m(ω)uk =

m(ω)ek if h(ω)
u
k = h(ω)
e
k
undetermined if h(ω)uk = 0
0 otherwise.
The best response functions are illustrated in Figure I.2. Different to the ethical
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case, they take a value of zero for any investment of the other party deviating from the
baseline ethical investment (indicated by the bold dashed lines). The only point with
positive investments of both parties is when they both set the baseline ethical investment.
While the best response functions are fundamentally different from the ones for the
ethical firm, they share the Nash equilibria at zero-zero and the baseline ethical invest-
ments. In fact, they lead to the same equilibrium of the investment game. To see this,
note that no party would ever find it optimal to choose an investment that is not on its
best response function, as it would be strictly dominated by playing the best response.
This implies that only two investments can occur for each party: zero or the baseline eth-
ical investment. As in the case with ethical production we invoke the Pareto-dominance
criterion so that the equilibrium with positive investment is the one that is played.21
I.2.2.5 t1(a) (Un)ethical Technology Choice
We have seen how the non-cooperative investment decisions are taken for ethical and
unethical firms in period t1(b). Based on this, we can now turn to period t1(a) analyzing
the supplier’s choice between the two technologies. In taking the technology decision, the
supplier faces a trade-off between the cost savings implied by unethical production and
the risk of losing its share of total revenues due to a consumer boycott.
First consider the determinants of the expected revenues of the supplier. A (mimick-
ing) unethical firm still faces a boycott with probability 1− γ so that expected revenues
are given by E[R(ω)uk ] = γR(ω)
e
k. With a fraction 1− φk going to the supplier and given
the equilibrium R(ω)ek in equation (I.11), expected revenues of an unethical supplier are
given by
(1− φk)E [R(ω)uk ] = γ(1− φk)Aα
α
1−α
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β]− α1−α
. (I.12)
The expected difference between ethical and unethical revenues of the supplier is
E[∆RS] = (1− φk) (R(ω)ek − E [R(ω)uk ]) .
21An alternative way to rationalize the equilibrium with positive investments would be to assume that
investments become relationship-specific if and only if both sides make a positive investment. So as soon
as both sides make a positive investment, all the properties of the baseline model apply. But in the
case in which one party makes zero investment, the input remains ‘pure’ and can be resold on the factor
market at zero cost. Intuitively, this technology works like mixing red and white liquid paint. Two parties
non-cooperatively decide the quantity of their type of paint they put into the same bucket. Once mixed,
both inputs cannot be recovered. But in the special case where zero of the red paint is added, the white
paint is not contaminated (not match-specific) and can be resold on the factor market for white paint
(and vice versa).
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This difference is always positive and reflects the fact that ethical firms have higher
revenues in expectation, as they always face full demand. We refer to this difference as the
ethical revenue premium. The supplier trades off its share of this ethical revenue premium
against the cost savings of unethical production. The unit cost savings are determined
by the scaling factor µ = c
u
m
cem
where 1 − µ ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as the unit cost
savings of unethical production which we refer to as the unethical cost advantage. Total
cost savings of unethical production are given by ∆C = (cem − cum)m(ω)ek. With m(ω)ek
given by equation (I.10).
In stage t1, the organizational decision as well as the lump-sum transfer are fixed, as
they are set in t0. The supplier therefore takes the decision on unethical production by
trading off E[∆RS] against ∆C. This decision can be described by a cutoff headquarter
intensity βS above which the supplier chooses the ethical technology and below which it
produces unethically.
Proposition I.1 The headquarter intensity of a sector influences the technology choice of
the supplier. Specifically, the supplier chooses unethical production when the headquarter
intensity β is lower than
βS = 1−
1− γ
α (1− µ)
. (I.13)
The cutoff βS (i) increases in the unethical cost advantage,
∂βS
∂(1−µ) > 0; (ii) decreases
in the probability of a boycott, ∂βS
∂(1−γ) < 0; (iii) and decreases in the mark-up,
∂βS
∂(1/α)
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.1.
Proposition I.1 implies a direct link between headquarter intensity and (un)ethical
production. Firms in sectors with a high supplier (low headquarter) intensity tend to im-
plement the unethical technology, while ethical production is more likely in headquarter-
intensive sectors. The choice between ethical and unethical production is driven by the
trade-off between the supplier’s total cost savings of unethical production and the sup-
plier’s expected loss of final revenue through a potential boycott. First, note that a high
supplier intensity (low β) scales up the supplier’s investment and therefore the potential
cost savings from unethical production. Therefore, the unethical technology tends to be
implemented in the supplier intensive sectors.
A stronger unethical cost advantage (1 − µ) scales up total cost savings and makes
unethical production attractive also for suppliers with lower levels of investments (i.e. in
more headquarter-intensive industries). The supplier trades off this per unit cost saving
against the expected per unit ethical revenue premium, which is determined by 1/α and 1−
γ. The former represents the mark-up a firm charges over its marginal cost, representing
the per unit profit margin. The probability of facing boycott (1 − γ) represents the risk
of loosing these profits when unethical production is chosen.
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Corollary 1 The supplier’s choice between the ethical and unethical technology is in-
dependent of the bargaining power and is therefore not affected by the organization of
production (outsourcing vs. integration).
Proof: Simply note that the organization only affects the bargaining power of the head-
quarter and the supplier. It follows from equation (I.13) that the choice between ethical
and unethical technology is independent of the bargaining power and does therefore not
depend on the organization of production.
The fact that the bargaining power and therefore the organization of production does
not affect the choice between ethical and unethical production has an important implica-
tion in our model. We have seen in Section I.2.1.4 that, by choosing between integration
and outsourcing, the headquarter can affect the bargaining power and thereby the invest-
ments of the two parties. The organization of production therefore provides an instrument
for the headquarter to affect the non-contractible investment choice of the supplier. Corol-
lary 1 implies, however, that this is no instrument the headquarter can use to influence
the technology choice of the supplier: the decision for or against unethical production is
independent of the bargaining power and is therefore also independent of the organization
of production.
The reason for this is that it affects the technology decision through two opposing
effects offsetting each other. On the one hand, a stronger bargaining power increases the
share of total revenue going to the supplier. This increases the losses in case of a boycott
and incentivizes ethical production. On the other hand, by increasing the share of total
revenues, the higher bargaining power also increases the optimal investment level. This
scales up the cost savings of unethical production. The derivation of equation (I.13) in
the Appendix A.1.1 shows that the two effects exactly offset each other.
I.2.2.6 t0: Optimal Organizational Structure and Transfer Payment
Transfer Payment Taking into account incomplete contracts, the investments in the
manufacturing input and the equilibrium outcome of the ex-post bargaining a supplier in
a sector in which β > βS knows its private profits are going to amount to
πek,S = (1− φk)R(ω)ek − cemm(ω)ek (I.14)
if it enters the match with the headquarter which has chosen organizational form k ∈
{O, V }. In the other case, in which a supplier knows it will choose unethical production
and mimicking because β < βS, it expects to earn
E
[
πuk,S
]
= γ (1− φk)R(ω)ek − cumm(ω)ek (I.15)
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in case of a successful match. Because the headquarter faces a large number of po-
tential suppliers competing perfectly for the opportunity to produce the final good with
it, these private profits represent the maximum amount a supplier is willing to pay for
this opportunity. The headquarter knows its own β and has decided the optimal organi-
zational form k ∈ {O, V }. Given this decision and anticipating the technology choice of
the supplier in t1 the headquarter extracts
Tk =
πek,S if β > βSE [πuk,S] if β < βS. (I.16)
Organizational choice At the same time, the headquarter chooses between integration
and outsourcing maximizing the total surplus of the match. Both decisions depend on
the supplier’s anticipated technology choice in stage t1.
As the supplier’s choice of technology does not depend on the bargaining power φk,
the headquarter observes the headquarter intensity of its sector and perfectly foresees
the technology choice of the supplier. Therefore, in the case of β > βS, the headquarter
anticipates ethical production by the supplier. In this case the total surplus of the match
is given by the sum of the two parties’ private profits
Πek = R(ω)
e
k − cemm(ω)ek − chh(ω)ek. (I.17)
If β < βS, the headquarter knows the supplier will choose the unethical technology
and mimic an ethical firm in investments, quantities and prices. The total surplus of the
match is then subject to the uncertainty generated by the threat of a consumer boycott
and is given by
E [Πuk ] = γR(ω)
e
k − cumm(ω)ek − chh(ω)ek. (I.18)
In deciding the organizational form of the firm the headquarter compares the overall
value of the relationship under outsourcing to the overall value under integration taking
the technology choice of the supplier as given. Given ethical production by the supplier,
the ratio of total profits under integration and total profits under outsourcing is given by
Θe(β) =
[(
φV
φO
)β (
1− φV
1− φO
)1−β] α1−α
1− α (1− β) + φV α [1− 2β]
1− α (1− β) + φOα [1− 2β]
.
The cutoff headquarter intensity above which the headquarter offers to the supplier a
contract stipulating integration of the supplier and the transfer payment TV given that it
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produces ethically (β > βS) is implicitly defined by
Θe(βe) = 1. (I.19)
Given unethical production by the supplier, the ratio of total expected profits is given
by
Θu(β) =
[(
φV
φO
)β (
1− φV
1− φO
)1−β] α1−α
γ − α (1− β)µ+ φV α [µ− β (1 + µ)]
γ − α (1− β)µ+ φOα [µ− β (1 + µ)]
.
The cutoff headquarter intensity βu above which the headquarter offers to the supplier
a contract stipulating integration of the supplier and the transfer payment TV given that
it produces unethically (β < βS) is implicitly defined by
Θu(βu) = 1. (I.20)
The expression differs from Θe(βe) in two respects. Because of unethical production
there is now a threat of a boycott and second, the unethical cost advantage is exploited
by the supplier. We summarize our result in the following subsection.
I.2.3 (Un)ethical Production, Factor Intensity and Ownership
Structure
We can now combine the above insights on the implementation of the (un)ethical tech-
nology and the organizational choices of the firm conditional on technology to analyze
the equilibrium of the model. Most notably, we are interested in the question of how the
technology choice of the supplier interacts with the integration decision of the headquarter.
I.2.3.1 The Unethical Outsourcing Incentive
Based on equations (I.19) and (I.20), we can state the following proposition:
Proposition I.2 There exists a unique βe below which the headquarter chooses outsourc-
ing irrespective of the technology choice of the supplier. Integration is always chosen for
headquarter intensities above βu and it always holds that βe < βu. A sufficient condi-
tion for a unique interior solution βu ∈ (βe, 1) to exist is given by γ > 4φV3+φV . For any
β ∈ (βe, βu) the headquarter chooses integration if and only if the supplier produces ethi-
cally and chooses outsourcing if and only if unethical production is anticipated.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.2.
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The parameter condition γ > 4φV
3+φV
is sufficient to ensure that βu < 1 implying that
both outsourcing and integration are chosen for some levels of headquarter intensity.
Since we are interested in the interaction of unethical production with the organization of
production, we focus on the cases in which both types of organizational form can emerge.
However, βe < βu regardless of whether the above condition holds.
Figure I.3: Unethical Production and the Two Integration Cutoffs.
0 1 
outsourcing if unethical 
outsourcing if ethical 
integration if unethical 
integration if ethical 
βe βu 
Figure I.3 highlights the pattern described in Proposition I.2. The axis shows the range
of admissible headquarter intensities implying high supplier intensity on the left and high
headquarter intensity on the right. The cutoff βe is identical to the cutoff in Antràs (2003).
It reflects the fact that the headquarter faces two underinvestment problems in period t1
(the headquarter’s and the supplier’s). The organization of production is an instrument
to alleviate the underinvestment of either the headquarter (through integration) or the
supplier (through outsourcing). The mechanism is that integration and outsourcing imply
different residual rights of control for the headquarter and the supplier. This changes the
bargaining power and thereby the share of total revenue each party obtains. As a larger
share of revenue increases the optimal investment, integration alleviates the headquarter’s
underinvestment while outsourcing alleviates the supplier’s underinvestment. We refer to
this pattern as the Antràs implication.
When the supplier chooses unethical production, the attractiveness of outsourcing in-
creases above and beyond the Antràs implication: unethical production reduces the unit
costs of the manufacturing input so that the difference between the actual and the opti-
mal investment increases. This aggravates the underinvestment problem of the supplier
compared to the case of ethical production with the same headquarter intensity. The
headquarter responds to this by expanding the use of the now cheaper manufacturing
input as much as possible. It can achieve this by shifting the residual rights of control to
the supplier through outsourcing to incentivize a larger ex-ante investment. We call this
the unethical outsourcing incentive. It is captured by the cutoff βu. The fact that βe < βu
shows that outsourcing is chosen by the headquarter for a larger range of headquarter
intensities if the supplier produces unethically. In particular, the unethical outsourcing
incentive distorts the Antràs implication towards outsourcing so that the headquarter
chooses outsourcing solely because of unethical production for β ∈ (βe, βu). This implies
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that the supplier’s technology choice can affect the organizational choice of the headquar-
ter. Specifically, the headquarter tends to keep unethical suppliers at arm’s length.
I.2.3.2 Ethical Integration and Unethical Outsourcing?
The equilibrium pattern of (un)ethical production and the organization of production
depends on how the cutoffs βS, βe and βu relate to one another. The following proposition
summarizes the relevant cases to be distinguished.
Proposition I.3 There exist three possible equilibria of the model characterized by βe <
βS < βu (Case 1); βe < βu < βS (Case 2) and βS < βe < βu (Case 3). Unethical
outsourcing and ethical integration are equilibrium outcomes in all three cases. Unethical
integration and ethical outsourcing can occur in equilibrium in Cases 2 and 3, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.3.
Proposition I.3 implies that unethical production and outsourcing are associated in
our model as are ethical production and integration. The reason is that the per unit
cost savings of unethical production are scaled by the size of the supplier’s investment,
which is larger in sectors with high supplier intensity (lower headquarter intensity) of
production. At the same time, the Antràs mechanism implies that sectors with a high
supplier intensity optimally shift bargaining power to the supplier through outsourcing to
mitigate the underinvestment problem where it is most severe. Taken together, sectors
with high supplier intensities tend to implement outsourcing and unethical production,
while sectors with a high headquarter intensity tend to feature ethical production and
integration.
This is illustrated in Figure I.4. In Case 1, βS is in between βe and βu. In this
case the cutoff splitting sectors into ethical and unethical ones also splits the sectors
into integrating and outsourcing ones. Cases 2 and 3 illustrate what happens if the
attractiveness of unethical production is very strong or very weak (e.g. because of the
cost advantage of unethical production analyzed in detail below). In Case 2, unethical
production is so attractive that the headquarter decides to integrate despite the use of
the unethical technology by the supplier. In Case 3, ethical outsourcing occurs for a
range of headquarter intensities. This illustrates that there is no mechanical link between
outsourcing and unethical production in our model. Both unethical integration and ethical
outsourcing can be equilibrium outcomes.
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Figure I.4: Interaction of Unethical Production and the Outsourcing Decision.
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I.2.3.3 Incentives for (Un)ethical Production and the Organization of the
Firm
We are ultimately interested in the question if and how the (un)ethical technology choice
of the supplier interacts with the organization of production. To address this question,
we define β̄ as the headquarter intensity above which integration actually takes place.
This cutoff is given by β̄ = βS in Case 1; β̄ = βu in Case 2; and β̄ = βe in Case 3. With
βe < βu, we can write the integration cutoff as:
β̄ =
min{βS; βu} if βS > βeβe otherwise. (I.21)
Proposition I.4 The outsourcing cutoff is weakly increasing in the unethical cost advan-
tage, i.e. ∂β̄
∂(1−µ) ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.4.
We can see from Proposition I.4 that the outsourcing cutoff is weakly increasing in
the unethical cost advantage given by 1− µ. An increase in the unethical cost advantage
increases both βS and βu and when unethical production surpasses a minimum level of
attractiveness for the supplier (βe < βS), this unambiguously increases the integration
cutoff β̄. This implies that besides the variables that affect βe that have already been
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accounted for in the literature, our model identifies the unethical cost advantage as a new
parameter that affects the integration decision of the firm. We will exploit this implication
in our empirical analysis in Section I.4.
The intuition behind the above result is as follows. Case 3 represents the case where
unethical production is very unattractive. In this case a marginal change in 1 − µ does
not affect outsourcing. Consider the case where there is no unethical cost advantage at
all (1 − µ = 0). In this case unethical production is never optimal for the supplier and
outsourcing is determined by the Antràs mechanism only. When we increase 1 − µ, the
least headquarter-intensive industries start to use the unethical technology, but they are
under the outsourcing regime anyway, so that the unethical outsourcing incentive does
not alter the policy of the headquarter.
Once 1 − µ is large enough to have βe < βS the picture changes. In this case the
unethical outsourcing incentive makes firms opt for outsourcing that would otherwise
choose integration. As both βS and βu increase in 1−µ, outsourcing increases in 1−µ both
in Case 1 and Case 2. The cutoff βS represents the incentives for unethical production for
the supplier while βu reflects the optimal response to it by the headquarter. As a stronger
cost advantage makes unethical production more attractive, βS increases in 1− µ.
For βu, note that when the headquarter anticipates unethical production, the damage
is done (in expectation) on the demand side: a boycott occurs and reduces demand to zero
with probability 1− γ. As the headquarter can influence neither the technology decision
nor the effect of a boycott, it takes these as given and has an incentive to maximize the
benefits of unethical production by increasing the supplier’s manufacturing investment
through outsourcing. This is the unethical outsourcing incentive discussed above. A
higher cost advantage of unethical production therefore increases the range of headquarter
intensities for which outsourcing is chosen by the headquarter, i.e. βu increases.
I.2.3.4 Headquarter’s Perspective on Ethical Production: Aspirations and
Reality
Before we proceed to analyzing the microfoundation of the link between the boycott and
prices, output and investments and before we present empirical test of Proposition I.4 in
the following sections, we now highlight an interesting tension that can arise between the
headquarter’s aspirations and actions regarding (un)ethical production. Consider a head-
quarter that states that it would like to source its products ethically but then incentivizes
its suppliers to expand unethical production. An external observer may interpret this as
evidence of a dishonest attempt of greenwashing or - simply put - a lie by the firm. Our
model, however, implies that this combination of actually wishing to source ethically but
expanding unethical production can be an equilibrium outcome.
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For this situation to occur two conditions have to be met. First, we need to be in a
situation where the headquarter chooses outsourcing if and only if unethical production is
anticipated, i.e. β ∈ (βe, βu) (condition 1). We have seen in the discussion of Proposition
I.2 that in this range the only reason to opt for outsourcing rather than integration is to
expand unethical production to fully benefit from the unethical cost advantage. Second,
within this range there must be a non-empty set of headquarter intensities for which
the headquarter would impose ethical production if it could (while the supplier would
not chose it on its own). As the headquarter can extract the full expected profits of the
match, it seeks to maximize joint profits (while the supplier trades off the cost savings only
against its own fraction of the expected revenues). Define the technology cutoffs βH,k with
k ∈ {V,O} as the cutoff headquarter intensities above which joint profits are maximized
by ethical production. The supplier only chooses ethical production for β > βS. We will
see below that βH,V < βH,O < βS. Then, the second condition is given by β ∈ (βH,O, βS)
(condition 2): in this range the headquarter would like the supplier to produce ethically
(and would then like to choose integration as long as condition 1 is satisfied). But the
supplier will implement the unethical technology. Under condition 1 this implies that
outsourcing is chosen by the headquarter in order to incentivize the supplier to expand
unethical production. Therefore, if there is a non-empty set of headquarter intensities
that simultaneously satisfy conditions 1 and 2, the described tension between aspirations
and reality is a possible equilibrium outcome. The following proposition establishes that
this is the case.
Proposition I.5 The technology cutoffs maximizing joint profits satisfy βH,V < βH,O <
βS. There is a non-empty set of headquarter intensities that satisfy β ∈ (βH,O, βS) ∧ β ∈
(βe, βu). That is, the headquarter would oblige the supplier to produce ethically if it could,
but, as it cannot, chooses outsourcing in order to expand unethical production.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.5.
I.3 Firm Choices and Boycotts: a Microfoundation
with Private Information
In the baseline model we made two simplifying assumptions concerning the link between
unethical production and the occurrence of boycotts. First, unethical firms that mimic
ethical firms (i.e. choose the same level of investment, quantities and prices) face a
boycott with an exogenous probability of 1 − γ. Second, unethical firms who deviate
from mimicking face a boycott with certainty. This allowed us to focus our analysis on
the predictions for the international organization of production. In this section we show
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that these assumptions can be microfounded. We present an extension of the model that
features private information on technology and an advocacy NGO investigating firms.
We will take a clear stand on how consumer boycotts emerge, how unethical production
affects the risk of facing a boycott as well as the resulting investment and pricing decisions
(mimicking) as equilibrium outcomes. We show that the qualitative results of the baseline
model and the empirical prediction we derive from it continue to hold in this microfounded
extension of the model.
The underlying intuition is that maintaining at least some degree of uncertainty about
the technology used may reduce the probability of facing a consumer boycott. And indeed,
acquisition of verifiable information on pollution and working conditions and the link to
final consumer brands is a costly and possibly dangerous (and illegal) activity in many
countries. One example is the Detox campaign by Greenpeace addressing, among other
things, the toxic water pollution of the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas (Greenpeace,
2011) and the Qiantang River (Greenpeace, 2012) in China by local textile and apparel
producers. According to Greenpeace, a year-long investigation into production practices
and buyer-seller linkages preceded its campaign to push a large number of top labels in
the apparel industry to ‘detox’ their supply chain. Another well-mediatized example of
the dangers of investigating working conditions in countries like China is the case of a
labor activist being arrested for trying to document poor working conditions in a factory
producing shoes for Ivanka Trump’s brand in southern China (New York Times, 2017).
We argue that this strong preference for discretion regarding pollution and working
conditions, backed even by the governments in key countries like China, is an important
feature worth modeling explicitly. Our microfoundation therefore grounds on the technol-
ogy implemented by the supplier being private information of the firm and being costly
to verify by a third party.
I.3.1 Private Information
Private information about the type of technology implies that the technology cannot be
directly observed from outside the match (while the headquarter and the supplier observe
it). Other variables like organization of production, investments, output and prices are
observable.
In the baseline model, either all firms in a sector choose the ethical technology or all
choose the unethical technology. This is a very stylized pattern that directly stems from
the fact that all firms in a sector are identical. In a sector in which all firms implement
the unethical technology, mimicking would not make sense, as there are no ethical firms
to mimic. We therefore assume that only a fraction κ of suppliers in each sector is able
to use the unethical technology. Because of this, in equilibrium there will be at least a
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fraction 1− κ of firms that produce ethically.
In period zero, when the headquarter offers the transfer payment to the supplier
and decides the organizational form of the firm, neither party knows whether unethical
production will be possible. This is only revealed at the next stage just before investment
decisions are taken and the (un)ethical technology choice is made.22 This assumption
implies that the organizational choice of the firm does not contain information on the
type of the firm: when it is taken, the headquarter does not know whether the unethical
technology will be available in period t1(a).
I.3.2 NGO and Consumer Boycotts
In contrast to the baseline model, we now have to be more specific about how a consumer
boycott emerges. We assume that there is an NGO that is able to organize such boycotts.
As the focus of this paper remains the international organization of production, we keep
the modeling of the NGO relatively stylized.23
The objective of the NGO is simply to start boycotts against as many unethical firms
as possible. The NGO can trigger a consumer boycott if it can provide sufficient proof
that a supplier has implemented an unethical technology. For simplicity, we assume that
triggering the boycott is costless for the NGO, while proving the use of the unethical
technology is (potentially) costly. The NGO is sophisticated enough to determine the
optimal choices of an ethical firm in a given sector. It then potentially faces two types of
firms. First, firms that are openly unethical and deviate from these choices. In this case
identifying the firm as unethical is costless for the NGO.24 Second, a group of seemingly
ethical firms that are all identical in terms of observables, but which contains ethical and
(mimicking) unethical firms. In this case the NGO has to incur a cost to identify the type
of the firm and to collect sufficient proof to build a campaign upon.
As investigations are costly, the fraction of firms the NGO can monitor (1−γ) depends
on the funds it can raise F . To organize ideas, we assume that this relation is determined
by 1−γ = Ψ(F ), where Ψ(F ) is strictly increasing in F . Also here, we keep the modeling
very stylized and simply take the funds F as exogenous.25
22One way to think about this is as follows. Ex-ante the supplier knows that there is some probability
κ that it can e.g. bribe government officials to turn a blind eye on toxic waste disposal into a river or on
the violation of work safety standards. If this is actually possible in the individual case, only turns out
after the match is formed and some investments are made.
23Different to e.g. Krautheim and Verdier (2016) or Aldashev and Verdier (2009) we do not intend to
contribute to a better understanding of the endogenous emergence of NGOs, interactions with donors,
the trade-offs shaping the fundraising process or the optimal allocation of funds across firms or sectors.
24We will see below that this is not an assumption but an outcome of the microfoundation.
25It would be conceptually straightforward to design a model of fundraising, where an endogenous
fundraising-effort of the NGO determines F taking into account different elements of the model that
affect e.g. the donors’ willingness to donate. As outlined in Footnote 23 this is beyond the scope of this
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These are the extensions and refinements we make in order to microfound the occur-
rence of consumer boycotts. All other events in the different periods are just like in the
baseline model. Transfer payment and organizational choice take place in t0. In t1(a), the
supplier first observes whether it can use the unethical technology and then chooses its
preferred one. Both supplier and headquarter then set investments non-cooperatively to
maximize their respective profits in t1(b). In t2, intermediates are produced and create the
hold-up problem. In t3, nature decides which of the firms that are not openly unethical
are undergoing a costly investigation by the NGO. The NGO spends all its resources and
monitors a fraction 1 − γ of firms and starts a boycott against all firms it finds to be
unethical. Supplier and headquarter renegotiate the distribution of revenue in period t4
and in t5, final goods are produced, sold, and the resulting revenue is distributed to both
parties according to the rule established in the bargaining at t4. We will next discuss the
informational content of the firms’ choices as well as belief formation of the NGO.
I.3.3 Setting a ‘Signal’ Non-Cooperatively?
There are three variables that are observable to the NGO and that potentially contain
information on the type of technology implemented. Investments, the quantity produced,
and the prices set. The organization of production (outsourcing vs. integration) is decided
upon in period zero, which is before nature decides whether the unethical technology is
available to the supplier. We argued in Footnote 17 that the produced quantity and the
price directly follow from the investment decisions. This implies that the investment stage
is decisive for the signaling considerations.
When the investment and pricing decisions of the firm are interpreted by the NGO
as containing information on the implemented technology, there is room for strategic
signaling when setting investments and prices. This would place us in the context of a
signaling game similar to the one in Krautheim and Verdier (2016). The core idea of the
signaling literature in economics (Spence 1973, 1974) is that an agent of a ‘high’ type may
deviate from an otherwise optimal action for the sole purpose to differentiate itself from a
‘low’ type which would otherwise pool with the ‘high’ type in terms of observables. This
requires that all parties understand that an action is taken on purpose in order to signal
one’s type.
The obvious difference to our setting is that investments - the decision that contains
information about the type of the firm - are set non-cooperatively. So there is not one
agent rationally choosing an investment in order to signal its type: headquarter and
supplier cannot coordinate to choose the profit maximizing investment, neither can they
paper. Plausible and empirically relevant relations between variables in our model and F are discussed
in Subsection I.4.3 in the empirical part of the paper.
CHAPTER I. REGULATORY VOID 44
coordinate on an investment in order to signal their type. This implies that we are not
in the context of a signaling game.
While investments cannot be set in a strategic attempt to signal the type of the firm,
they are still interpreted by the NGO as potentially containing information on the firm
type. In the case of an unethical firm this means that the ‘wrong’ investment choices can
trigger an investigation by the NGO and lead to a boycott. We will see below that this
changes the best response function of headquarter and supplier in the non-cooperative
investment game.
I.3.4 NGO Beliefs and Investigations
The only difference between firms in a sector is whether they have the option to implement
the unethical technology. The ex-ante probability that a given supplier has this option
is given by κ. Here, we are interested in the question what optimal choices of an ethical
and unethical firm are conditioning on their type θ ∈ {e, u}. Whether the firms with an
option to produce unethically actually decide to do so, is determined at an earlier stage.
When unethical production is profitable in expectation, the NGO knows that a fraction
κ of firms are unethical. The non-cooperative investment game results for each firm in
an observable investment profile i(θ) = {h(θ),m(θ)} with h(θ) ≥ 0 and m(θ) ≥ 0.26 In
period t3 the NGO picks an action si ∈ {0, 1} which is to initiate an investigation on firms
with investment profile i.
The NGO has a belief function η(θ | i). Conditional on observing some investment
profile i, it assigns a probability of η(θ | i) to the firm being of type θ. If η(θ = u | i) = 1,
the NGO immediately starts an investigation.
Proposition I.6 In the extended model, (i) ethical firms are indifferent to NGO inves-
tigations and therefore set their investments independently of NGO beliefs; (ii) unethical
firms face an NGO investigation with certainty unless they mimic (i.e., set the same in-
vestment as) ethical firms. If unethical firms mimic ethical firms, their probability of being
investigated is reduced to 1− γ < 1.
Proof: In the text.
The expectations of the NGO follow Bayes’ Law implying the following belief function
η(θ = e | i) = Pr(i | θ = e) Pr(θ = e)
Pr(i | θ = e) Pr(θ = e) + Pr(i | θ = u) Pr(θ = u)
. (I.22)
26For ease of exposition we suppress the organizational subscript k and the variety index ω where
possible. It is well understood that the strategies are chosen and decision are made conditional on
outsourcing or vertical integration chosen by the headquarter at an earlier point in the game.
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Note that ethical firms are indifferent to being investigated: they always get full
demand in period t5, as they never face a boycott. Denote by ĩ the investment profile
of an ethical firm resulting from the non-cooperative investment game. An ethical firm
would never adjust ĩ to accord with an arbitrary belief of the NGO, as this only affects
the probability of being investigated, which has no effect on the firm.
We therefore have Pr(̃i | θ = e) = 1 and Pr(̄i | θ = e) = 0 for any ī 6= ĩ.27 Therefore, ĩ
is the only investment profile for which the NGO assigns a positive probability to ethical
production: η(θ = e | ĩ) > 0 and η(θ = e | ī) = 0 for any ī 6= ĩ. Any other investment
profile triggers an immediate investigation by the NGO.
The NGO can compute if in a given sector firms have an incentive to be unethical.
When unethical firms in that sector pool with ethical firms by setting ĩ, they form a
group of seemingly ethical firms for which investigation is costly for the NGO. As in this
case η(θ = e | ĩ) < 1, the NGO trivially maximizes its objective of starting a boycott
against the largest possible number of unethical firms by spending its whole budget on
investigations of firms in the seemingly ethical group (and then start costless boycotts
against all identified unethical firms).28
I.3.5 Non-Cooperative Investments with Degenerate Demand
We have seen above that unethical firms can only generate positive demand (in expecta-
tion) by investing ĩ. For this investment the firm faces full demand if it arrives at stage
t5 without a boycott.
27In a signaling setup, one would have to further investigate the question if ethical firms would want
to deviate from ĩ, choosing an investment profile that is unprofitable to mimic for unethical firms. As
outlined above, in our model investments are not contractible and are set non-cooperatively. Therefore,
investments cannot be used to signal the type of the firm to the NGO.
28 One may think that the fact that the NGO interprets the investment levels as containing information
of the type of the firm can only work in a context of homogeneous firms. And indeed, when firms differ
in productivity (and if this productivity is private information to the firm) different investment levels
would be in line with ethical production. One could probably construct a complicated argument on
how the NGO forms expectations on the probability of unethical production conditional on observing the
investment level and accounting for the underlying productivity distribution. The NGO may then assign a
higher probability to controlling firms with ‘unlikely’ investment levels. There is, however, a very simple
alternative way to include firm heterogeneity into the model without raising such concerns. Already
Melitz (2003) highlights that heterogeneity in technology (differences in productivity) or in preferences
(differences in quality) are isomorphic in his model. For the latter case, it is quite obvious that being
part of the utility function of the consumer, quality can hardly be private information of the firm. So
conditional on the - observable - quality, the ethical investment level can again be computed. Therefore,
an extension of the model to a setting with heterogeneous firms would not be inconsistent with our
microfoundation. As argued in Footnote 12 in the introduction, we doubt that the additional insights of
such an extension would outweigh the likely costs in terms of tractability.
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Lemma I.1 The equilibrium investment profile ĩ of an ethical firm is characterized by
the same expressions, i.e. equations (I.9) and (I.10), as the equilibrium profile i∗ in the
baseline model.
Proof: This directly follows from the fact that the optimal choices of the headquarter
and the supplier in a match that only has the ethical technology available (or in a sector
where all firms endogenously choose ethical production), is unaffected by any element of
the microfoundation.
It remains to be shown that ĩ = i∗ is the equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative
investment game also for an unethical firm. Clearly, it is a Nash equilibrium of the
investment game if it yields positive profits in expectation, as any deviation from it would
lead to zero demand. As in the Antràs (2003) model, zero-zero is a Nash equilibrium that
is ruled out by the Pareto dominance assumption.
Consider the case of an unethical firm (i.e. the decision to use the unethical technology
has already been taken). The right-hand side graph in Figure I.2 illustrates the best
responses of the investment game in this case. The best response to any investment level
other than i∗k = {hek,mek}, with k ∈ {V,O} is zero for both parties, as any deviation from
i∗k leads to an investigation by the NGO resulting in a boycott with zero demand. No
party would ever find it optimal to choose an investment that is not on its best response
function, as it would be strictly dominated by playing the best response. We can therefore
state the following proposition.
Proposition I.7 In the extended model, unethical firms mimic ethical firms, i.e. the
equilibrium investment profile of an unethical firm is identical to the equilibrium invest-
ment profile of an ethical firm.
Proof: In the text.
Using the results of this section, we show in Appendix A.1.7 that the microfounded
version of our model produces the same qualitative results as the baseline model. Expres-
sions only differ as they now also contain the fraction 1− κ of firms that cannot use the
unethical technology, which we introduced for consistency in the microfoundation.
I.4 Implementation of the Empirical Test
The key prediction of our model is the unethical outsourcing incentive. It implies that
the possibility of reducing costs by implementing an unethical technology does affect the
international organization of production. Specifically, we should observe more outsourcing
in sectors that are more prone to produce unethically. Unethical production is hard to
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measure in the data. We therefore use our model to shift the analysis to the level of the
incentive for unethical production. Equation (I.13) implies that the decision to implement
the unethical technology depends on the unethical cost advantage (1−µ) and the ethical
revenue premium which is determined by the mark-up (1/α) and the probability of facing
a boycott (1 − γ). We show in Appendix A.1.6 that 1/α and 1 − γ have ambiguous
effects on the outsourcing decision in our model. Proposition I.4, however, implies a clear
prediction for the effect of 1−µ: an increase in the cost advantage of unethical production
leads to an increase in β̄. Our model therefore implies that a strong cost advantage of
unethical production in an industry increases the prevalence of international outsourcing
relative to vertical integration. We now test this prediction.
I.4.1 Intrafirm Import Share
We follow the established empirical literature and take Nunn and Trefler (2013), Antràs
and Chor (2013) and Antràs and Yeaple (2014) as our main references. We use U.S.
Census Bureau data on intrafirm trade for the years 2007 to 2014.29 We employ the
standard measure of vertical integration at the industry level: the share of U.S. intrafirm
imports in total U.S. imports. Data on intrafirm trade at a detailed country-industry level
come from the Related Party Trade Database administered by the U.S. Census Bureau.30
We use information on U.S. imports in manufacturing from all over the world at the
NAICS 6-digit level for the years 2007 to 2014. We convert the data to IO2007 industries
from the BEA’s input-output tables.
Crucially, the trade flows are distinguished by the relationship between the entities
who trade them. A trade flow is marked as taking place between two related parties
when the importer holds at least a 6% equity stake in the exporter and as unrelated trade
otherwise. We construct our dependent variable, the intrafirm import share, as the value of
related party imports over the sum of the value of related and unrelated party imports for
each IO2007 industry-country-year.31 Our regression sample includes 231 manufacturing
industries in the least data-demanding specification. In our main specifications, we cover
around 215 industries.
29One reason for using industry-level data is that the very few firm-level datasets that contain in-
formation on organizational decisions are not publicly available. Several authors have used such data,
including Tomiura (2007), Corcos, Irac, Mion, and Verdier (2013), Defever and Toubal (2013), Kohler
and Smolka (2014) and Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger, and Newman (2016). Second, we need information on
the incentives to produce unethically, which, to our knowledge, are not available in these data.
30The data are available online from http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty/.
31A third category, unreported trade, captures import flows that are not marked as either type of
trade. The share of unreported trade flows in total imports is usually negligible. Antràs and Chor (2013)
provide a more detailed discussion of the distribution of unreported trade across industries and source
countries.
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I.4.2 The Unethical Environmental Cost Advantage
The key parameter in our model is the unethical cost advantage 1 − µ. µ measures the
ratio of unethical to ethical marginal cost of the manufacturing input in the model, and
we stress that the input m in the model stands for everything the supplier contributes
to the production process. The marginal cost cm therefore captures not only payments
to workers, but also other expenditures by the supplier, such as provisions for workplace
safety and the cost of compliance with local environmental regulation. For reasons of data
availability, we focus our analysis on the environmental incentives of unethical production.
I.4.2.1 The Industry Dimension
An industry producing large volumes of toxic waste as well as carbon dioxide emissions and
which is intensive in the use of natural resources arguably benefits more from unethical
production. To measure this environmental unethical cost savings potential of an industry
we draw on data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) provided by the U.S.
Census Bureau. Starting from 2007, the survey records the industry-level expenditure on
water, sewer, and refuse removal, as well as other non-electric utility payments including
the cost of hazardous waste removal. We use this expenditure category as a proxy for
the money amount an industry would save if production took place in an unregulated
environment.
One advantage of this measure is that, according to the survey manual, it excludes
payments for machinery, equipment, and electric utility.32 This makes us confident that we
capture only those costs that are directly related to the removal of hazardous materials
and other waste and that more capital-intensive industries are not mechanically more
intensive in waste removal costs.33
We construct our variable of an industry’s environmental cost savings potential (ECSP)
as the log of an industry’s expenditure on waste removal relative to its payroll, total cost,
or total sales, respectively. We will explain in Section I.4.4 why the normalization by total
costs and total sales are our preferred specifications. We provide the results for normal-
ization with payroll for direct comparison to the literature and show that our results are
32The survey manual contains detailed instructions about the forms to be filled out
by sampled establishments. The manual for the survey year 2015 is available from
https://bhs.econ.census.gov/bhs/cosasm/ASMInstructions.pdf. The instruction pertaining to our vari-
able can be found on p.17 of that manual.
33Another advantage is that it appears plausible to consider expenditure on waste removal a lower
bound for the unethical environmental cost advantage of an industry for two reasons. First, because
our measure excludes salaries of employees whose work includes waste removal or treatment. Second,
because we are using data from a technologically advanced country, it is likely that the implemented
technology in the US is less environmentally intensive than in most other countries. It is therefore likely
that production in many other countries takes place with more environmentally intensive technologies
implying that the true potential cost savings are likely to be higher than measured by our variable.
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not driven by the change in normalization.
In Figure I.5 we provide evidence of the variation in our proxy in a histogram of the
ECSP calculated as spending on waste removal relative to industry payroll (left panel)
and a proxy of total cost of the industry (right panel) across industries and years.34 The
distribution is very right-skewed in both cases and in the bulk of industries spending on
hazardous waste removal makes up between 0% and 10% of payroll or between 0% and
1% of total cost.35
I.4.2.2 The Country Dimension
The extent to which the potential cost savings translate into actual savings depends
crucially on the strictness of regulation in the source country. Only if regulation there is
more lenient than in the U.S., can (some of) the potential cost savings be realized.
To measure the country dimension of the unethical environmental cost advantage,
we employ the Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPSI) computed by the OECD
for 26 member countries (excluding the U.S.) and the six non-member countries Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa for the years 2007 to 2012. The index
combines information on 14 environmental policy instruments that are mainly related to
air and climate pollution and is suitable for comparisons across countries. According to
the OECD’s definition, a policy is more stringent if it puts a higher explicit or implicit
price on pollution or environmentally harmful behavior. An index value of 0 is the lowest
stringency possible, while an index value of 6 denotes the highest stringency. The maxi-
mum value the index attains in our sample is 4.41 for Denmark in 2009. The lowest value
is .375 for Brazil in 2011.
I.4.3 Control Variables
In addition, we use various control variables that have been identified in the literature as
determinants of intrafirm trade or have been used for robustness checks therein (see Nunn
and Trefler, 2013, Antràs and Chor, 2013 and Antràs and Yeaple, 2014). In particular,
we control for the logs of capital intensity, R&D intensity and high-skill intensity. We
take the data on physical capital expenditure and the share of non-production worker
wages from the ASM. R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditure relative to sales and
is calculated from Compustat data on U.S. firms. In addition, we control for material
intensity (normalized expenditure on materials, from ASM). We follow the literature and
34The construction of the proxy for total cost is described in Section I.4.6.2.
35In Appendix A.2.2 we document that our measures generate rankings of industries that are arguably
in line with common preconceptions about environmentally ‘dirty’ industries.
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Figure I.5: Variation in Environmental Cost Savings Potential.
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disaggregate capital into its components, which arguably differ in relationship-specificity,
to obtain a cleaner proxy for headquarter intensity.
As outlined in the beginning of this section, our model does not provide unambiguous
predictions for the probability of facing a boycott 1−γ and the mark-up 1/α in the context
of this analysis. We therefore control for the two without interpreting the coefficients.
Concerning 1− γ, we link the probability of facing a boycott to the support the NGO
gets from donors in Section I.3.36 NGOs tend to choose targets that are well-known to
consumers/donors. It is plausible and in line with theoretical modelling (e.g. Eesley and
Lenox, 2011) as well as empirical evidence (e.g. King, 2008, and Hatte and Koenig, 2018)
that NGOs therefore tend to select large firms and those with a high brand valuation.
These variables should therefore correlate with the probability of facing a boycott. This
leads us to include the within-industry size dispersion measure from Nunn and Trefler
(2008) as a proxy for average firm size in a sector. We also include the estimates of the
elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006) to control for the feature of
brand valuation that it makes varieties less substitutable. Concerning 1/α, the mark-up
is directly linked to the elasticity of substitution, which is given by 1/(1−α) in our model.
By controlling for the elasticity of substitution, this effect (that also relates to the aspect
of brand valuation from above) is also accounted for in the estimates.37
36In a model focusing on the NGO-firm-donor-consumer interaction, this could also include support
from consumers in terms of willingness to boycott or to protest.
37Further details on the sources of these variables and their construction are delegated to Appendix
A.2.2.
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I.4.4 Intensities
We normalize our explanatory variables by industry payroll to make them consistent with
the construction of the proxies for headquarter intensity in the literature.38 Regressions
using this definition will provide an easy point of reference to compare our results with
those from the preceding literature.
In our preferred specifications, however, we construct all intensities (except for R&D)
as the log of the respective expenditure relative to total industry cost. We assess the ro-
bustness of our results by normalizing with total sales as well. While total industry sales
can be taken directly from the data, we must construct a proxy for total cost, for which
we sum payroll, cost of materials, total capital expenditure, total rental payments and
an aggregate term for all other expenditures from the ASM. We prefer these definitions
because we believe they capture more directly the relative importance of a particular type
of cost for the overall production process. As explained in Section I.2.1.2, we interpret
the factors of production in the model as aggregate inputs each party brings into the pro-
duction relationship. Different types of costs play more or less significant roles in these
aggregates. For example, firms typically spend on R&D, invest in physical capital and
hire labor at the same time. They also incur other types of costs, including expenditure
on the removal of (hazardous) waste or investments in workplace safety or costs of ac-
quiring inputs and intermediate products. Some of these costs tend to be incurred by the
headquarter, others by a supplier (integrated or independent). In our view, all these dif-
ferent types of costs should be accounted for when factor intensities are computed as the
question we seek to address is: Do industries outsource more in low regulation countries,
when they can potentially save a larger fraction of total cost by producing unethically?
An additional argument for using broader measures of factor intensities is the fact
that the share of capital expenditure in total cost and the share of the wage bill (payroll)
in total cost are significantly correlated with a positive coefficient of 0.1345 in our data.39
This casts some doubt on the consistency of computing capital intensity - the key variable
in the existing literature - by normalizing by payroll in our sample.
38An exception is R&D intensity, which is normalized by total sales in the literature, which we also
follow for comparability.
39The correlation coefficient is 0.1687 when using total sales in the denominator. This correlation is
puzzling when one has a Cobb-Douglas production function in mind with labor and capital as inputs.
In the data, a very large portion of an industry’s expenditure is allocated to intermediate inputs. When
we correlate the sum of payroll and material input expenditure relative to total cost with the share of
capital expenditure in total cost, the correlation coefficient is highly significant at −0.5677.
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I.4.5 Empirical Specification
We estimate variants of the following regression equation.
intrafirmijt = η0 + η1 ECSPjt + η2 (ECSPjt × EPSIit) + ρXjt + ζit + εijt. (I.23)
intrafirmijt is the share of related party imports in total imports by the U.S. from country
i in industry j in year t. ECSPjt is our proxy for the part of the unethical environmental
cost advantage varying across industries j and over time t. EPSIit proxies for the part
of the unethical environmental cost advantage that varies across source countries i and
time t. Xjt contains the established determinants of intrafirm trade and the other control
variables mentioned above. ζit is a set of country-year fixed effects to control for everything
that is specific to a country in a given year. The fixed effects therefore control for the
level effect of the EPSIit. They also control for the endogenous choice of a sourcing
location to the extent that this is driven by country- or country-year-specific factors, such
as geography, corporate tax rates or cultural linkages. We want to take out this variation
to be able to make statements about the tendency to outsource production conditional
on the chosen source country. In all our regressions, we cluster standard errors at the
IO2007-industry level as this is the level of variation of our main explanatory variables
and industry characteristics are highly auto-correlated over time.
Our data on intrafirm imports cover 230 countries and territories. But our measure of
the level of regulation, EPSI, is limited to 26 OECD countries (excluding the U.S.) plus
the six non-member countries listed above. We therefore run the specification in equation
(I.23) in two versions.
In the first specification we only include ECSPjt but not the interaction effect. This
allows us to make use of the full sample. In this case the prediction of the model holds un-
der the premise that most of the 230 countries and territories have more lenient regulation
and enforcement (capacity) than the U.S. Within the set of countries for which EPSI data
are available the U.S. takes a middle position. Arguably, many, if not most, of the 198
countries and territories for which EPSI is not available (the remaining non-OECD coun-
tries plus OECD members Chile, Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico,
and New Zealand) should indeed be expected to have more lenient regulation and en-
forcement (capacity) than the U.S. The presence of some countries with similar or higher
levels of regulation should bias the results against our hypothesis, so it is save to keep
them in the sample.40 We therefore expect η1 < 0: industries with a higher potential cost
advantage should have a lower share of intrafirm trade.
40We have experimented with leaving out countries with a stricter EPSI value than the US based
on the OECD data. As expected, this changes significance levels and coefficient mildly in favor of our
hypothesis.
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In the second specification, we add the interaction of the cost savings potential ECSPjt
and EPSIit, the OECD Environmental Stringency Index. Due to the limited coverage
of the EPSIit we have a strongly reduced sample size in this specification. On the other
hand, the interaction effect allows for more flexibility to analyze the differential impact
a given level of ECSPjt has across varying regulatory environments. The tendency to
outsource production in industries with a given ECSPjt should be stronger when the
goods are sourced from countries with more lenient environmental policies. In the second
specification, we therefore expect η2 > 0 and continue to expect η1 < 0.
I.4.6 Empirical Results
In this subsection we present our estimation results. In our preferred specification, we
normalize the explanatory variable with total cost. We then show that the results we find
also hold qualitatively when we normalize with total sales and payroll. First, however,
we show that the well-established results in this literature also hold in our data.
I.4.6.1 Previous Literature
Replication of earlier results provides a useful benchmark for our empirical work as we use
data from the same sources but for the years 2007 to 2014.41 Intensities are constructed
relative to industry payroll. In the case of R&D intensity, we follow Antràs and Yeaple
(2014) and add 0.001 to the ratio of R&D expenditure over sales before taking the natural
log in order to avoid throwing away the zeros.42
Column 7 of Table I.1 reports results of a regression specification as in the previous
literature, including the established decomposition of capital into its components and
normalization with payroll. Other machinery is arguably the most relationship-specific
of the four capital components and is strongly associated with more intrafirm trade as
is R&D intensity. Dispersion is also highly significant and positively associated with
intrafirm trade. These results are consistent with prior evidence on the determinants of
intrafirm trade. In columns 1 and 4 we rerun the established specification using total cost
and total sales, respectively, as normalization variable. The results are quite similar, both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
41Nunn and Trefler (2013) use data for the year 2005 only, Antràs and Chor (2013) use data from 2000
to 2010. Antràs and Yeaple (2014) use data from 2000 to 2011 from the intrafirm trade data and shorter
subsets of this time span for the industry controls.
42We recognize that this way of handling zeros is not innocuous but follow the literature to ensure
comparability. We have experimented with other values, such as adding 0.00001 as Nunn and Trefler
(2013) do, and this does not change our results qualitatively.
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I.4.6.2 Core Findings
In column 2 of Table I.1 we add our measure of environmental cost saving potential
(ECSP) to our preferred specification with the total cost normalization. We indeed find
that a larger ECSP is associated with less intrafirm trade on average and is significant
at the 10% level. The other coefficients do not change much compared to column 1 and
continue to have the right signs. Industries with a higher ECSP seem to be more likely to
outsource production. The number in brackets reports the standardized beta coefficient
associated with the respective coefficient. When the log of the ECSP increases by one
standard deviation, the intrafirm trade share decreases by 4.5% of a standard deviation
on average.
In column 3 we add the interaction term of the ECSP with the index of environmen-
tal policy stringency (EPSI). As expected, we find the interaction effect to be positive
and significant at the 5%-level. The level effect of the ECSP almost doubles in absolute
magnitude and is negative and significant at the 1% level. The interaction effect uncovers
a strong cross-country pattern of heterogeneity in the effect of the ECSP. This under-
scores the empirical importance of both the industry-specific and the country-specific
components of the parameter 1− µ.
These results hold when we control for the elasticity of substitution (log sigma) and
within-industry size dispersion. The effect of the elasticity of substitution is negative and
insignificant throughout, while the effect of dispersion is highly significant and positive in
all specifications. This is consistent with findings in the previous literature and with our
theory, which predicts an ambiguous effect.
Due to to the limited coverage of the EPSI our sample drops to roughly one fourth
of its former size as we have to exclude the many non-OECD countries (except the six
emerging economies mentioned above) for which we do not have data. In Appendix A.2.1.2
we provide additional tables which show that the level effect of the ECSP is also negative
when we remove the interaction effect and hold the (small) sample size constant. In many
cases the level effect is not significant when the sample size is reduced, indicating that it
is indeed countries outside the realm of developed OECD countries driving our results.
To analyze the cross-country dimension further, we report marginal effects of the ECSP
at various percentiles of the distribution of the EPSI. In Table I.2, columns 2 and 3 show
the marginal effect and the corresponding p-value for the total cost specification from
Table I.1. There is sizable variation in the marginal effect. The coefficients are significant
at the 1% level up to and including the first decile. The four countries in the first decile are
Brazil, China, Indonesia, and South Africa. They turn insignificant by conventional levels
at the fourth decile. The marginal effect continues to fall until it reaches a value of almost
zero at the ninth decile of our sample. Table I.2 clearly shows that the effect of the ECSP
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Table I.1: The Effect of Unethical Environmental Cost Advantage on Intrafirm Trade
Dependent Variable: Intrafirm Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Intensity Definition: Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Sales Total Sales Total Sales Payroll Payroll Payroll
log ECSP -0.0223* -0.0401*** -0.0201* -0.0387*** -0.0237** -0.0270*
(0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0121) (0.0143) (0.0115) (0.0140)
[-0.0443] [-0.0897] [-0.0390] [-0.0843] [-0.0621] [-0.0784]
log ECSP 0.00892** 0.00917** 0.00174
X EPSI (0.00429) (0.00435) (0.00410)
[0.176] [0.187] [0.0262]
log sigma -0.00682 -0.00232 -0.00436 -0.000124 -0.00627 -0.00194
(0.00702) (0.00889) (0.00685) (0.00865) (0.00703) (0.00907)
[-0.0151] [-0.00599] [-0.00965] [-0.000320] [-0.0139] [-0.00500]
log other machinery intensity 0.0299*** 0.0393*** 0.0588*** 0.0306*** 0.0391*** 0.0503*** 0.0276*** 0.0395*** 0.0490***
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.00974) (0.0102) (0.0144) (0.00948) (0.0101) (0.0138)
[0.0490] [0.0643] [0.103] [0.0494] [0.0630] [0.0909] [0.0629] [0.0899] [0.123]
log skill intensity 0.0402* 0.0369* 0.0578*** 0.0350*** 0.0336*** 0.0375** 0.0497* 0.0507* 0.0490
(0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0152) (0.0282) (0.0274) (0.0373)
[0.0837] [0.0767] [0.131] [0.0739] [0.0708] [0.0862] [0.0445] [0.0453] [0.0487]
log R&D intensity 0.0221*** 0.0207*** 0.0267*** 0.0224*** 0.0210*** 0.0278*** 0.0214*** 0.0196*** 0.0269***
(0.00390) (0.00404) (0.00483) (0.00382) (0.00396) (0.00496) (0.00450) (0.00452) (0.00544)
[0.0960] [0.0898] [0.130] [0.0970] [0.0913] [0.135] [0.0928] [0.0853] [0.130]
log materials intensity 0.0747 0.0648 0.131** 0.0554** 0.0494** 0.0455 -0.00568 0.00424 -0.00949
(0.0637) (0.0628) (0.0582) (0.0224) (0.0244) (0.0328) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0118)
[0.0405] [0.0351] [0.0796] [0.0391] [0.0349] [0.0366] [-0.0118] [0.00882] [-0.0215]
dispersion 0.0840*** 0.0779*** 0.0858*** 0.0836*** 0.0785*** 0.0871*** 0.0821*** 0.0757*** 0.0846***
(0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0149)
[0.0966] [0.0898] [0.113] [0.0962] [0.0905] [0.115] [0.0944] [0.0872] [0.112]
log building intensity -0.0108* -0.00822 -0.0114 -0.00844 -0.00690 -0.0103 -0.0138** -0.0107* -0.0146*
(0.00643) (0.00639) (0.00776) (0.00638) (0.00632) (0.00746) (0.00608) (0.00621) (0.00780)
[-0.0227] [-0.0174] [-0.0275] [-0.0174] [-0.0142] [-0.0241] [-0.0347] [-0.0270] [-0.0407]
log auto intensity -0.0116** -0.0118*** -0.0181*** -0.0133*** -0.0132*** -0.0211*** -0.0106** -0.0107** -0.0181***
(0.00457) (0.00435) (0.00594) (0.00459) (0.00442) (0.00614) (0.00470) (0.00442) (0.00626)
[-0.0351] [-0.0355] [-0.0569] [-0.0410] [-0.0405] [-0.0677] [-0.0304] [-0.0304] [-0.0537]
log computer intensity -0.00912 -0.0119 0.000841 -0.00693 -0.00998 0.00338 -0.0117 -0.0146* -0.00229
(0.00765) (0.00784) (0.0106) (0.00711) (0.00754) (0.0108) (0.00769) (0.00768) (0.0109)
[-0.0222] [-0.0289] [0.00216] [-0.0167] [-0.0241] [0.00860] [-0.0224] [-0.0280] [-0.00459]
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IO2007 industry clusters 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
Observations 130,985 130,364 35,434 130,985 130,364 35,434 130,985 130,364 35,434
R-squared 0.179 0.181 0.169 0.181 0.182 0.169 0.179 0.181 0.167
Note: Estimation by OLS with standard errors clustered at the industry level reported in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients reported in brackets. ***, **, and *
denote significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. log ECSP is the log of expenditure on waste and hazardous materials removal over payroll, total cost or total
sales. sigma is the estimate of the import demand elasticity from Broda and Weinstein (2006).
on intrafirm trade is driven by the countries with the lowest environmental regulation.
This supports our theoretical setting in which the possibility of environmentally unethical
production arises due to differences in regulation across countries.
Dividing our explanatory variables by total sales in columns 4 to 6 of Table I.1, it
becomes clear that our result is not driven by the normalization variable we use. The co-
efficient of the ECSP is weakly significant and negative in column 5, and becomes larger in
absolute terms and highly significant when we add the interaction term, which is positive
and significant at the 5%-level here as well. Turning to the marginal effects in columns 4
and 5 of Table I.2, it is evident that the pattern is qualitatively and quantitatively almost
identical to the one from the total cost specification.
CHAPTER I. REGULATORY VOID 56
Table I.2: Marginal Effects of the ECSP
Intensity Definition Total Cost Total Sales Payroll
EPSI percentile Marginal Effect p-value Marginal Effect p-value Marginal Effect p-value
5 -0.036 0.007 -0.034 0.009 -0.026 0.043
10 -0.035 0.008 -0.033 0.010 -0.026 0.041
20 -0.027 0.024 -0.025 0.032 -0.024 0.035
30 -0.022 0.060 -0.020 0.080 -0.024 0.039
40 -0.020 0.102 -0.018 0.135 -0.023 0.045
50 -0.017 0.153 -0.015 0.198 -0.023 0.053
60 -0.016 0.204 -0.014 0.262 -0.022 0.060
70 -0.014 0.275 -0.012 0.348 -0.022 0.071
80 -0.012 0.374 -0.009 0.463 -0.021 0.085
90 -0.010 0.447 -0.008 0.546 -0.021 0.097
Note: Marginal effects of log ECSP at deciles of the EPSI are calculated from the regressions in Table I.1, columns 3,
6, and 9, respectively.
In Columns 7 to 9 of Table I.1, we test our prediction using the established payroll
definition of intensities. When included by itself in column 8, the effect of the ECSP
is negative with roughly the same magnitude as the coefficients from columns 2 and 5.
It is even significant at the 5%-level. When we add the interaction effect in column 9,
the pattern holds qualitatively, with a negative level effect and a positive interaction
term. However, significance levels are lower than in the other specifications. This result
is mirrored in columns 6 and 7 of Table I.2. The magnitude of the marginal effect changes
only very little over the distribution of the EPSI while significance levels range from 5%
below the median and a 10%-level of significance up to the ninth decile.
We conduct various checks to assess the robustness of the effect we find. In particular,
we add a measure of downstreamness and its interaction with the elasticity of substitution
as in Antràs and Chor (2013) and include further controls used in that paper as robustness
checks. We report the results in the Appendix A.2.1.
I.5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a model of the international organization of production with
international regulatory differences, unethical cost savings and consumer boycotts. We
have shown that a high supplier intensity of the production process favors the implemen-
tation of the unethical technology as well as international outsourcing, while headquarter-
intensive sectors tend to choose integration and ethical production. The headquarter has
no instrument to affect the supplier’s technology choice. The implementation of the un-
ethical technology by the supplier, however, feeds back on the headquarter’s choice of the
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boundaries of the firm. When the headquarter anticipates unethical production by the
supplier, it is more inclined to keep the supplier at arm’s length. This new unethical out-
sourcing incentive therefore creates a link between unethical production and outsourcing
from within the logic of the property rights theory of the firm: outsourcing increases the
optimal investment of the supplier and thereby increases the cost savings of unethical
production. We also show that it is possible that the headquarter would prefer ethical
production (if technology was contractible) but incentivizes an expansion of unethical
production as an optimal response to contract incompleteness. To focus on the impli-
cations of unethical production for the international organization of production, in the
baseline model, we imposed that any deviation from investments, quantities or prices of
an ethical firm immediately triggers a consumer boycott (mimicking). We also analyzed
a fully microfounded version of the model where the link between a deviation from the
ethical observables and a boycott emerges from asymmetric information, credence goods
and an NGO monitoring suppliers and potentially starting boycotts. We found that all
results from the baseline model hold qualitatively. Using U.S. Census Bureau data, we
have provided evidence that, as predicted by the model, the share of U.S. intrafirm im-
ports is higher in sectors with a strong unethical cost advantage. Also in line with the
theory, this effect is strongest in countries with a low level of regulatory stringency.
Chapter II
Trade, Migration and Economic
Disintegration
II.1 Introduction
North America and Europe are currently experiencing a globalization backlash. In recent
years, parties and politicians have been elected to parliaments and offices who blame
globalization in its two dimensions of international trade and international migration for
a wide range of social and economic problems. In 2016, Britons voted to leave the EU to
“take back control” over migration, and Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election
on a protectionist anti-immigration platform. In continental Europe, several right-wing
populist parties and candidates have scored successes in recent elections, many of them
with anti-EU or anti-immigration agendas.1 As a consequence, the European integration
framework is under severe strain. While negotiations over Brexit are already underway,
political tensions within the EU over immigration concern refugee reallocation in Eastern
Europe as well as pressures from economic migrants from North and Sub-Sahara Africa
in Italy and Spain. The danger of a break-up of the European Union is a common theme
in the public debate.
1Marine Le Pen made it to the runoff of the 2017 French presidential election with a promise to
leave the EU once elected to office. The parties forming the new governing coalition in Austria won
the 2017 election with a promise of a tougher position on immigration. In the German general election,
the new right-wing AfD party won 13% of Bundestag seats with a strong anti-immigration stance in the
campaign. Italy is currently governed by a populist alliance combining EU and Euro-criticism with tough
anti-immigration rhetoric.
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In the academic debate about the causes of anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment
within the European Union, Rodrik (2018) argues that immigration is simply a politically
salient topic that provides right-wing populist movements with a narrative to mobilize
voters, while the roots of the grievances are not cultural but in fact economic in nature.
Consistent with this view, a number of recent papers highlight the relationship between
“disintegrative” voting behavior (i.e. pro-Brexit or pro right-wing populists) on the one
hand and import competition (Dippel, Gold, and Heblich, 2015, as well as Colantone
and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b), inequality (Pastor and Veronesi, 2018), low incomes, high
unemployment and past dependence on manufacturing (Becker, Fetzer, and Novy, 2017)
on the other.
The perhaps more controversial side of the argument points to direct adverse economic
effects of immigration as a possible explanation for the success of disintegrative forces.
Barone, d’Ignazio, de Blasio, and Naticchioni (2016) identify labor market competition
as one channel through which immigration has raised vote shares for parties with tougher
positions on immigration in Italian municipalities. Becker and Fetzer (2018) find for the
U.K. that immigration from Eastern Europe following the 2004 Eastern Enlargement is
linked to negative effects on wages at the lower end of the wage distribution as well as
increased pressure on the welfare state and a reduction in home-ownership rates among
U.K.-born citizens.2
In this paper, I put the direct adverse economic effects of immigration to a more
comprehensive test in a quantitative general equilibrium model of trade and migration,
addressing the following question: Considering welfare-maximizing decisions of govern-
ments, is international labor market integration able to cause a country’s endogenous exit
from the EU? More generally, how resilient are deep regional integration projects like the
EU in the face of migration shocks?
To answer these questions I build a quantitative multi-country model of trade and labor
migration that features rich interactions between these two dimensions of globalization. I
simulate the model to analyze the conditions under which a fall in migration costs can lead
to welfare losses for some countries in a world with costly trade. Such welfare losses present
the affected countries with the disintegration trade-off : Because of the indivisibility of
the free movement of labor and goods inside the EU Single Market, unilateral migration
policies designed to restrict immigration are only possible outside of it. Exit, however,
entails a rise in mutual tariff levels between the exiting country and the remaining EU
countries, hindering trade.
To study the quantitative importance of the disintegration trade-off I confront the
2For the U.S., Mayda, Peri, and Steingress (2018) find evidence on voting behavior in response to
immigration that is also consistent with competition on the labor market and for public resources.
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model with changes in migration and trade policy during the first phase of the EU Eastern
Enlargement between 2004 and 2007 and evaluate the welfare consequences. Based on the
findings, I use counterfactual exercises to study the trade-off. I consider an exit scenario
involving tariff increases and a reset of migration policies to pre-Enlargement levels and
assess welfare effects for the exiting country as well as remaining members of the EU
Single Market.
The model features workers of different nationalities with heterogeneous preferences
over their desired place to live and work as in Redding (2016). Workers consume goods
and rent residential land. To the setup in Redding (2016) I add bilateral utility costs
of migration and keep track of the nationality of the workers.3 They maximize their
utility by choosing the location that offers them the highest real income, taking into
account migration frictions and worker-specific preference draws over locations. The use
of idiosyncratic preference draws allows the model to generate a stable spatial equilibrium
featuring two-way migration flows and analytical expressions for migration shares that can
easily be matched to the data.
The production side of the economy consists of a single industry with perfect competi-
tion, productivity draws and a fixed set of differentiated varieties as in Eaton and Kortum
(2002). Trade is based on comparative advantage due to technological differences and la-
bor is the only factor of production. Trade between countries is costly and subject to
iceberg trade costs as well as ad valorem tariffs that are redistributed to the residents of
the collecting country as in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Trade and migration interact in a natural way in this model. A change in trade policy
directly changes the terms of trade of the affected countries. This does not only influence
trade patterns but also migration decisions through changes in relative real incomes across
countries. Conversely, changes in migration costs directly affect the distribution of workers
across locations, which in turn influences trade patterns through the effects of migration
on labor markets, changing the nominal wage and thereby the terms of trade.
In addition, the model features two externalities of migration and economic outcomes
described by Peri (2016). First, there is a productivity spillover from migration. An
increase in the number of workers in a country raises the overall technology level as
in Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez
(2016). Empirical studies show that immigration and denser interactions among economic
agents can be associated with higher rates of innovation and productivity (Kerr and
3In the context of the Eastern Enlargement both modeling additions are important. Bilateral migration
costs are needed to be able to construct the necessary policy changes during the labor market integration.
Nationalities are needed because the enlargement affected migration costs differentially across country
pairs. It lowered the cost of migrating to the U.K. for Polish workers, but not for German citizens, for
example.
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Lincoln, 2010, and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). Second, residential land is a fixed
factor owned by immobile landlords. Growth of a country’s workforce creates congestion
effects through increasing land prices as in Redding (2016) or Monte, Redding, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2018), lowering real income. Saiz (2007) provides empirical evidence of the
relevance of this channel.
In the simulation exercise, I let 100 countries with randomly drawn economic funda-
mentals conduct costly trade with one another and then lift a prohibitive migration barrier
separating the labor markets of an “eastern” and a “western” section of the country grid.
If the two integrating regions are similar, lifting the barrier generally increases average
utility of each country’s citizens. Lower migration costs decrease the utility costs of living
in a foreign country and bring the world economy closer to its frictionless equilibrium.
If the two regions are sufficiently dissimilar, however, for example in their levels of
technology, lifting the migration barrier causes migration flows to be skewed towards
the high technology countries. Large migration inflows into these countries then exert
downward pressure on the nominal wage and worsen the terms of trade in the receiving
countries so that the real wage there may fall. This effect can be so large that it dominates
the gains in utility that arise from lower costs of migration. Average utility of a country’s
workers may then also fall, generating the disintegration trade-off : unilaterally reversing
the adverse effects of immigration through higher migration costs requires an exit from
the Single Market leading to higher tariffs.
While utility of the world economy as a whole increases as it moves towards the
frictionless equilibrium, the welfare loss in a receiving country is just one side of a re-
distribution of the gains from trade towards the workers of net sending countries: those
leaving enjoy higher real wages in their high technology destinations while those who stay
at home get access to goods produced with the foreign, more efficient technology at lower
cost. When the integrating regions are dissimilar enough in economic fundamentals, this
redistributive effect is large enough to dominate the first-order decrease in utility costs of
migration.
To assess the quantitative importance of the disintegration trade-off, I match the model
to data on trade and migration from before the EU Eastern Enlargement and feed into it
actual changes in tariffs and estimates of migration cost reductions for the first episode
of the Enlargement between 2004 and 2007 from Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza
(2017), who also study the welfare effects of the Eastern Enlargement.
I find that this episode of trade and labor market integration raised aggregate EU
utility by 0.47%. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries.4 Using
4This is in line the results from Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017), who find that aggre-
gate EU welfare rose by 0.62%. They also find that in the aggregate, the EU15 countries would have
experienced welfare losses in the absence of trade liberalization.
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average utility of the citizens of a country as a welfare measure, U.K. and Greek citizens
lose the most with a loss of 0.41% and 0.50% in their utility, respectively, while the citizens
of Slovakia (+10.61%), Lithuania (+5.16%) and the Czech Republic (+2.55%) gain the
most. Looking at changes in real incomes across countries, the magnitude of the effects
is smaller, but the ranking of winners and losers is roughly the same.
I then use these findings to study political economy considerations of optimizing gov-
ernments facing the impact of the Eastern Enlargement. From the perspective of a govern-
ment involved in the negotiations, the Eastern Enlargement can hardly be considered an
exogenous shock. In light of the heterogeneous welfare effects, I rationalize the joint agree-
ment to the enlargement decision by all involved governments by considering an objective
function that attaches some weight to aggregate European welfare in addition to welfare
of the government’s own citizens. I calculate how large these pro-European weights would
have to be to make a government at least indifferent between agreeing to and rejecting the
enlargement decision. Not surprisingly, the governments of the U.K. and Greece have the
largest implied pro-European weights with 46.61% and 51.17%, respectively. For other
Western European governments, single-digit or low double-digit weights are sufficient to
explain agreement to the Eastern Enlargement based on the model’s assessment.
In the final part of the paper, I consider a “Brexit” scenario based on the welfare
assessment of a “populist” government that maximizes the welfare of the median British
citizen and ignores aggregate EU welfare. This scenario entails mutual tariff increases
between the U.K. and the remaining EU countries as well as a reset of the costs of
migrating to the U.K. to pre-Enlargement levels for Eastern European citizens. I find
that “Brexit” can improve U.K. citizens’ welfare relative to the enlargement scenario with
continued U.K. membership. However, even with “Brexit”, British citizens are slightly
worse off than before the Enlargement.
This paper builds on recent developments in the use of quantitative models in economic
geography and international trade. Redding (2016) uses idiosyncratic preference draws
to study the welfare effects of a reduction in transport costs in the presence of goods
trade and labor mobility. Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg (2018) use this approach
to study commuting in local U.S. labor markets.5 In contrast, I use this modeling to
study the welfare consequences of the interaction of trade and migration when migration
barriers fall.
In a two-country Ricardian model based on Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977),
Davis and Weinstein (2002) show that labor mobility makes the net receiving country
worse off when it is technologically superior. I show that this result also holds in a
5See for example Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (2017) for
further quantitative work involving the allocation of labor across space. Redding and Rossi-Hansberg
(2017) provide an overview.
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multi-country setting when the integrating economic regions are sufficiently dissimilar.
To focus on the terms of trade effect as clearly as possible, I stick to a simple Ri-
cardian setup with only one factor of production and one sector. In doing so, I neglect
possible complementarity effects of immigration that arise in models with multiple factors
of production as highlighted by Borjas (1995, 1999) and studied jointly with the Davis
and Weinstein (2002) effect by Felbermayr and Kohler (2007).6
In assessing the welfare consequences of the EU Eastern Enlargement this paper is also
related to Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017), who do so in a discrete-time
dynamic setting exploiting the differences in timing of the labor market liberalization
across EU15 countries. Similar to my results, they find an increase in aggregate EU
welfare, while EU15 countries lose from the enlargement. My study differs in two respects.
First, for the purpose of my question it is not necessary to incorporate the dynamic
structure. Instead, I conduct a comparative statics analysis of the part of the Eastern
Enlargement that began in 2004 and ended in 2007. Second, I take the model one step
further and consider the political economy behind the agreement of the EU governments
to the enlargement as well as the decision to leave the EU in response to a migration
shock. This connects this paper to Galiani and Torrens (2018), who study the political
economy of migration in Ricardian trade models. Contrary to their stylized setup with
corner solutions, this model can easily be matched to data and allows for the assessment
of continuous policy changes.
More generally, this paper relates to literature studying the interaction of trade and mi-
gration in various settings, such as welfare effects of remittances in di Giovanni, Levchenko,
and Ortega (2015) or labor market adjustment in tradeable and non-tradeable sectors as
in Burstein, Hanson, Tian, and Vogel (2017). A further connection exists to literature
that quantitatively analyzes changes in trade policy, such as Costinot and Rodŕıguez-
Clare (2014), Ossa (2014), and Caliendo and Parro (2015). These papers abstract from
labor mobility, however, and do not feature labor mobility frictions as a policy variable.
This paper also connects with studies on the welfare implications of economic integra-
tion using the EU Enlargement as a policy example, e.g. Dustmann and Frattini (2013)
and Kennan (2017), and older studies by Baldwin (1995) and Baldwin, Francois, and
Portes (1997), as well as literature analyzing the causes of Brexit (e.g. Becker, Fetzer,
and Novy, 2017 and Becker and Fetzer, 2018), its consequences (e.g. Dhingra, Huang,
Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, and Van Reenen, 2017), as well as literature measuring the
economic costs of further EU integration reversal as in Felbermayr, Gröschl, and Heiland
(2018) and Mayer, Vicard, and Zignago (2018).
6These effects are relevant for a more comprehensive quantitative assessment of the Eastern Enlarge-
ment. The model can easily be extended to a setting with multiple factors of production and sectors with
differing factor intensities to incorporate Borjas-type effects.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II.2 outlines the model
and discusses the theoretical findings, Section II.3 presents the simulation results, Section
II.4 assesses the EU Eastern Enlargement and Section II.5 discusses the political economy
considerations. Section II.6 concludes.
II.2 A Quantitative Model of Migration and Trade
The world consists of I countries indexed by i (or n) = 1, . . . , I and each country i is
home to Ni workers, who are also citizens of that country.
7 Workers are indexed by ω.
Each country is endowed with Hi units of residential land owned by immobile landlords.
Workers are mobile across countries and while they retain their citizenship throughout
the model, they may migrate to live and work in another country as a consequence of
utility maximization.
II.2.1 Demand and Indirect Utility
Utility of a worker ω, citizen of i, living and working in n is given by
Uniω =
bniω
κni
(
Qnω
α
)α(
Hnω
1− α
)1−α
. (II.1)
Each worker derives utility from the consumption of a Cobb-Douglas bundle of goods
Qnω and residential housing Hnω with goods consumption weight α ∈ (0, 1). While
labor is mobile across countries, the supply of housing is exogenously fixed at Hn and
introduces congestion effects from migration. These congestion effects are empirically
relevant as argued by Peri (2016) and Saiz (2007). Empirical support for the constant
expenditure share implied by the Cobb-Douglas form can be found in Davis and Ortalo-
Magné (2011). A worker incurs migration costs κni ≥ 1 as reduction in utility.8 Utility
is also determined by an idiosyncratic and country-pair-specific utility draw bniω. The
composite consumption good Qnω is given by the CES aggregate
Qnω =
[∫ 1
0
qnω(j)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties j.
7I use the terms worker and citizen interchangeably.
8An alternative approach would be to model migration costs as a reduction in the quantity of labor a
worker can offer. This would not change a lot in the model. However, wages would have to be computed
differently.
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A worker earns the wage rate wn in her location of residence and receives a lump-
sum redistribution of tariff income tn from the government of the country of her place of
residence. The budget constraint is then given by
PnQnω +RnHnω = wn + tn = νn,
where Pn is the ideal price index of consumption varieties dual to the consumption index
Qnω and Rn is the rental rate for residential housing Hnω prevailing in n. With the Cobb-
Douglas formulation of utility, two-stage budgeting can be applied and expenditures on
consumption and housing are given by
PnQnω = ανn
RnHnω = (1− α) νn.
A worker’s demand for variety j is then given by
qnω(j) =
pn(j)
−σ
P 1−σn
ανn,
where Pn =
[∫ 1
0
pn(j)
1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
. Using the above equations in (II.1), indirect utility of
worker ω then becomes
Uniω =
bniω
κni
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
. (II.2)
II.2.2 Mean Utility and Migration Shares
In modeling migration I follow Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) and Red-
ding (2016) in assuming that the idiosyncratic preference draws bniω are distributed ac-
cording to an extreme value distribution. I choose the Fréchet distribution because it
delivers compact closed-form expressions for migration shares and average utility of work-
ers from a particular country as will be shown below.9 Specifically, preference draws in
country n are distributed according to the CDF
Ḡn(b) = exp
{
−Bnb−ε
}
, (II.3)
where Bn governs the (country-specific) location of the distribution and ε is the shape
parameter. In the model, I assume that amenities - or average attractiveness - Bn may
9Other extreme value distributions can also be used to get tractable expressions for migration shares.
For example, Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) use a Type I extreme value distribution in
their dynamic framework.
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differ across countries, while the shape parameter ε is constant across countries.10 Solving
indirect utility for b and inserting this into the distribution gives the distribution of utility
for workers of nationality i living and working in n as
Gni(U) = exp
{
−ΨniU−ε
}
,
with Ψni = Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε
, where νn
PαnR
1−α
n
is real income of a worker living and working
in country n. Accordingly, Gni(U) is also the probability that utility of a worker from i
who chooses to live and work in n is lower than U .
Workers choose the country that offers them the highest indirect utility. Assuming
that the idiosyncratic preference draws are independent across workers and locations,
the probability that a worker from i attains utility larger than U is then given by the
complement of the probability that she attains utility smaller than U in all countries,
hence
Pr [Ui > U ] = 1−
∏
n
Gni(U) = 1−Gi(U)
with Gi(U) = exp {−ΨiU−ε} and Ψi =
∑
n Ψni. Because agents maximize their utility,
the distribution of maximum utility Gi(U) is of particular interest.
The mean of this distribution gives the mean utility of workers from i after they have
optimally chosen their place of residence taking real wages, migration costs and their
idiosyncratic preferences into account. As I show in Appendix B.1.1,
Ūi =
∫ ∞
0
UdGi(U) = δ
[∑
n
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε] 1ε
, (II.4)
where δ = Γ
(
ε−1
ε
)
, Γ (·) is the Gamma function and I assume ε > 1. Equation (II.4) shows
how mean utility of workers from country i is shaped by the migration options around
them. Naturally, the higher amenities and real incomes are in the surrounding countries,
the higher is mean utility. Migration frictions κni are key because they are the only diadic
part of the expression. Workers who face low migration costs have easier access to the
real incomes foreign countries offer. Migration costs might be low because a country is in
close geographical proximity to many other countries. They might also be low because of
similarities in culture and language and, importantly, also for political reasons.
The distributions from above can also be used to determine the fraction of each coun-
try’s citizens living in a particular country. These migration shares are computed by
10The assumption that Bn is country-specific is not necessary for the workings of the model. In
particular, the results of the quantitative exercise do not depend on it. Bn is a constant and cancels out
when the model is expressed in changes. All quantitative results obtained in Sections II.4 and II.5 remain
the same if I assume Bn = B = 1 ∀n.
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calculating the probability that some country n is the one that offers the highest utility
to a worker from i, or equivalently, the fraction of workers from i who choose to migrate
to n. In particular,
λni = Pr [Uni ≥ max {Uki} ∀ k]
is the probability that country n offers higher utility to a worker from country i than all
other possible migration destinations. As I show in Appendix B.1.2, evaluation of this
probability using the Fréchet distribution gives migration shares as
λni =
Ψni
Ψi
=
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε
∑
k Bkκ
−ε
ki
(
νk
Pαk R
1−α
k
)ε . (II.5)
The share of workers from i migrating to n is increasing in amenities and real income
in n and decreasing in the migration costs κni relative to the attractiveness of all other
countries as migration destinations.
II.2.3 Production and Goods Trade
Production and goods trade follow the well-known structure of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
To keep the setup as simple as possible, labor is the only factor of production.11 Goods
can be traded subject to spatial frictions φni = (1 + τni) dni, where dni is an iceberg-
type trade costs and τni is an ad-valorem tariff. Total factor productivity in a country
is given by µiL
β
i , where µi is an exogenous country-specific shifter and Li is the size of
the labor force in country i as in Eaton and Kortum (2001), Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare,
and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez (2016) and Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017). This
introduces a positive spillover from migration on productivity regulated by the parameter
β ≥ 0. Empirical studies show that immigration and denser interactions among economic
agents can be associated with higher rates of innovation and productivity, see e.g. Kerr
and Lincoln (2010) and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010).
Using the properties of the Fréchet distribution following Eaton and Kortum (2002),
11This assumption is made to illustrate the mechanism in the simplest way possible. Relaxing it is
easy and would make migrants of different skill levels complements or substitutes in production to the
native population depending on the initial endowments. As this distinction is an important effect of
immigration on native welfare, I will include in continuing work.
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bilateral expenditure shares πni and price indeces Pn are then given by
πni =
µiL
β
i (φniwi)
−θ∑
k µkL
β
k (φnkwk)
−θ (II.6)
Pn = γ
(∑
k
µkL
β
k (φnkwk)
−θ
)− 1
θ
, (II.7)
where γ = Γ
(
θ+1−σ
θ
) 1
1−σ and Γ (·) is the Gamma function. I assume θ > σ − 1 to obtain
a finite price index.
II.2.4 Closing the Model
With Ni workers from each country and migration shares λni, labor supply in country n
is the sum of migrants from all countries including n itself,
Ln =
∑
i
λniNi, (II.8)
where λni is defined in equation (II.5). With labor as the sole factor of production and
perfect competition, labor income in country n equals worldwide sales net of tariffs,
wnLn =
∑
i
πin
1 + τin
Xi, (II.9)
where πin is defined in equation (II.6). Workers spend a fraction α of their income on
goods and the remaining fraction 1 − α on housing so that the rental rate of housing is
given by
Rn = (1− α)
νnLn
Hn
. (II.10)
Following Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg (2018) I assume that landlords are im-
mobile and spend all their income RnHn on consumption goods. The advantage of this
assumption is that it precludes mechanical externalities from landlords’ consumption on
workers’ migration choices.12 Tariff revenues Tn are redistributed to the residents of a
country as a pure income transfer. Aggregate spending on goods Xn in n is then equal to
Xn = ανnLn +RnHn = ανnLn + (1− α) νnLn = wnLn + tnLn = wnLn + Tn, (II.11)
12If also landlords spent a part of their income on housing, an increase in the rental rate that results
from an inflow of workers would drive up house prices even further because also landlords would then
spend more on housing. An alternative modeling approach is taken by Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and
Sforza (2017), who let worldwide land rents be redistributed through a global portfolio. This allows them
to generate endogenous trade imbalances.
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where Tn =
∑
i τni
πni
1+τni
Xn. Workers spend a fraction α, landlords all of their income
on goods. Because landlords’ income is just the fraction 1 − α of worker income, total
spending on goods is equal to total worker income. This can be divided into income from
labor wnLn and total tariff redistribution Tn = tnLn.
II.2.5 Equilibrium in Levels
The model can be simplified so that the equilibrium is expressed in terms of four endoge-
nous variables: wages wn, labor supplies Ln, migration shares λni as well as expenditure
shares πni.
Inserting (II.11) into the definition of tariff revenues Tn, solving for Tn and plugging
this back into (II.11) gives that
Xn =
wnLn∑
i
πni
1+τni
. (II.12)
Using this on the right-hand side of equation (II.9) yields a balanced trade condition
expressed in terms of wages and labor supply as
wnLn =
∑
i
πin
1 + τin
wiLi∑
k
πik
1+τik
.13 (II.13)
In Appendix B.1.3 I show how, using the conditions for housing market clearing (II.10)
and (II.11) as well as expenditure shares (II.6), migration shares (II.5) can be written as
λni =
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
µnL
β
n
πnn
)αε
θ
(
Hn
Ln
)(1−α)ε (∑
k
πnk
1+τnk
)−αε
∑
lBlκ
−ε
li
(
µlL
β
l
πll
)αε
θ
(
Hl
Ll
)(1−α)ε (∑
m
πlm
1+τlm
)−αε . (II.14)
The three parentheses divide real income in the destination country n into three com-
ponents. Goods consumption and trade contribute to real income with a weight α and
are determined by the well-known ratio of aggregate productivity µnL
β
n over the domestic
expenditure share πnn taken to the power of the inverse of the trade elasticity θ. The
remaining share of income goes to housing whose contribution to real income is deter-
mined by the intensity of congestion given by the ratio of housing supply Hn relative to
the number of workers Ln living in country n. The third component captures income
effects of tariffs raised by the government. If tariffs were not raised at all, the sum in
the parenthesis would add up to unity. With positive tariffs, any increase in tariffs will
increase real income through higher transfers. Because tariffs are taken from goods trade
13To see this, note that plugging in equation (II.12) on the left-hand side of equation (II.9) gives that
imports net of tariffs are equal to exports net of tariffs as in Caliendo and Parro (2015), eq. (9).
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flows, they enter with a weight α as well. Together with the resource constraint
Ln =
∑
i
λniNi (II.15)
and expenditure shares
πni =
µiL
β
i (φniwi)
−θ∑
k µkL
β
k (φnkwk)
−θ (II.16)
equations (II.13) and (II.14) constitute a system of four equations in the four endogenous
variables {wn, Ln, λni, πni}I,Ii=1,n=1.
The fundamentals of the economy are Θ ≡ ({dni} , {µn} , {Bn} , {Hn} , {Nn})I,In=1,i=1,
trade and migration policies are given by Ξ ≡ ({τni} , {κni})I,In=1,i=1.
Definition II.1 Given fundamentals Θ and policy variables Ξ as well as a set of values
for the elasticities (α, β, ε, θ), the equilibrium of the model is given by a set of wages, labor
supplies, expenditure and migration shares {wn, Ln, πni, λni}I,In=1,i=1 that solve the problem
given by equilibrium conditions (II.13), (II.14), (II.15), and (II.16).
II.2.6 Equilibrium in Changes
Using the exact hat algebra method introduced by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008)
and applied to trade policy evaluation by Caliendo and Parro (2015), it is possible to
express the above equilibrium conditions in changes. Defining the relative change of an
endogenous variable x̂ as the ratio of its value in the new equilibrium relative to the old
one, x̂ = x
′
x
, the equilibrium of the model is calculated as follows.
Given data on expenditure shares πni, trade policy changes φ̂ni and values for β and
θ, the change in the price index P̂n can be calculated using an initial guess for the change
in wages ŵi and labor forces L̂i using
P̂n =
[∑
i
πniL̂
β
i
(
φ̂niŵi
)−θ]− 1θ
. (II.17)
This can in turn be used to calculate the implied changes in expenditure shares π̂ni using
π̂ni = L̂
β
i
(
φ̂niŵi
)−θ
P̂ θn . (II.18)
Given π̂ni, the implied change in aggregate expenditure can be calculated as
X̂n = ŵnL̂n
∑
k
πnk
1 + τnk
(∑
i
π̂ni
φ̂ni
πni
(1 + τni)
)−1
(II.19)
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to iterate on the guess for the change in wages ŵn until the balanced trade condition in
the new equilibrium holds. It is given by
w′nL
′
n =
∑
i
π′in
1 + τ ′in
X ′i, (II.20)
where the left-hand side can be calculated using the current guess ŵnL̂n multiplied by
wnLn, which can be constructed using data on aggregate spending Xn and equation
(II.12). On the right-hand side, π′in = π̂inπin and 1 + τ
′
in = φ̂in (1 + τin). Furthermore,
X ′i = X̂iXi. This inner loop produces changes in nominal wages, expenditure shares and
price indeces as well as aggregate expenditure consistent with balanced trade, given the
initial guess for the change in the labor force. Using these outcomes in addition to data
on migration shares λin in the initial equilibrium, changes in migration frictions κ̂in and
values for α and ε gives the implied change in mean utility as
ˆ̄Un =
∑
i
λinκ̂
−ε
in
(
L̂βi
π̂ii
)αε
θ
L̂
−ε(1−α)
i
(∑
m
πim
1 + τim
)αε(∑
k
π̂ik
φ̂ik
πik
(1 + τik)
)−αε 1ε , (II.21)
which can in turn be used to calculate the implied changes in migration shares λ̂ni as
λ̂ni = κ̂
−ε
ni
(
L̂βn
π̂nn
)αε
θ
L̂−ε(1−α)n
ˆ̄U−εi
(∑
m
πnm
1 + τnm
)αε(∑
k
π̂nk
φ̂nk
πnk
(1 + τnk)
)−αε
. (II.22)
Finally, the outer loop iterates over guesses for changes in the labor force L̂n until the
resource constraint
L̂n =
∑
i
λ̂ni
λniNi
Ln
(II.23)
holds, where data on initial labor forces Ln and native population sizes Ni are needed.
These new values for L̂n are then used to update the inner loop. The algorithm then
converges to a vector of wage changes ŵn and a vector of labor force changes L̂n that
are consistent with the resource constraint, balanced trade and the exogenous change in
policy variables κ̂ni and φ̂ni.
Defining Lni as the number of workers with nationality i living and working in n, labor
forces Ln =
∑
i Lni, national populations Ni =
∑
n Lni and migration shares λni = Lni/Ni.
Furthermore, with Xni being gross trade flows between countries, total expenditure are
Xn =
∑
iXni and trade shares are πni = Xni/Xn.
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Proposition II.1 When the model is expressed in changes, it can be solved by only using
data on gross bilateral trade flows {Xni}I,In=1,i=1, international migrant stocks {Lni}
N,N
n=1,i=1
as well as an initial tariff structure {τni}I,In=1,i=1, a set of policy changes
{
φ̂ni, κ̂ni
}I,I
n=1,i=1
and values for the elasticities (α, β, ε, θ) using equations (II.17) through (II.23).
Proof: In the text.
II.2.7 Trade, Migration and Welfare
To understand how trade and migration interact in this model how this interaction affects
welfare, it is useful to start from equation (II.4).14 It shows that mean utility of the
citizens of country i is shaped by real incomes in all possible migration destinations,
with higher weight on those locations that are more attractive places to live in (high Bn)
as well as those that are more accessible (low κni). While the Bn are exogenous and
constant parameters, a decrease in migration costs κni has a direct effect on utility. The
remaining effect of the migration shock goes through general equilibrium adjustments in
real incomes around the world in response to the change in κni. Equation (II.4) implies
that mean utility of the citizens of country i will fall in response to a migration shock
if real incomes fall in countries where many of them live, which typically are the home
country and neighboring locations, and if they do so strongly enough to dominate the
positive effect of reduced migration frictions.
To study these general equilibrium adjustments in real incomes in more detail, it is
useful to consider the relative change in mean utility of the citizens of country i based on
equation (II.21),
ˆ̄Ui =
∑
n
λniκ̂
−ε
ni
(
L̂βn
π̂nn
)αε
θ
L̂−ε(1−α)n
(∑
m
πnm
1 + τnm
)αε(∑
k
π̂nk
φ̂nk
πnk
(1 + τnk)
)−αε 1ε ,
which is restated here for easier reference.
The effect of migration on mean utility can be decomposed into four channels. First,
there is the technology spillover. An inflow of workers increases the level of technology
µnL
β
n in n with an elasticity β thereby increasing real income. Second, an inflow of workers
increases demand for housing relative to the available fixed supply Hn. The strength of the
effect is governed by the share 1−α that workers spend on residential housing. The larger
L̂n, the stronger is the increase in the rental rate Rn, reducing real income. The relative
strength of these two effects is governed by the relationship between the parameters α,
β, and θ. In particular, the congestion effect will dominate the spillover effect conditional
14Because I do not consider it in the quantitative exercise, I abstract here from the discussion of land
owners’ utility. I leave this analysis for future work.
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on domestic expenditure shares and tariff income if β < θ 1−α
α
, that is, if the spillover
effect from labor force size on technology is small enough or the share of income spent on
housing is large enough. When parameter estimates from the literature are considered,
this is typically the case.
Third, and most importantly, there is an interaction between migration and trade
through the change in the domestic expenditure share π̂nn. Migration affects πnn through
two channels. First, net immigration increases labor supply and puts downward pressure
on the nominal wage wn. Second, in the presence of technology spillovers, an inflow of
workers increases the level of technology µnL
β
n. Both effects, better technology and lower
nominal wages, make domestic sourcing more attractive and lead to an increase in πnn,
lowering the real wage in n. As is well known from the work of Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012), the inverse of the domestic expenditure share is a sufficient
statistic for the gains from goods trade. An increase in πnn therefore implies a decrease in
the extent to which n benefits from trade with other countries because an inflow of labor
leads to better technology and lower production costs at home.
Looking at the effect through the terms-of-trade lens, an inflow of workers puts down-
ward pressure on nominal wages, reducing export prices relative to import prices, which
tends to imply a welfare loss. This interaction through the nominal wage is present even
if technological spillovers as well as congestion effects are turned off by setting β = 0 and
α = 1.
In the presence of tariffs, there is a fourth effect that works through tariff income. An
inflow of workers makes domestic sourcing more attractive. Holding tariffs constant so
that φ̂nk = 1 ∀n, k, an inflow of workers implies that the summation in the last parenthesis
becomes larger because there is an increase in domestic expenditure, π̂nn > 1, from which
no tariffs are levied. This implies a negative effect on real income because of reduced
tariff income available for redistribution. The main result of this analysis is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition II.2 Mean utility of the workers from country i depends on real incomes
around the world. In a trade equilibrium, an increase in the size of the workforce affects
real incomes because it interacts with the domestic expenditure share πnn. An inflow of
workers in a country puts downward pressure on the nominal wage there, increasing the
domestic expenditure share and depressing real income.
Proof: In the text.
I show in Section II.3 that, ignoring tariffs and shutting down congestion as well as
productivity spillovers, the terms of trade effect of a migration shock alone can be large
enough to cause a net loss in welfare relative to the initial trade equilibrium if the change
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in migration frictions causes sufficiently large migration flows. This is the case when
the countries whose labor markets integrate are different enough in initial fundamental
characteristics. If these negative welfare effects occur in countries in which many of
country i’s workers live and are strong enough to dominate the positive welfare effects of
the decrease in κni, this leads to a fall in mean utility of those workers.
Two qualifications are in order. First, it is important to stress that this argument about
the possibly negative welfare effects of a migration shock is only valid in an equilibrium
with (costly) trade. Starting from complete autarky with fixed populations and no trade
any decrease in either trade costs or migration frictions will have unambiguously positive
welfare effects. The negative effects only occur relative to the level of welfare in an
equilibrium with trade.
Second, while the negative welfare effects may occur for countries that receive a suf-
ficiently large inflow of migrants, the sending countries naturally experience a welfare
increase. Abstracting from congestion and productivity spillovers, labor mobility there-
fore redistributes the welfare gains from goods trade from high real income countries to
those with low real income. In particular, countries with high real income tend to be at-
tractive migration destinations. Citizens of sending countries gain for two reasons. Those
who emigrate enjoy a higher real income in their destination than what they would have
earned at home. Those who stay benefit from cheaper access to foreign high-technology
goods because the cost of production there is lowered by the increase in labor supply.
This improves their terms of trade.
The aggregate welfare effect of a migration shock can be measured using the population-
weighted change in mean utility around the world,
ˆ̄U =
∑
i
Ni
N
ˆ̄Ui, (II.24)
where N =
∑
iNi is the total number of workers around the world.
15 In Sections II.3
and II.4 I show that ˆ̄U is positive in response to a migration shock, while some countries’
workers may experience an increase or a decrease in their mean utility.
II.3 Simulation
In this section I simulate the model using random numbers as fundamentals of the
economies. The purpose of the simulation is twofold. First, control over initial condi-
tions allows me to show that negative effects on utility of citizens of some countries do
not occur mechanically in this model, but require sufficiently dissimilar countries. Second,
15In the quantitative assessment, I also calculate ˆ̄U =
∏
i
ˆ̄U
Ni
N
i . The differences are minimal.
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I can disentangle the different channels outlined above and show that even in the absence
of technology spillovers and congestion effects, the terms of trade channel can produce
the negative welfare effect.
II.3.1 Setup
I construct a grid of 100 points representing countries. For each country I draw values
for the number of citizens Ni, technology µi and amenities Bi from a log-normal distri-
bution. All countries are assigned the same value for the endowment of residential land
Hi. Distances between the countries are measured as the Euclidean distance between the
points on the grid and determine trade and migration costs in the model. For simplic-
ity, I abstract from tariffs here. I also need to calibrate the four structural parameters,
the trade elasticity θ, the migration elasticity ε, the share of goods consumption in the
households’ budget α as well as the strength of the technology spillover controled by β.
Following Head and Mayer (2014) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014), I set θ = 4, and
ε = 3 following Bryan and Morten (2017). The goods consumption α = 0.75 is taken from
Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) and I set β = 1 to be consistent with Eaton and Kortum
(2001).
Figure II.1: Country Grid and the Migration Barrier
Note: Grid of simulated countries in latitude-longitude space and the migration barrier.
The policy change I consider in this simulation is the removal of a migration barrier
between the two halves of the grid, called “West” and “East”. Figure II.1 depicts the
migration barrier as a black line. In the initial situation all points on the grid trade
with each other, but migration is only possible on either side of the grid. The removal
of the barrier then allows workers to migrate to the other region. The welfare effects of
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this change are used to demonstrate the mechanisms and channels active in the proposed
model.
II.3.2 Results
To show that the terms of trade effect inducing utility losses for citizens of some countries
does not occur mechanically, I consider the opening of the migration barrier under two
scenarios. In the first, countries on either side of the grid draw all their fundamental
values from distributions with identical means, implying that countries on both sides
of the divide are on average equally attractive, equally productive, and have the same
number of citizens on average. In the second scenario, I let countries west of the divide
draw their productivity levels µi from a distribution with a larger mean, making them
more productive on average than the eastern countries. Table II.1 shows the mean values
of fundamentals on both sides of the migration barrier for each scenario.
Table II.1: Fundamental Values in the Simulation
avg. prod. avg. amen. avg. nat. pop.
West East West East West East
equal distr. 1.64 1.71 1.63 1.71 1532 1498
high µ 7.37 0.38 1.63 1.71 1532 1498
Note: Means of random draws of location fundamentals for 100
simulated countries.
Essentially, this is an application of the idea from Davis and Weinstein (2002) in a
quantitative multi-country setting. Figure II.2 plots each country’s value of µi relative
to the most productive country on a log-scale on the horizontal axis and the change in
average utility of the country’s citizens ˆ̄Ui on the vertical axis. It is important to note that
each point represents the change in average utility for the citizens of a country, wherever
they may live. This means that the value also accounts for the utility increases of workers
who left their home country, for example.
The top left panel of Figure II.2 shows the results when the two regions draw their
fundamentals from identical distributions. Accordingly, both triangles (East) and circles
(West) are homogeneously spread over the horizontal axis. The vast majority of points
lie slightly above the zero-change line indicating that there are utility gains from reduced
migration frictions for the citizens of most countries. In the top right panel the exercise is
repeated but with countries in West drawing the productivities from a distribution with
a higher mean. Accordingly, the circles are clustered at the higher end of the relative pro-
ductivity line. A clear pattern emerges in which the citizens of most countries in West lose
slightly from labor market integration, some outliers in both directions notwithstanding.
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Figure II.2: Removal of the Migration Barrier - Welfare Effects
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Note: Results of a simulation of the removal of the migration barrier with 100 countries.
The utility gains for the citizens from East are disproportionately larger. This underscores
that the aggregate change in welfare is positive. In fact, weighting the changes in average
utility with the citizen shares accounted for by each country, the migration liberalization
scenario increases global utility by 3.43% when the geometric mean is considered. The
global change in real income is calculated as the geometric mean of the changes in real
income in each country, with the new equilibrium labor forces as weights. Global average
real income increases by 0.09%.16
The bottom left panel keeps productivity high in West but removes the congestion
effect by setting α = 1. This exercise shows that in the presence of technology spillovers
alone, the redistributive mechanism is not strong enough to generate systematic welfare
losses in the more productive region. Finally, the bottom right panel additionally removes
the technology spillover, leaving only the terms of trade effect through changes in the
nominal wage as the only channel through which trade and migration interact. The
familiar pattern reemerges, with small but systematic losses in West and larger gains in
East.
In the next section, I confront these theoretical results with the data.
16The numbers only change mildly, when the arithmetic mean is considered. Global average utility
then increases by 3.68% and global average real income increases by 0.13%.
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II.4 Eastern Enlargement
The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union was the largest experiment in labor
market integration in recent history. In this section, I match the model to data on trade
and migration from before the Eastern Enlargement and confront it with changes in tariffs
and migration costs during the first phase of the enlargement period from 2004 to 2007. I
use this experiment to assess the welfare effects of the EU Eastern Enlargement through
the lens of the model proposed in Section II.2.17
For the assessment of the economic effects of the Eastern Enlargement, I consider the
migration and trade interactions between 25 countries or country groups and a constructed
rest of the world. The sample includes the EU15 countries Austria, Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden.
For data reasons I aggregate Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to one country
(BNL). As new member states I consider the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, who all joined in 2004 as well as Bulgaria and
Romania, who joined in 2007. The sample also includes Croatia, which did not join the
EU until 2013.18
Upon joining the EU, all new member states forfeited their own trade agreements
and joined those already signed by the EU. In addition, tariffs between all EU states
fell to zero. In contrast to the trade liberalization, the opening of labor markets had a
considerable time dimension. Only the U.K., Ireland and Sweden opened their borders
to all new member states in 2004, who in turn reciprocated by opening theirs. Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia were the only new states that did non open their labor markets to
all EU15 states. All new states opened their labor markets to citizens from other new
members. In 2006, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal allowed for free worker movement,
with the Netherlands and Luxembourg following in 2007, France in 2008, Belgium and
Denmark in 2009. Germany and Austria opened their labor markets only in 2011.
Because the model is static, I cannot use the time variation in the counterfactual
exercise. Instead, I follow Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) and consider
labor market liberalizations that took place until 2007 to avoid picking up effects of the
beginning financial crisis and compute comparative statics taking all the changes in tariffs
and migration costs into account that happened until then. As a consequence, the welfare
effects presented below do not take into account migration movements that happened
after 2007, for example due to Germany and Austria’s opening up of their labor markets.
17In the welfare assessment, I focus on the welfare changes of workers, neglecting the welfare of land
owners. Their inclusion in the welfare calculus is left for future work.
18Cyprus and Malta complete the list of ten new member states that joined in 2004. They are added
to the rest of the world for data availability reasons.
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This is an important caveat and should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. To
evaluate the effects of these I use the model with all channels throughout. I also continue
to use the value for the structural parameters as given in the simulation in Section II.3.
II.4.1 Data and Calibration
According to Proposition II.1, only data on labor force composition, trade flows, the initial
tariff structure and on the changes in tariffs and migration costs are needed to solve the
model in changes.
II.4.1.1 Tariffs
Tariff data come from WITS, where I use effectively applied rates for the years 2003 and
2007 from TRAINS. Where observations are missing, I impute values from earlier years.19
I construct two tariff matrices for the year 2003, one using tariffs with industry trade
flows as weights and another with a simple average. The main results presented below are
produced using the weighted tariffs. Robustness checks using simple averages are reported
in Appendix B.2.2. Under the weighted scheme, the average tariff level for the Eastern
European countries under consideration when exporting to the EU was 2.4% in 2003,
down from 4.85% in 2001. EU15 countries faced an average tariff of 3.1% when exporting
to Eastern Europe, down from 4.6% in 2002. I calculate tariff changes by constructing a
similar tariff matrix for the year 2007 and dividing the values by one another.
II.4.1.2 Changes in Migration Costs
Changes in the cost of migration are not as easily measurable as changes in tariffs.
Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) present a model-consistent strategy to
identify changes in migration costs by exploiting time variation in migration shares in a
difference-in-difference setting. Unfortunately, the comprehensive data from Eurostat’s
Labor Force Survey they use are currently not available publicly. For lack of another
data source with similar characteristics, I turn to their estimates and apply them to my
model. This is possible because both models generate gravity-type expressions for migra-
tion shares. The fixed effects structure derived from the migration shares in Caliendo,
Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) can therefore also be constructed from my model.20
This means that given the same data and the consistent fixed effects structure, I can take
19Tariffs charged by Latvia and Romania in 2003 are taken from 2001, those charged by Slovakia and
Hungary for 2003 are taken from 2002.
20Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017) use a Type I extreme value distribution for the
individual shocks together with a dynamic framework which gives their migration costs a fixed-cost
flavor. In my model, the Type II extreme value distribution is very tractable with a multiplicative utility
cost of migration. Both approaches produce analytically similar expressions for migration shares.
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their point estimates and relate them to the structure of my model. In particular, the
coefficient of interest measuring the change in migration costs for workers of new member
states for a destination country n is given by
υn,NMS,post = −ε (lnκni,post − lnκni,pre) ,
where κni,post is the data equivalent of κ
′
ni, migration costs in the new equilibrium. With
the left-hand side taken from Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017), and a value
of the migration elasticity ε, the ratio κ̂ni can be recovered.
21 They estimate values of
υ for migration between new member states and the countries that opened their labor
markets between 2004 and 2006, i.e. the U.K., Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal as well
as for the changes in migration costs between the new members themselves. These are
then also the country pairs for which I compute implied changes in migration costs for the
quantitative exercise. The coefficients found by Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza
(2017) for the change in the cost of migrating from an EU15 country to one of the new
member states were insignificant. Like them, I therefore hold migration costs constant in
this direction.
II.4.1.3 Trade and Migration Data
Bilateral (net) trade flows come from WIOD (Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Stehrer, and
de Vries, 2015). I consider data for the year 2003, directly before the enlargement. I
add tariffs to generate the matrix of Xni in the model and calculate initial aggregate
expenditure levels Xn. The raw data naturally reflect trade imbalances that exist be-
tween the sample countries. In the exposition of the model, I have abstracted from these
imbalances. For the quantitative exercise, I remove the imbalances before I evaluate the
welfare effects of changes in migration and trade costs. To do so, I measure trade im-
balances net of tariffs in the data. Then I feed the raw data into the inner loop of the
solution algorithm outlined in Section II.2.6 and correct the excess demand vector by the
vector of imbalances. I hold labor forces fixed as found in the data and solve the model
for a vector of wage changes that is consistent with balanced trade as given by equation
(II.20). Using this vector of wage changes I construct a new matrix of bilateral trade
flows that are consistent with balanced trade and evaluate the policy changes starting
from these constructed data.22
As noted above, the detailed labor force surveys used by Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro,
21The estimation strategy is explained in detail in Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017),
Section 4.3.
22Caliendo and Parro (2015) also remove trade imbalances from their data before they apply the
NAFTA tariff changes.
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and Sforza (2017) to construct migration shares are not publicly available on the Euro-
stat website. I therefore turn to the Extended Database on Immigrants in OECD and
non-OECD countries (DIOC-E) used also by Biavaschi, Burzyński, Elsner, and Machado
(2018). These data contain information on the number of migrants in OECD and many
non-OECD countries, among other things differentiated by level of education and age.
Unfortunately, they are only available every five years. The last available data before
the Eastern Enlargement date to the year 2000/2001. These are the data from which I
construct the matrix of bilateral migration stocks Lni using the numbers for people aged
15 to 64 (age groups 1 and 2). Due to missing data I need to impute some of the values
in the matrix to get a full matrix to feed into the model. The changes and assumptions I
make in the course of the procedure are described in Appendix B.2.1.
II.4.2 Results
When I assess the welfare effect of the Eastern Enlargement between 2004 and 2007,
I consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, tariff levels are held constant at their
2003 level and only migration costs are lowered. The second scenario features the full
liberalization including tariff changes.
II.4.2.1 Scenario 1: Migration Liberalization Only
Figure II.3 presents the two key welfare outcomes in this scenario. The top panel plots
percentage changes in average utility of the citizens of a country in relation to the per-
centage change in the labor force of the home economy. The bottom panel plots the
change in real income in each country with the same horizontal axis. Where data points
are too close to be individually discernible, I replace them with squares. It is important
to recall that a data point in the top panel represents the change in utility of the citizens
of the designated country, wherever they live. That means the welfare measure takes
into account the real income they earn abroad as well as the utility costs they incur from
living in a foreign country. The values are calculated from equation (II.21). In contrast,
the bottom panel shows the changes in real income that workers earn who live in the
designated country - irrespective of their nationality. This measure of welfare does not
account for utility losses from migration. The numbers corresponding to the plots are
presented in Table II.2.
The top panel shows that the utility gains from the Eastern Enlargement are quite
substantial and that it is the workers of the new member states who benefit greatly from
the migration liberalization. Slovakian workers take the lead with an increase of 10.8%
compared to the initial equilibrium. All other workers of the new states gain between
CHAPTER II. TRADE, MIGRATION, DISINTEGRATION 82
Figure II.3: Eastern Enlargement - Migration Liberalization Only
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
1.5% and 5% on average. The welfare effects for the citizens of the EU15 countries are
much smaller. At the top end, Austrian, German and Swedish workers gain about 0.01%
in utility. The model predicts workers from the U.K., Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal
to incur utility losses from the migration liberalization. The strongest effects are found in
the U.K. and Greece, whose workers lose about 0.3% to 0.4% of their utility. Aggregate
EU welfare increases by 0.57% in this scenario.
The percentage changes in real income plotted in the bottom panel are smaller in
absolute terms than the changes in utility as can be seen from the smaller range of the
vertical axis. It is again the new member states’ real incomes that rise the most, with
the two notable exceptions of Hungary and Czech Republic, whose real incomes fall.
Among the EU15 countries, effects on real incomes are very small with Greece and the
U.K. standing out with real income losses. The common factor among the four main real
income losers U.K., Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic is the strong increase in
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Table II.2: Eastern Enlargement - Migration Liberalization Only
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force EU Weight
——— change in percent ——— pct. pts.
Austria AUT 0.014 0.016 -0.196 0
Bulgaria BGR 3.254 0.473 -7.603 0
Benelux BNL 0.011 0.013 0.000 0
Czech Rep. CZE 2.790 -0.230 2.366 0
Germany DEU 0.012 0.015 -0.118 0
Denmark DNK 0.009 0.011 -0.019 0
Spain ESP 0.002 0.002 0.041 0
Estonia EST 1.850 0.108 -1.500 0
Finland FIN 0.009 0.010 -0.012 0
France FRA 0.006 0.007 -0.006 0
U.K. GBR -0.335 -0.362 4.801 36.90
Greece GRC -0.393 -0.424 7.969 40.69
Croatia HRV 0.003 0.000 -0.035 -
Hungary HUN 1.496 -0.225 2.158 0
Ireland IRL -0.012 0.040 0.173 2.06
Italy ITA -0.036 -0.037 0.533 5.85
Lithuania LTU 5.168 0.788 -9.136 0
Latvia LVA 2.479 -0.013 -0.067 0
Poland POL 1.627 0.267 -3.193 0
Portugal PRT -0.004 -0.005 0.093 0.75
Romania ROU 2.660 0.509 -5.810 0
Rest of World ROW 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -
Slovakia SVK 10.873 1.186 -12.026 0
Slovenia SVN 1.390 0.229 -2.696 0
Sweden SWE 0.012 0.014 -0.052 0
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the
labor force as well as the implied pro-European welfare weight of the government objective
function for each country in the sample.
the labor force these countries experience. The labor forces of Greece and U.K. increase
by 7.9% and 4.8%, respectively, those of Hungary and the Czech Republic by 2.1% and
2.3%, respectively.
More generally, an increase in the size of the labor force in the home economy tends
to be associated with losses in real income and average utility of workers and vice versa:
Slovakia and Lithuania experience the largest labor force outflows (−12% and −9.1%)
and see the largest increases in average utility and real income.
However, Hungary and the Czech Republic differ from the U.K. and Greece in an
important respect. While the latter see losses in average utility of their citizens as well as
in real income in the national economy, the citizens of Hungary and the Czech Republic
gain on average in terms of utility, while their national economies can only offer a lower
real income. This difference is rooted in the asymmetric changes in migration costs that
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follow from the estimates provided by Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017).
Hungary and the Czech Republic are net recipient countries of migrants but their citizens
can escape the downward pressure on their wage by exploiting the improved migration
options to the EU15 countries. In contrast, the U.K. and Greece receive workers from the
new member states, but their utility costs of migrating have not changed. It is important
to note that this is an exogenous feature of the model as the cost of migrating from a EU15
country to a new member state were held constant in the quantitative exercise following
the insignificant estimates in this direction of migration by Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro,
and Sforza (2017). In addition, even if migration costs had fallen for British or Greek
citizens, the new migration options would have been relatively less attractive than those
faced by Eastern European citizens. In addition to the U.K. and Greece, also the citizens
of Ireland, Italy and Portugal face average utility losses, albeit on a much smaller scale.
II.4.2.2 Scenario 2: Migration and Trade Liberalization
Scenario 2 considers both the liberalization in migration as well as the tariff cuts that
came with the accession of the new member states. The top panel, showing again changes
in average utility in relation to relative initial market size, reveals only minor differences
to the results from Scenario 1. Again, the new member states gain from the Eastern
Enlargement while effects in the EU15 countries are quite small in comparison. It is
again the U.K. and Greece whose citizens experience the largest utility losses. At −0.41%
and −0.5%, they are even a bit larger in absolute terms than in Scenario 1. In addition,
the total number of countries whose citizens see a loss in average utility has more than
doubled to 11 from 5. Aggregate EU welfare increases by 0.47% in this scenario.23
Looking at the changes in real income, it is interesting to see that more new member
states see real income losses than in Scenario 1 and that they also tend to be larger. Given
that the changes in average utility are similar in both scenarios for the new member states,
the interaction of trade liberalization and lower migration costs seems to widen the gap
between real income changes in the national economies on the one hand and the change
in average utility for the country’s citizens.
Consider the case of Bulgaria. In Scenario 2, the model predicts a 1.7% increase in
average utility for Bulgaria’s citizens, but a loss of −1.2% in real income in the national
economy. According to equation (II.21), this is only possible if migration costs decrease
strongly and Bulgaria’s neighbors experience sufficiently large real income growth. The
size of the labor force in Bulgaria does decrease by 7.5% in the model. How does the
loss in real income come about? Although Bulgaria’s domestic expenditure share falls in
23The magnitude of this value is in line with Caliendo, Opromolla, Parro, and Sforza (2017), who find
an aggregate EU welfare increase of 0.62%.
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Figure II.4: Eastern Enlargement - Migration and Trade Liberalization
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
response to the enlargement, pointing to higher gains from trade, the strong migration
outflow reduces the level of technology through the spillover channel and causes a net loss
in real income through the goods consumption channel (−0.66%). Tariff reductions lead
to more trade but reduce income through the tariff channel (−2.49%). The large outflow
of workers lets the rental rate for residential land fall so that real income increases via
the congestion channel (+1.97%), but the effect is not strong enough leaving a net loss
in real income.24 In this model, Bulgaria is an example of how positive effects of trade
liberalization on real income can be overturned by losses from reduced tariff income and
due to factor mobility. Utility of Bulgarian labor, however, increases.
The main take-away from Scenario 2 is that even in the presence of a concurrent
trade liberalization, the model predicts negative welfare effects for the citizens of some
24The joint effect can be recovered by dividing the three percentages by 100, adding 1, and multiplying
the three resulting numbers.
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Table II.3: Eastern Enlargement - Migration and Trade Liberalization
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force EU Weight
——— change in percent ——— pct. pts.
Austria AUT 0.022 0.049 0.102 0
Bulgaria BGR 1.729 -1.224 -7.520 0
Benelux BNL -0.021 -0.003 0.245 4.20
Czech Rep. CZE 2.554 -0.467 2.299 0
Germany DEU -0.031 0.001 0.335 6.22
Denmark DNK -0.011 0.009 0.185 2.23
Spain ESP -0.029 -0.018 0.183 5.70
Estonia EST 1.618 -0.064 -0.833 0
Finland FIN 0.012 0.025 0.070 0
France FRA -0.018 -0.008 0.222 3.69
U.K. GBR -0.412 -0.392 5.108 46.62
Greece GRC -0.495 -0.493 8.328 51.17
Croatia HRV -0.389 -0.375 0.217 -
Hungary HUN 1.091 -0.637 2.180 0
Ireland IRL -0.080 0.025 0.371 14.47
Italy ITA -0.065 -0.044 0.682 12.04
Lithuania LTU 5.160 0.832 -8.777 0
Latvia LVA 2.077 -0.391 0.307 0
Poland POL 1.752 0.428 -2.990 0
Portugal PRT -0.104 -0.046 0.407 18.00
Romania ROU 2.054 -0.129 -5.834 0
Rest of World ROW -0.835 -0.842 -0.034 -
Slovakia SVK 10.613 0.945 -11.523 0
Slovenia SVN 1.455 0.317 -2.349 0
Sweden SWE -0.008 0.009 0.212 1.61
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the
labor force as well as the implied pro-European welfare weight of the government objective
function for each country in the sample.
countries, mainly the U.K. and Greece. Based on these results, I now study quantitatively
the trade-off between staying inside the EU Single Market given the effects of the Eastern
Enlargement on the one hand, and leaving the Single Market in order to be able to set
unilateral migration policies on the other.
II.5 On the Political Economy of Economic Disinte-
gration
Governments are responsible for setting migration and trade policies. In the analysis
of the political economy of these two policy dimensions, I address two questions. The
first concerns the problem that the Eastern Enlargement is by no means an exogenous
shock to a welfare-maximizing government because the enlargement was supported and
CHAPTER II. TRADE, MIGRATION, DISINTEGRATION 87
the accession treaty ratified by each of the EU15 member countries. Using this model
to assess the consequences of the Eastern Enlargement in 2003, a British government
would not have agreed to the accession of the new member states, for example. The
second question concerns the trade-off between staying in the EU and exiting with a loss
of access to the Single Market.
II.5.1 How Pro-European Does the Government Have to Be?
I tackle the first question by noting that governments change over time and with them
their attitude towards Europe. Starting from the fact that all the EU15 countries including
the U.K. did agree to the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 and that the U.K. in particular
was part of the group that most aggressively liberalized its labor market in the beginning
of the transition period, I calculate the weight that each government must have attached
to aggregate EU welfare to be at least indifferent between accession and no accession of
the Eastern European countries.25
To do so, I calculate the aggregate change in utility of EU workers including both old
and new member states according to the formula given in equation (II.24), summing over
all countries in the sample except Rest of World and Croatia. I then create a vector ι of
political economy weights that measure the importance given to the change in aggregate
EU welfare in the pro-European government objective function given by
Oi,EU = ιi
ˆ̄UEU + (1− ιi) ˆ̄Ui. (II.25)
As long as a government’s objective function evaluates at a loss compared to the initial
equilibrium (i.e. Oi,EU < 1), I increase the EU weight ιi in the objective function. Col-
umn 6 of Table II.3 shows the results. For countries whose citizens gain on average in
terms of utility, the value remains at zero as the Eastern Enlargement is preferred even
without a political economy weight for aggregate EU welfare. Although the utility losses
for Greek and British citizens are below 1%, the political economy weight of aggregate
EU welfare needed to produce an indifferent government is nonetheless substantial at
51.2% for Greece and 46.6% for the U.K. This results from the fact that the aggregate
increase in EU welfare is not particularly large at only 0.47%. For other EU15 countries
like Germany, Denmark, France and the Benelux countries, EU weights below 10% are
sufficient to tilt the government’s decision in favor of the enlargement. Note that these
countries did not open their labor markets until 2009 or 2011. Therefore the cost of mi-
grating from Eastern Europe to those countries remains constant in the model. Other
early migration liberalizers like Ireland, Italy and Portugal need two-digit EU weights to
25I thank Sebastian Krautheim for this suggestion.
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rationalize consent.
I contrast these results with the welfare evaluation of two other government types. The
populist government does not care about aggregate European welfare, but - for political
economy considerations - maximizes the change in the welfare of the median citizen.
Median utility of workers from i is defined as
Ũi = G
−1
i
(
1
2
)
.
In Appendix B.1.4 I show that the relative changes of mean and median utility are identical
in this model so that
Oi,pop =
ˆ̃Ui =
ˆ̄Ui. (II.26)
The change in the mean and median of a Fréchet distributed variable are identical because
the ratio of the two statistics is not affected by the location of the distribution. Median
and mean utility of workers of a particular nationality are thus identical up to a constant.
It follows that the relative changes in median and mean utility of workers from country
i for a given change in real incomes around the world are also the same. Therefore
the only difference in the valuation of welfare outcomes between the pro-European and
the populist governments comes from the inclusion of aggregate European welfare in the
pro-European’s objective function.
Finally, the technocratic government does not look at welfare of its citizens but instead
aims to maximize real income of the workers living in its area of jurisdiction, independent
of their nationality. In doing so, it also ignores changes in utility that derive from changes
in migration costs so that
Oi,tech =
ν̂i
P̂αi R̂
1−α
i
. (II.27)
There are several countries for which differences in the government objective function
also make a qualitative difference in the assessment of the Eastern Enlargement. Ac-
cording to Table II.3, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and
Romania, the median and mean workers gain in terms of utility, but real income in
the country itself falls. Strong support for the Eastern Enlargement in these new mem-
ber states can be rationalized in this model by governments that take into account the
improved mobility and earnings prospects of their citizens abroad, be they populist or
pro-European in nature. Based on the real income losses, the technocratic government
type would object to the enlargement.
On the other hand, there is a number of EU15 countries including Germany, Denmark,
Ireland and Sweden, whose economies see increases in real income following the Eastern
Enlargement but whose citizens lose in terms of utility at the median. Here a technocratic
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government type or a pro-European one with a sufficiently large EU weight in the objective
function can rationalize support for the enlargement. It is important to stress, however,
that the welfare assessment conducted here only includes the changes made up to 2007
and can thus not be considered a full analysis. Subsequent labor market liberalizations
in other western and central European countries can significantly affect the outcomes of
the model.
II.5.2 An Exit Scenario
Motivated by the ongoing Brexit negotiations, I use the model to assess the trade-off
between the consequences of the Eastern Enlargement on the one hand, and leaving the
EU Single Market on the other for the U.K., whose citizens take the second largest utility
losses in the full liberalization Scenario 2 (next to Greece).
I make the following assumptions. When the enlargement decision was taken, the
government in power in the U.K. was sufficiently “pro-European” to agree to it and to open
up its labor markets. Now a government of the “populist” type has come to power and
re-assesses the enlargement decision. According to the numbers in Table II.3, the median
U.K. worker has lost 0.41% in utility as a consequence of the Eastern Enlargement. The
government therefore considers a move to “take back control” over migration policy and
set unilateral migration policies. Because membership in the EU Single Market requires
upholding the freedom of movement of goods and labor, the only way to re-raise migration
barriers is to leave the Single Market. In this case the EU would impose tariffs on U.K.
goods and the U.K. would lose the benefits of trade agreements negotiated by the EU.
To quantify the effects of an exit scenario, I re-calculate Scenario 2 with the difference
that the costs of migrating from a new member state to the U.K. remain constant while
they fall for the other liberalizing EU countries. At the same time, tariffs for new member
states with EU countries drop to zero as before, but U.K. tariffs with all (including the
new) EU countries increase to U.K. tariffs with the rest of the world just like the EU
applies rest of world tariffs to imports from the U.K. These tariffs are at about 2% in the
data. This is similar to a “chaotic Brexit” scenario, in which tariffs automatically return
to MFN levels with the rest of the world because no new trade agreement has been signed
between the EU and the U.K. at the end of the negotiation period.
Figure II.5 plots the results of this exercise. The first important point is that leaving
the Single Market can indeed improve the British position relative to Scenario 2. In the
top panel, the U.K. value is now almost exactly on the zero change line together with
Germany, Italy and France. A look at the numbers in Table II.4 shows that the U.K. is
still worse off than before the Eastern Enlargement and “Brexit”, but only by −0.056%
compared to a loss of −0.412% in Scenario 2. Second, the utility gains for the new member
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Figure II.5: Eastern Enlargement and U.K. Single Market Exit
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
states are smaller than in the case of enlargement without Brexit. This can be seen from
eyeballing Figures II.4 and II.5, where for example the gains for Slovakian citizens have
fallen below 10%. Column 6 of Table II.4 shows the percentage-point difference between
the change in average utility in the Brexit scenario compared to Scenario 2. For example,
Bulgarian citizens lose almost one percentage point in utility growth and Polish citizens
lose 1.2%-points. This reflects the fact that the important migration destination U.K.
has not become more accessible which affects utility growth negatively: a lower share of
citizens of a new member state moves to an important high real income location. In fact,
the only country whose citizens experience substantial improvements relative to Scenario
2 are British citizens. They are still worse off than before the enlargement, but less so.
Re-raising migration costs to the U.K. to pre-Enlargement levels leads to migration
diversion. In the model, Greece’s labor increases by 8.5% in the Brexit scenario compared
to 8.3% in Scenario 2. But it is other Eastern European countries who are predicted
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to receive large migration inflows when Britain is not available as a destination. While
the Czech labor force increases by 2.3% in Scenario 2, including Brexit increases the
labor force growth rate to almost 6%. Similarly, Hungary’s labor force grows by 2.2% in
Scenario 2, but by 5.7% in the Brexit case.
Table II.4: Eastern Enlargement and U.K. Single Market Exit
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force Diff. to Scen. 2
——— change in percent ——— pct. pt. change
Austria AUT 0.018 0.044 0.187 -0.0042
Bulgaria BGR 0.794 -1.327 -5.363 -0.935
Benelux BNL -0.042 -0.026 0.243 -0.022
Czech Rep. CZE 0.950 -0.774 5.995 -1.604
Germany DEU -0.044 -0.014 0.400 -0.013
Denmark DNK -0.031 -0.014 0.190 -0.020
Spain ESP -0.029 -0.020 0.187 -0.001
Estonia EST 0.493 -0.223 1.342 -1.126
Finland FIN -0.003 0.009 0.076 -0.015
France FRA -0.026 -0.017 0.224 -0.008
U.K. GBR -0.056 -0.006 0.300 0.357
Greece GRC -0.486 -0.485 8.565 0.009
Croatia HRV -0.388 -0.371 0.242 0.001
Hungary HUN -0.495 -0.976 5.707 -1.586
Ireland IRL -0.103 0.062 0.175 -0.023
Italy ITA -0.070 -0.050 0.700 -0.005
Lithuania LTU 3.843 0.606 -6.208 -1.317
Latvia LVA 0.841 -0.554 2.841 -1.236
Poland POL 0.505 0.189 -0.162 -1.247
Portugal PRT -0.095 -0.036 0.403 0.009
Romania ROU 1.590 -0.213 -4.790 -0.464
Rest of World ROW -0.836 -0.843 -0.0334 -0.001
Slovakia SVK 9.134 0.701 -8.940 -1.478
Slovenia SVN 0.757 0.198 -0.886 -0.698
Sweden SWE -0.026 -0.011 0.243 -0.018
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the labor
force and the difference in the change in average utility relative to Scenario 2 in percentage points.
II.5.3 Discussion
The results of this Brexit scenario must be interpreted with the assumptions in mind that
have been made in both policy dimensions. First, I have assumed that Brexit means that
migration policy returns to its state before the Eastern Enlargement. This neglects the
fact that the U.K. might restrict its migration policy only for some Eastern European
countries or that it might impose additional restrictions for EU citizens. In the tariff
dimension I have imposed that both the EU and the U.K. set their tariff levels towards
each other to the duties they charge from the rest of the world. This does not account for
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a possible new trade agreement. Because the sample does not distinguish between other
major trading partners of the U.K., such as Japan or the U.S., the tariff changes that
the U.K. faces because it drops out of the EU’s existing trade agreements are also not
included in this exercise.
Additionally, the migration diversion predictions need to be interpreted with caution.
It would be wrong to take away from the model that the occurrence of Brexit would
lead to strong re-migration of Eastern European workers to their home or neighboring
countries. The above exercise neglects the fact that within the time that has passed,
other western European countries have also liberalized their labor markets, making it
more likely that migration is diverted to other western economies like Germany or France.
In the absence of estimates for the change in migration costs from Eastern Europe to these
countries, accounting for these important policy changes for a more realistic assessment
of the consequences of Brexit for migration is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the spirit of doing trade theory with numbers, however, this exercise is interesting
because it highlights the quantitative importance of the trade-off between unilateral mi-
gration policy and membership in a comprehensive free trade agreement. In the exercise
considered above, a full reversal of migration policy with mild mutual tariff increases
upon exit can almost bring the U.K. back to its initial welfare level before the Eastern
Enlargement.
II.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I studied the interaction of migration and trade in a quantitative multi-
country model with a particular focus on the trade-off between unilateral migration policy
and the benefits of membership in a deep regional integration framework. Idiosyncratic
preference shocks generate a stable spatial equilibrium of migration featuring two-way
flows in tractable analytical expressions, while trade is based on the standard Ricardian
multi-country framework. In addition to its interaction with trade through the labor
market, migration affects welfare outcomes through technology spillovers and congestion
effects on the market for residential land.
I showed that countries that are popular migration destinations following a fall in
migration costs may lose from labor market integration in the presence of trade if and
only if the integrating countries are dissimilar enough. This is the case because a large
inflow of workers exerts downward pressure on the nominal wage, worsening the terms of
trade of the receiving country. In a simulation of the model this effect is active even when
the externality channels are turned off.
I confronted the model with data on trade and migration from Europe before the
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Eastern Enlargement of 2004 and fed into it changes in tariffs and estimates of changes
in migration costs for the first phase of the enlargement process from 2004 to 2007. The
model predicted the U.K. and Greece to be the main losers from the Eastern Enlargement,
while the citizens of the new member states enjoy substantial utility gains, profiting from
increased migration opportunities to high wage countries and cheaper access to high-
technology goods.
Finally, I considered a simple counterfactual scenario in which the U.K. leaves the Eu-
ropean Single Market. Resetting migration costs to pre-Enlargement levels and mutually
raising tariffs with the remaining EU can almost return U.K. citizens’ welfare to its initial
level.
One important avenue for future work is the addition of the complementarity channel
of migration as in Borjas (1995, 1999) by differentiating between high-skill and low-skill
labor as well as the inclusion of multiple sectors of production. Another fruitful direction
for continued research lies in the application of the quantitative approach to trade policy
as pioneered by Ossa (2014) to this model, including an extension to the second dimension
of migration policy. This would allow for a more comprehensive assessment of equilibrium
migration policies and tariff levels following a migration-induced exit from the European
Single Market.
Chapter III
Gains from New Goods in a
Ricardian Model of Trade
III.1 Introduction
Since David Ricardo’s insights on comparative advantage over 200 years ago, there is broad
consensus among trade economists that international trade is mutually beneficial for the
participating economies. In the public debate, this insight requires continuous defending
against variations of the mercantilist position that exports are good and imports are
bad. These positions may come in the form of blunt protectionism of the Trumpian kind,
or with more subtlety in the form of pride in ever increasing German current account
surpluses. While there is agreement on their existence, the academic debate about the
sources and the size of the gains from trade is ongoing and constitutes one of the most
important questions in the field of international economics.
A wide class of models in the theory of international trade - labeled “quantitative
trade models” by Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2014) - identify the gains from trade as
the inverse of the domestic expenditure share taken to the power of one over the trade
elasticity. Since shown by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012), henceforth
ACR, this result has found widespread use in quantitative work. The variety of micro
structures from which this result can be derived underscores its generality.1
1The formula is valid for perfect competition models with country-level product differentiation (Arm-
ington, 1969) or producer heterogeneity (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), as well as for monopolistic compe-
tition models with homogeneous firms (Krugman, 1980) or heterogeneous firms, i.e. Melitz (2003) with
94
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At the same time, there is a sharp divide in the sources of gains from trade these models
are based on. While the models proposed by Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980)
feature gains from variety only, the more recent models with heterogeneous producers
by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) with Pareto-distributed productivity
predict gains to arise solely because of the reallocation of resources towards the most
productive goods (Ricardian specialization) or firms (selection into exporting).2 In an
attempt to quantify the welfare effects of globalization, it seems restrictive to consider
only one source of gains from trade at a time.
This paper therefore develops a quantitative model of international trade that features
gains from access to new goods and from the reallocation of resources. The model is
tractable enough to be matched to aggregate or sectoral trade data. This allows for a
quantitative assessment of the magnitude of the gains from trade in comparison to the
established models in which those gains are given by the formula from ACR.
The model builds on the multi-country version of the Ricardian trade model by Eaton
and Kortum (2002), henceforth EK, in which resources are reallocated towards compara-
tive advantage goods when a country opens up to trade. Introducing one simple change
to the model, I assume that countries randomly and independently of one another draw a
measure of goods they are able to produce in autarky out of the continuum of producible
goods. Given countries’ sets of goods available for production, they draw productivities
for each of these goods from an appropriately scaled Fréchet distribution. In the open
economy different goods are then produced by different sets of producer countries, or
producer sets for short. Some goods are produced only by two countries, others by more.
This implies that, in contrast to the EK model, there is only a subset of goods that is
produced by all countries in the world.
This has two important consequences. First, and as in EK, out of the set of goods that
were already available for consumption in autarky, consumers can buy from the lowest-
cost producer who is potentially located in a foreign country when their country opens
up to trade. Second, consumers get access to new goods they were unable to consume in
autarky. Unlike in a Krugman or Armington world, consumers are able to choose from
which producer to source the newly available goods. In this sense, gains from new goods
Pareto-distributed productivity.
2In the Melitz-Pareto model there may be more or fewer varieties available for consumption after
the move from autarky to trade depending on the relative size of production and exporting fixed costs.
More than just counting varieties, the productivity of the entering firms relative to those exiting matters
for welfare. Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2008) make the point that in the
case of countable variety gains from abroad, those varieties’ prices are higher than those of the exiting
domestic firms’ prices, canceling the positive welfare effect of increased variety through lower aggregate
productivity. Also Feenstra (2010) shows that there are no variety gains on the consumption side using
the Sato-Vartia index. In the working paper version of their paper, Hsieh and Ossa (2016) show and
discuss this result in a multi-sector environment with asymmetric countries and CES preferences.
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and gains from specialization interact in this model and increase the overall gains from
trade compared to the standard EK setup. On the other hand, because the vast majority
of goods is only offered by a subset of producer countries, the number of possible sourcing
locations is reduced for those goods. This reduces the specialization gains. I determine
the net effect of these two forces in a quantitative exercise.
Despite the different sets of producible goods across countries the model retains its
tractability. It delivers analytical expressions for bilateral trade flows, the real wage and
the gains from trade, as well as an (augmented) structural gravity equation. The standard
EK model is nested as a special case in which all countries know how to produce all goods.
However, the different measures of goods produced across countries do break the con-
venient result - highlighted by EK - that the distribution of prices importing consumers
actually pay is independent of the origin of the imported goods. Countries produce differ-
ent sets of goods and the competitive environment differs across producer sets. It matters
for the average price whether it is the three most productive countries that produce a
good or the three least productive, for example. Consumers optimally shift expenditure
to the goods produced by sets of countries that offer particularly cheap prices. This may
be the case because the countries in a producer set are all very productive, very close
to the importing country, or have low wages. With CES preferences, this expenditure
shifting term is parsimonious and helps deliver compact analytical expressions.
To assess the magnitude of the gains from trade in this model, I calibrate it to match
aggregate bilateral trade flows between 26 OECD economies. To calibrate the measure of
goods produced by each country, I consider two approaches. First, I take guidance from
theory and assume that the measure of goods produced by each country is proportional
to the size of its labor force so that the share of goods each country is able to produce
is proportional to its share of the world population. This is in the spirit of Krugman
(1980). This way of calibrating the country-specific goods measures implies that gains
from new goods are particularly large in small countries. To alleviate the concern that
the average increase in the gains from trade is driven by this small country bias, I also
consider a symmetric case in which the share of goods produced by each country is an
exogenous constant. This is different from assuming that all countries can produce all
goods as in EK. Because countries randomly draw from a continuum of goods, the goods
shares producible by each country are equally-sized but still country-specific.
A first important result is that both versions of the model predict more trade than
the standard EK model. This stems from the fact that for most of the goods consumed
by each country, domestic sourcing is not an option because each country only produces
a subset of all goods. The level of trade costs needed to match the calibration target,
the observed average trade share in the data, is therefore larger than in a standard EK
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model. This in itself decreases the implied gains from moving from autarky to trade.
Nonetheless, I find that on average the gains from trade increase by 43% relative to
the EK model in the size-proportional case and by 47% in the symmetric case. This
implies that the gains from access to new goods more than outweigh the reduction in the
gains from specialization that occurs because not all countries are available as sourcing
locations for all goods. These similar aggregate numbers hide important differences in the
distribution of the gains across countries between the two models. In the size-proportional
case, the smallest countries benefit most from access to new goods. This leads to a negative
and significant relationship between country size and the increase in the gains from trade
relative to the EK model. In the symmetric case, the gains from new goods are more
evenly distributed across countries. The relationship between size and the increase in the
gains from trade is insignificant here.
A decomposition of the gains from trade into those derived from specialization on com-
parative advantage goods and those derived from access to new goods and their optimal
sourcing reveals a strong positive relationship between country size and the gains from
specialization in the size-proportional case. This stems from the fact that larger countries
are also able to produce more goods. For the largest country, gains from specialization on
own comparative advantage goods account for 12% of total gains. In the symmetric case,
the relationship is weaker and negatively signed reflecting the more even distribution of
producible goods across countries.
This paper relates to the debate over the size of the gains from trade started by Arko-
lakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012). Melitz and Redding (2015) show that small
deviations from the restrictions imposed by ACR lead to variable trade elasticities and
substantial deviations from ACR for the predicted effects of various trade liberalization
scenarios in the heterogeneous firms model. Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2014) and
Ossa (2015) show that the consideration of varying trade elasticities across industries can
significantly increase the predicted gains from trade. Sampson (2016) considers a dynamic
version of the heterogeneous firms model with productivity spillovers from incumbent to
newly entering firms and finds substantial increases in the gains from trade based on dy-
namic selection. Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2018) extend the
ACR formula to the case with variable mark-ups using various demand systems. They
consider only those demands that conform with the macro restrictions imposed by ACR.
They find that the gains from trade implied by the addition of pro-competitive effects are
roughly identical to those predicted by CES models. In contrast to these contributions
my argument is based on a static, single sector model with CES preferences and with-
out intermediate goods, in which the gains from trade increase because the two standard
sources of gains from new goods and reallocation gains interact.
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Other contributions introduce additional sources of gains from trade by considering
cases in which the ACR restrictions are not satisfied. Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2014)
analyze the effect of a log-normal distribution of productivity. Feenstra (2018) consid-
ers a truncated Pareto distribution and QMOR preferences to re-introduce variety and
pro-competitive gains into the Melitz-model. He finds that the truncated productivity
distribution reduces the gains from resource reallocation so much that the net effect on
the gains from trade is negative compared to the unbounded Pareto benchmark without
the variety and pro-competitive channels. Relative to these papers, my model is based on
a Ricardian framework with heterogeneous producers. The reallocation gains from trade
derive from the specialization of countries on their comparative advantage goods instead
of expansion of high productivity firms. By abstracting from entry and exit, the gains
from new goods in my model are conceptually more similar to Krugman or Armington-
type models than to models featuring endogenous selection. However, the possibility to
choose the sourcing location for newly available goods introduces a previously unstudied
interaction of new goods and reallocation gains from trade. While my model also deviates
from one ACR restriction because it does not feature a CES import demand system, the
model remains tractable because CES preferences and unbounded (Fréchet) distributions
can continue to be used.
This paper also relates to a recent literature that extends the EK model in various
directions and applies it in quantitative work, e.g. Alvarez and Lucas, Jr. (2007), Fieler
(2011), Shikher (2011), Caliendo and Parro (2015), and Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and
Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez (2016). Ramondo and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) consider an extension
of the EK model to multinational production and its interaction with goods trade to
assess the gains from openness. Their contribution is related to this paper in the sense
that they also add an additional channel through which countries gain from openness
in a Ricardian model beyond the standard specialization gains. Most closely related
is the paper by Somale (2017), who considers the interaction of directed research and
comparative advantage. To my knowledge it is the only other work based on EK that
modifies the innovation process underlying the Fréchet distribution of productivity. In
contrast to Somale (2017), the focus of my work is not on the interaction of research,
innovation and comparative advantage, but on the interaction of access to new goods and
specialization in determining the magnitude of the gains from trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 develops the theoreti-
cal model. In Section III.3 the quantitative exercise is described and results are presented.
Section III.4 concludes.
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III.2 A Ricardian Trade Model with Gains from New
Goods
In this section I outline a Ricardian model of trade based on EK in which countries
produce different sets of goods in autarky. When they open up to trade, consumers can
buy previously consumed goods from the lowest-cost supplier and in addition get access
to new goods.
To do so, I modify the innovation process that underlies the productivity distribution in
the EK model. While the Fréchet distribution of productivity is assumed to be exogenous
in EK, Eaton and Kortum (2001) provide a microfoundation of this distribution based on
an innovation process that delivers the Fréchet distribution as the technology frontier at
some point in time. The innovation process is particularly simple in their model because
of the assumption that the continuum of producible goods is identical across countries
and has unit measure. I modify this assumption to introduce gains from new goods.
III.2.1 The Technology Frontier
There is a continuum J of goods that is potentially producible. Each country i out
of the set C = {1, . . . , N} of countries randomly draws a measure Si ⊂ J of goods
for which it then possesses a production technology.3 This model therefore features two
randomization stages. First, each country randomly draws a measure of goods Si. Second,
and conditional on this set of goods, the productivities are drawn.
As is shown in Appendix C.1.1, the modified technology frontier is then given by
Fi(z, Si) = Pr [Zi ≤ z] =
Si
J
exp
{
−Ti
Si
z−θ
}
+
J − Si
J
. (III.1)
For the fraction of goods Si
J
, which i is able to produce, productivity is distributed
according to a scaled Fréchet distribution.4 The goods for which i does not possess the
technology have zero productivity, so the probability of having a productivity lower than
z is unity.
3Without loss of generality, J can be normalized to unity so that Si is the share of goods producible
by country i. I stick to J here for clarity of exposition. However, in the calibration exercise I will assume
that Si is proportional to country size Li and set J to the sum of all country sizes. This is then equivalent
to normalizing J to unity and letting each country produce a share of goods that is proportional to their
share of “world” population.
4The scaling is consistent with the generalization of the technology frontier noted in Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2011), footnote 11.
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III.2.2 Setup of the Model
While utility and pricing are identical to the original model proposed by EK, the inter-
action of technology frontiers across countries generates new price distributions as I show
below.
III.2.2.1 Utility and Pricing
Utility of a representative consumer is identical across countries and is given by the CES
aggregate
U =
[∫ J
0
q(j)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
, (III.2)
with σ > 1. Goods are substitutes and consumers have love of variety. There is perfect
competition so that the price offered by country i to n for variety j is
pni(j) =
wi
zi(j)
dni.
5 (III.3)
If j cannot be produced by i, zi(j) = 0 and accordingly the price offered to n goes to
infinity. Each country buys from the cheapest source, so that
pn(j) = min {pni(j), i = 1, . . . , N} .
III.2.2.2 Technology in the Open Economy
To fix ideas about the way in which the country-specific measures of goods interact in
this Ricardian model, consider a world with two countries, i.e. N = 2 and C = {1, 2}.
Due to the randomly drawn technologies, the knowledge to produce a good j could be in
the possession of each subset of C including C itself. This is the power set of C,
P(C) = {{} , {1} , {2} , {1, 2}}
with cardinality |P(C)| = 4 = 2N . For what follows, it is useful to define each element
c ∈ P(C) as a producer set.
To be able to work with the producer sets, it is important to determine which goods are
produced by which set. Figure III.1 shows a possible distribution of technologies across
the two countries for a normalized measure of existing goods. Each country i knows how
to produce a fraction Si/J of all goods. Each producer set is now attached to a range on
5The assumption that labor is the only factor of production and that intermediate inputs are not used
is made in order to focus on the new mechanism. It can be relaxed easily.
CHAPTER III. RICARDIAN NEW GOODS GAINS 101
Figure III.1: Technology in the Open Economy
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S1/J
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the goods line, whose length is labeled λ(c). Intuitively, it must hold that
∑
c λ(c) = 1
and
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) = Si/J .
6 This will be shown formally below.
Figure III.1 also shows how specialization and gains from new goods interact in this
model. For the goods in λ (c = {1, 2}) that are produced by both countries, country 1 can
choose whether to source those goods domestically or from abroad, benefiting from lower
prices abroad for some goods. The goods in λ (c = {2}) are not available for consumption
in autarky. These are new goods that introduce gains from new goods for consumers in
country 1. Consumers derive no gains from trade for the goods produced only by country
1 in λ (c = {1}). They are consumed as in autarky. However, because country 1 is the
sole provider of these goods on the world market it will capture full world demand for
these just as country 2 captures full world demand for the goods in λ (c = {2}). In more
complex settings with N countries, country 1 does not only have one foreign country to
source from. For most of the new goods, there will be several potential suppliers. Country
1 consumers will therefore benefit from access to these new goods and the fact that they
can buy from the lowest-cost producer of each of the new goods. Finally, there is a range
of goods λ (c = {}) that are not produced at all - no country possesses the technology to
produce these goods.
III.2.2.3 The Distribution of Prices
Returning to the full model with N countries, the prices each country offers are determined
using equation (III.3) in the technology frontier (III.1). It follows directly that the fraction
6The second sum reads as the sum over all producer sets c in which i is an element.
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of goods for which i offers a price lower than p to n is
Si
J
Gni(p) =
Si
J
(
1− exp
{
−Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ pθ
})
, (III.4)
while the fraction of goods for which i offers a finite price larger than p to n is
Si
J
[1−Gni(p)] .
Because goods are drawn randomly and independently across countries, the fraction of
goods for which all countries jointly charge a finite price larger than p in n is
N∏
i=1
Si
J
[1−Gni(p)] = λ(C) exp
{
−pθΦn(C)
}
,
with λ(C) =
∏N
i=1
Si
J
and Φn(C) =
∑N
i=1
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ. Analogously, for any other producer
set c 6= C, the fraction of goods for which all producing countries jointly charge a finite
price larger than p while all non-producing countries have zero productivity for these
goods and therefore charge p→∞ (i.e. their probability of charging a price greater than
p is unity) is
∏
i∈c
Si
J
[1−Gni(p)]
∏
i/∈c
J − Si
J
· 1 = λ(c) exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}
,
with λ(c) =
∏
i∈c
Si
J
∏
i/∈c
J−Si
J
and Φn(c) =
∑
i∈c
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ. These expressions reflect
the two randomization stages of the model. First, countries randomly draw a set Si
of goods they know how to produce. From the definition above it becomes clear that
λ(c) is the probability that a good is produced jointly by the countries in c (and only by
them). This is then also the share of goods that is offered jointly by the countries in c. The
term summarizes the weight attached to each producer set on the goods line. Second, and
conditional on this goods share, the exponential summarizes the distribution of prices that
are offered to n by the countries in c. Φn(c) then depends on c, because in each producer
set different (numbers of) producer countries generate different price distributions in n.
The fraction of goods produced by the countries in c and for which the producers jointly
charge a price smaller than p in n is then given by λ(c)
(
1− exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
})
. The price
distribution in n is then the fraction of all goods for which the price pn that n actually
pays is lower than p. Aggregating over producer sets,
Gn(p) = Pr [pn < p] = 1−
∑
c
λ(c) exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}
, (III.5)
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where
∑
c λ(c) = 1.
7 Equation (III.5) nicely shows how the model nests the EK model as
a special case. In EK, all countries produce all goods so that Si = J ∀ i and therefore
λ(C) = 1 and λ(c) = 0 ∀ c 6= C. The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma III.1 The λ(c) appropriately weight the aggregation across producer sets. In
particular it holds that
∑
c λ(c) = 1 and
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) =
Si
J
. Equation (III.5) is therefore
the aggregate price distribution.
Proof: See Appendix C.1.2.
III.2.3 Goods Shares and the Price Index
Because the aggregation across producer sets is so parsimonious in this model, the stan-
dard EK algebra can be applied to derive goods shares and the country-level price index.
As is shown in Appendix C.1.3, the fraction of goods that country n buys from i is given
by
π̄ni =
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Ti (dniwi)
−θ
SiΦn(c)
=
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)πni(c). (III.6)
At the producer set level, the share of goods bought by n from i depends negatively
on trade and production costs and positively on country-level productivity Ti/Si relative
to the corresponding variables of all other competitors, summarized in the Φn(c)-term.
The dependence of Φn(c) on the producer set is again crucial because (the number of)
competitors differ across producer sets. For example, in a set with very few competitors,
a country will provide a larger fraction of goods to n simply because there are only few
potential suppliers available.8 These goods shares at the producer set level are then
aggregated with the appropriate weight of the producer set on the goods line to the
aggregate share of goods bought by n from i. In other words, π̄ni denotes the probability
that a randomly picked good j is bought in n from i. The answer reflects again the two
randomization stages. First, what is the probability that the good is produced by the
producer set c and second, conditional on the producer set, what is the probability that
the price charged by country i is the lowest price available?9
Using similar techniques, the result from equation (III.5) can be applied to derive the
CES price index that is dual to the utility function (III.2). As is shown in Appendix
7This summation includes the producer set that is the empty set. This set has the weight λ (c = {}) =∏N
i=1
J−Si
J and the probability that the price offered to n is larger than p is unity. One way to see this
is to recognize that Φn(c = {}) =
∑
i∈c
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
= 0 because the sum has no elements.
8By construction there is a producer set for each country, in which that country is the sole supplier
of a particular range of goods. Because this model assumes perfect competition, this does not have an
effect on mark-ups and countries do not exploit their “monopoly”.
9The derivation in Appendix C.1.3 formally deals with the case in which country i is not an element
of a particular producer set.
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C.1.4,
P 1−σn =
∑
c
Pn(c)
1−σ = γ1−σ
∑
c
λ(c)Φn(c)
σ−1
θ , (III.7)
where γ is a constant and I impose θ > σ − 1 in order to obtain a well-defined price
index. Also here do the λ(c)-terms provide the appropriate weighting of the different
competitive environments in the individual producer sets as given by the Φn(c)-terms.
The model collapses again to the EK case when Si = J ∀ i.
III.2.4 Expenditure Shares
In addition to the goods shares and the price index, a third property of the Fréchet dis-
tribution is important for the functioning of the model. EK show that the distribution
of prices in a country is independent of the location from which goods are sourced. In
other words, there is no intensive margin adjustment: when a sourcing location becomes
cheaper, the importing country increases the range of goods that are sourced from this
location - adding increasingly expensive goods - until the price distribution is again iden-
tical to that of the goods that are sourced from other locations. This property allows EK
to treat goods shares also as expenditure shares.
That is the case in this model only at the level of each producer set. Conditional on
the set of producer countries, goods shares are chosen such that the price distributions
equalize across producer countries within the producer set. Therefore πni(c) is the fraction
of goods bought from i by n in producer set c and also the fraction of expenditure allocated
to country i out of the expenditure spent on producer set c.
The fact that different countries produce different (measures of) goods prevents price
distributions from being equalized conditional on a sourcing location. Therefore, π̄ni is
not the share of expenditure allocated by n to goods from i. To arrive at the proper
expenditure share, producer set level expenditure shares πni(c) need to be weighted with
the share of total expenditure allocated to a particular producer set.
With CES preferences, these expenditure shares are parsimonious. Producer set goods
shares need to be weighted simply with the relative size of the producer set’s price index,
πni =
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
πni(c). (III.8)
Because 1−σ < 0, producer sets in which prices are low relative to the overall price index
receive larger expenditure shares and vice versa. Pn(c) is small when Φn(c) is large. In
the model, Φn(c) can be large for two reasons. First, if the producer set contains many
countries, the longer sum raises Φn(c). Intuitively, the more countries are active in a
producer set, the more numerous are the sourcing options country n faces. The more
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competitors there are, the more are supplier countries squeezed to selling only their most
productive goods, thereby lowering the price index at the producer set level. Second,
aggregate productivity, wages and trade costs determine the size of Φn(c). Two producer
sets with the same number of competitors can differ in the price indeces they imply if the
countries in one of them are much more productive than the ones in the other. Trade
costs and wages have similar effects. The price index implied by a producer set with three
close countries will - everything else equal - be lower than the price index of a producer
set with the identical number of countries that are more distant. The following lemma
summarizes these results.
Lemma III.2 At the producer set level, price distributions are independent of the sourc-
ing location. Because different countries produce different (measures of) goods, this inde-
pendence result does not hold in the aggregate. Equation (III.6) only represents aggregate
goods shares. Consumers shift expenditure towards cheaper producer sets so that expendi-
ture shares πni are given by equation (III.8).
Proof: See Appendix C.1.5.
III.2.5 Bilateral Trade Flows and the Gravity Equation
With expenditure shares properly defined, bilateral trade flows Xni can be written as
Xni =
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
πni(c)Xn, (III.9)
where Xn is aggregate expenditure in country n. I show in Appendix C.1.6 that these
trade flows satisfy a gravity equation of the form
Xni =
(
dni
Pn
)−θ
Λn∑N
m=1
(
dmi
Pm
)−θ
XmΛm
XnQi, (III.10)
where Λn =
∑
c:i∈c λ(c)
θ
σ−1
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)θ+1−σ
is an additional term that reflects the measure
of goods produced by the exporting country and the expenditure shares allocated to it
by the importing country. It takes the value of 1 in the EK model. As Λn sums over all
producer sets in which a given exporter is active, this model implies that a country will
export a lot if it has a large economic mass Qi and if it is able to produce many goods.
However, Λn has no consequences for the (partial equilibrium) elasticity of trade with
respect to trade costs because it is monadic. When equation (III.10) is log-linearized, Λn
is captured by the importer fixed effect. The Λm-terms disappear in the exporter fixed
effect. The fact that different countries produce different measures of goods has thus only
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an effect on the level of trade flows, but not on (partial equilibrium) percentage changes
following changes in trade costs.
III.2.6 Equilibrium
The model is closed by two conditions. First, labor markets must clear. With labor as
the only factor of production in the economy, labor income in i equals total worldwide
sales of a country,
wiLi =
∑
n
πniXn. (III.11)
Second, goods markets clear so that aggregate expenditure is equal to aggregate income,
wiLi = Xi. (III.12)
Taken together, and eliminating domestic sales on both sides of the equation, equations
(III.11) and (III.12) imply balanced trade so that total imports equal total exports in
each country, ∑
n 6=i
πinXi =
∑
n6=i
πniXn. (III.13)
III.2.7 Autarky and the Gains from Trade
The expression for the gains from trade is the key object to study the interaction of gains
from specialization and gains from new goods. I adopt the real wage wi/Pi as the welfare
measure. As shown in Appendix C.1.7, the real wage in the open economy can be written
as (
wi
Pi
)
T
=
(
Ti
Siπii
) 1
θ
γ−1
[∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
θ
σ−1
(
Pi(c)
Pi
)θ+1−σ] 1θ
. (III.14)
The autarky real wage (wi/Pi)A can be obtained by setting πii = 1 and noting that in au-
tarky country i only consumes the fraction Si/J of goods i it produces itself. Because the
prices for all other goods are infinity, the expression in parentheses collapses to (Si/J)
1
σ−1
and the autarky real wage is
(
wi
Pi
)
A
=
(
Ti
Si
) 1
θ
γ−1
(
Si
J
) 1
σ−1
. (III.15)
When countries produce different sets of goods, it is not only country-level productivity
Ti that matters for welfare. Because θ > σ− 1 and σ > 1 by assumption, the elasticity of
the autarky real wage with respect to the measure Si of goods producible in the economy
is 1
σ−1 −
1
θ
> 0. In addition to higher productivity, countries that are able to produce
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more goods are richer in per-capita terms due to love of variety (1/ (σ − 1)) despite the
fact that the number of available ideas Ti is spread over a larger set of goods (−1/θ).
Dividing equation (III.14) by equation (III.15), the gains from trade are given by
GTi = π
− 1
θ
ii
[∑
c:i∈c
[
λ(c)
(Si/J)
] θ
σ−1
(
Pi(c)
Pi
)θ+1−σ] 1θ
. (III.16)
In addition to the well-known inverse of the domestic expenditure share πii, GTi contains
a second term that reflects how expenditure is spread across producer sets as foreign
sourcing locations as well as new goods become available. Recall that
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) =
Si/J so that the first brackets after the summation simply reflect how the fraction of
goods produced by i in autarky is now split up into different producer sets with different
(numbers of) competitors. The term in parentheses accounts for the expenditure shares
that are allocated to these producer sets. It is important to keep in mind that the
price index Pi also contains goods that were unattainable for country i in autarky. The
expenditure shares Pi(c)/Pi therefore reflect the gains from new goods indirectly: the
larger the measure of new goods available under trade and the cheaper these are, the
lower is Pi relative to previously consumable goods in Pi(c) and therefore also the fraction
of aggregate expenditure allocated to the previously available goods.
The distinction between the gains from specialization and those from the access to
new goods is more easily visible in the following decomposition of the gains from trade.
As is shown in Appendix C.1.8, they can be written as
GTi =
[∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Si/J
πii(c)
−σ−1
θ
] 1
σ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GTi,SP
(
Pi,SP
Pi,T
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GTi,NG
, (III.17)
where Pi,T is the price index in country i with trade and Pi,SP is the price index of goods
for which gains arise from specialization only, that is, those that i can also produce in
autarky: P 1−σi,SP =
∑
c:i∈c Pi(c)
1−σ. The first term shows how the fraction Si/J of goods
producible in autarky is divided into producer sets with weights λ(c) on the goods line
and a fraction πii(c) of expenditure allocated to producer set c that is spent on domestic
goods. I label those gains specialization gains GTi,SP . These are gains from trade that
stem purely from sourcing some of the autarky goods from other countries at cheaper
prices. The second factor measures the relative size of the overall price index to the price
index of the goods producible at home under trade. Due to love of variety, each new
good with a finite price lowers Pi,T relative to Pi,SP . The more new goods there are for
country i (i.e. the smaller Si), the larger is the ratio in parentheses. Therefore, GTi,NG
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measures the gains from new goods that cannot be produced in autarky. These gains also
include gains from specialization because the price index of goods sourced from abroad is
already optimized with respect to the sourcing locations. This means that the price index
Pi,T already contains the optimized sourcing decisions of country i for the newly available
goods and thus also reflects the specialization of the producer countries.10 The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition III.1 When countries produce different sets of goods, the gains from trade
are given by equation (III.17). The first term measures the gains derived from importing
previously producible goods from abroad at lower prices. The second term measures the
gains derived from the fall in the price index due to the availability of previously uncon-
sumed goods.
Proof: See Appendix C.1.8.
What can be said about the size of the gains from trade based on equation (III.17)? It
is not clear ex-ante whether the overall gains from trade are larger than in the EK model.
While the gains from new goods are clearly a new source of gains that is absent in the
standard model, the gains from specialization are reduced relative to EK, where there are
N sourcing options for each good. In this model, the great majority of goods can only
be sourced from a subset of all countries. This reduces the gains from specialization as
measured by the first part of equation (III.17) and the specialization component that is
embedded in the ‘New Goods’ part of the gains from trade. I assess the relative size of
those two forces in the following quantitative exercise.
III.3 Quantitative Exercise
The key new variable in this model is the share of goods produced by each country
Si/J . In the quantitative analysis, I consider two instructive ways of calibrating this
variable which are described in detail below.11 In both cases I follow the theoretical result
from Eaton and Kortum (2001) and the calibration exercises conducted by Ramondo and
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) and Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez (2016)
in calibrating the ratio Ti/Li proportional to the research intensity µi. For clarity of the
theoretical effects of this choice, I include this formulation in the following exposition of
the two cases before describing the data these variables are matched to.
10It seems difficult to disentangle specialization and gains from new goods further because it is unclear
what the right counterfactual is. Countries produce different sets of goods, so it is not possible to construct
a benchmark price index in which i buys all new goods from one particular country, for example.
11I discuss alternative approaches to the one presented here in Section III.3.5.
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III.3.1 The Size-Proportional Case
In this first case, I let theory be my guide in the choice of Si/J . Reflecting the free entry
result from Krugman (1980), I assume that the measure of goods produced by a country is
proportional to the size of its labor force, so that Si = Li. The fraction of goods produced
by each country is then equal to its share of the world population, Si/J = Li/
∑
k Lk. This
is observationally equivalent to normalizing J to unity (as in EK) and letting countries
produce measures of goods proportional to their share in the world population.
The real wage in autarky is then given by
(
wi
Pi
)
A
= γ−1
(
Ti
Li
) 1
θ
(
Li∑
k Lk
) 1
σ−1
= γ−1µ
1
θ
i
(
Li∑
k Lk
) 1
σ−1
. (III.18)
This case is interesting because it highlights a link of this model to the monopolistic
competition models of trade. In the standard EK model, Li = J = 1 so that there is
a technological scale effect. Larger countries have higher aggregate productivity Ti and
therefore enjoy a higher real wage in autarky. The theory-consistent choice of the param-
eterization of the measure of producible goods Si = Li exactly cancels this technological
scale effect and replaces it with a love of variety scale effect present in the monopolistic
competition trade models. Larger countries do produce more ideas but they are absorbed
by the larger measure of goods they apply to. Instead, consumers enjoy a higher real
wage in autarky through the larger measure of varieties available for consumption and
captured by the term (Li/
∑
k Lk)
1
σ−1 .12
The gains from trade then become
GTi =
[∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Li/
∑
k Lk
πii(c)
1−σ
θ
]− 1
1−σ (
Pi,SP
Pi,T
)
. (III.19)
Because smaller countries produce fewer goods in autarky, gains from new goods de-
crease in country size. While there are fewer goods that a large country cannot produce in
autarky, small countries face a large expansion in the set of consumable goods when they
open up to trade. The smaller the country, the larger Pi,SP/Pi,T . The new goods gains
from trade are thus of particular benefit to small countries. The size-proportionality of
the measure of goods also implies via the gravity equation (III.10) that large countries do
not only export a lot because of their economic mass, but also because they have more
goods to offer.
12In Krugman (1980), autarky welfare can be written as P−1K =
σ−1
σ ϕ
(
L
σf
) 1
σ−1
and in Melitz (2003),
autarky welfare is P−1M =
σ−1
σ ϕ̃
(
L
σ(π̄+f)
) 1
σ−1
.
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III.3.2 The Symmetric Case
Because the first case creates a strong bias in gains from new goods towards small coun-
tries, the concern arises that an increase in the gains from trade relative to the standard
EK model may be driven by this assumption. To alleviate this concern, I consider a
second, symmetric case in which countries produce equally sized but - due to the random
draw - different sets of goods of measure Si = 1/N with J = 1 and N being the number
of countries in the model.13
In this case, the autarky real wage is given by
(
wi
Pi
)
A
= γ−1
(
Ti
Si
) 1
θ
(
Si
J
) 1
σ−1
= γ−1 (µiLi)
1
θ
(
1
N
) 1
σ−1−
1
θ
. (III.20)
With this specification, all countries profit from access to new goods to the same extent
and the results reflect the interaction of these new goods gains with the country-specific
gains from specialization. The gains from trade are here given by
GTi =
[∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)Nπii(c)
1−σ
θ
]− 1
1−σ (
Pi,SP
Pi,T
)
. (III.21)
As in the general case, the first term in brackets reflects how consumption spending
over the measure 1/N of goods that were available in autarky is now spread over other
producing countries. In contrast to the size-proportional case above, there is no systematic
bias towards small countries in the term reflecting the new goods gains from trade. Each
country gets access to an equally-sized measure of new goods.
III.3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to match aggregate trade data from 26 OECD countries to assess
the effect of the interaction of new goods gains with specialization on the magnitude of
the gains from trade.
I use the dataset provided by Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez
(2016). Structural parameters to be calibrated are θ and σ, in addition to country sizes
Li, research intensities µi, and the matrix dni of bilateral trade costs.
13Note that 1/N is chosen only for convenience. I discuss the effect of choosing different constants in
Section III.3.4.3.
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III.3.3.1 Parameters and Data
The model outlined in Section III.2 implies a log-linear gravity equation. It is therefore
model-consistent to turn to the trade literature for estimates of θ. Head and Mayer (2014)
find a mean estimate of 3.78 for structural gravity estimates and Simonovska and Waugh
(2014) find a value of θ between 4 and 5. I set θ = 4.
In contrast to the EK model, the value of the elasticity of substitution σ matters for the
gains from trade in this model. The larger σ, the larger is the elasticity of substitution
between goods. This reduces the utility gains from new goods. I follow established
estimates in the literature, e.g. Broda and Weinstein (2006), and choose σ = 4, which is
also consistent with the parameter restriction needed for a finite price index, θ > σ − 1.
Following Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez (2016), country sizes
Li are set to the measures of equipped labor from Klenow and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2005).
This measure corrects for differences in physical and human capital per worker. They are
also used to construct the producible goods measures in the size-proportional case, with
Si = Li and J =
∑
i Li. It is important to stress that although the producible goods
shares add up to unity, producible goods shares of different countries overlap because of
the random draw. As a consequence there is also a fraction of the unit measure of goods
that is not produced at all as indicated in Figure III.1.
I follow Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-Rodŕıguez (2016) in setting the re-
search intensity µi proportional to the share of country-level R&D-employment. These
shares are taken from the World Development Indicators and are averaged over the 1990s.
With the assumption that Ti = µiLi, this produces a calibration of technology levels as
in Ramondo and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) and Ramondo, Rodŕıguez-Clare, and Saboŕıo-
Rodŕıguez (2016).
In principle any cross-section of trade data can be matched perfectly when trade costs
are treated as free parameters. It is therefore important to discipline them as a function
of known core determinants. To keep things simple, bilateral trade costs are defined as
dni = exp {β1} distβ2ni for i 6= n,
where distni is the distance between the most populated cities of countries n and i from
CEPII. I target a distance elasticity of −1.05, which is well in line with estimates from
the literature. See Head and Mayer (2014) for a survey. With θ = 4, this implies a
value of β2 = 0.2625. β1 is then calibrated to produce trade flows whose average matches
the average bilateral trade in manufacturing in the data. Bilateral trade flows Xni are
averaged over 1996-2001 from OECD STAN. The average bilateral trade share in the data
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is 0.0155.14
III.3.3.2 Calibration Procedure
The wage updating function at the heart of the code follows Alvarez and Lucas, Jr. (2007).
Given exogenous parameters θ, σ, country sizes Li and technology levels Ti = µiLi, as well
as the matrix of trade costs dni and an initial wage guess, model outcomes are calculated
using the equilibrium expressions for trade shares and price indeces. Aggregate exports
and imports of each country are evaluated using an excess demand function. The nominal
wages of countries that export more than they import are raised, the others lowered. With
the updated wage, new excess demand functions are calculated. This algorithm is repeated
until the percentage change in wages falls below some threshold level.
In extending the basic code to allow for different measures of produced goods across
countries, the main challenge is the introduction of producer sets. With N = 26 coun-
tries, there are 2N = 67108864 producer sets to be considered. I keep track of them by
converting the numbers from 0 to 226 − 1 into binary numbers, each with 26 places. The
permutations of ones and zeros then reflect all possible permutations of producer combi-
nations, where the ones indicate membership of a country in a producer set. For example,
the producer set corresponding to the number 67108863 consists of N = 26 ones in the
binary system and represents the producer set in which all countries are members. The
producer set matrix is then an N × 2N matrix.
Next, I use the matrix of producible goods measures Si and J − Si together with the
producer set matrix to calculate the λ(c)s for each producer set. The producer set matrix
is then applied to calculate the N × 2N matrix of Φn(c)-terms - each country i consumes
goods from all producer sets, which differ in their composition. Given the matrix of
Φn(c)s, application of equation (III.7) first gives the matrix of producer set level price
indeces Pn(c) and subsequent summation gives the vector of price indeces Pn consistent
with the initial wage guess.
With Φn(c), Pn(c), and Pn in hand, the N×N×2N matrix of trade shares πni(c) at the
producer set level can be constructed. Using equation (III.8) they are then summed over
the third dimension to give the N ×N aggregate expenditure trade shares πni from which
aggregate trade flows Xni can be constructed to evaluate the balanced trade condition
(III.13).
Due to the large number of producer sets the matrices take up a lot of memory, I
divide the producer set matrix into several parts and let the computer calculate each part
in turn before summing up to the aggregate total.
14Country-level absorption is calculated from the same data as production minus exports plus imports
from the sample countries in manufacturing.
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Table III.1: Model Overview
model goods measures R-squared β1 avg GT median GT
Eaton-Kortum Si/J = 1 0.9361 0.8206 16.45% 10.95%
New Goods, size-prop. Si/J = Li/
∑
i Li 0.9303 1.1034 23.42% 13.42%
New Goods, symmetric Si/J = 1/N 0.9379 1.0773 21.88% 14.41%
Note: The column R-squared contains the goodness of fit between the actual bilateral trade flows
between 26 OECD countries and those predicted by the model. β1 is a global trade cost shifter chosen
so that the model produces trade flows whose average matches the average trade share in the data.
For the calibration of the parameter β1 I add an upper level loop over the algorithm
calculating the equilibrium that evaluates the average trade share produced by the model
after each round. If the average trade share is larger than the targeted value of 0.0155
from the data, β1 is increased in proportion to the difference between the target and the
actual value in the next round until the model outcome equals the target exactly and vice
versa.
III.3.4 Results
In this section, the quantitative implications of the model are evaluated. I first consider
the size-proportional case in which the measure of goods produced by each country is
proportional to the size of its labor force so that there are scale effects as in monopolistic
competition models of trade. To analyze the extent to which the results are driven by
the fact that this assumption disproportionately allocates large gains from new goods to
smaller countries I then continue to examine the symmetric case, in which each country
is able to produce an equally-sized share of all goods.
I compare both versions of the New Goods model to the standard EK model. To
discipline the models, each of them is calibrated to match the average trade share found
in the data so that the calibrated values of β1 differ between them. Table III.1 summarizes
the model characteristics.
While all models match the data well, the value of β1 that is needed to match the
average trade share is higher in the New Goods models than in the standard EK model.
This implies that the New Goods models predict higher trade flows for a given level of
trade costs, which is a consequence of the fact that countries produce different sets of
goods. For each country there is some measure of goods for which home production is
not an option. Hence, the fraction of expenditure that is allocated to goods produced at
home is lower than in the standard EK model, in which home production is an option for
all goods. The need to buy new goods from abroad therefore increases overall trade flows.
This effect can also be seen in the modified gravity equation (III.10). In the propor-
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tional case larger countries export more for two reasons. First, because their aggregate
expenditure is higher. This is a standard gravity feature. Second, larger countries pro-
duce more goods and therefore face more demand for their goods from all over the world.
Seen from the importer’s perspective, trade flows are now skewed towards large exporter
countries beyond the standard gravity effect, because they are a sourcing option for a
larger fraction of the goods that are consumed.
In the symmetric case, the calibrated value of β1 is lower than in the proportional case
but still larger than in the standard model. This shows that the larger trade flows are not
driven by the proportionality assumption, but arise because domestic sourcing is not an
option for all goods. The fact that larger countries are able to produce more goods only
strengthens this effect.
In both cases, the gains from trade are larger in the New Goods model than in the
standard EK model both on average as well as at the median. These aggregate numbers
already provide an important result of the quantitative exercise. The increase in the gains
from trade through access to new goods is larger than the loss that comes from a reduced
number of sourcing options for many of the consumed goods. There is a net increase in
the gains from trade relative to the standard model. Because these numbers mask a lot
of heterogeneity, I now turn to analyzing the results in more detail.
III.3.4.1 The Gains from Trade
Figure III.2 plots the gains from trade in the standard EK model and the New Goods
models as a function of relative country size.15 The stars show that smaller countries gain
more from trade than large ones even when all countries produce all goods. This effect
is well established and stems from the fact that small countries face a disproportionate
increase in demand for their comparative advantage goods when they open up to trade.
In addition, this relationship is reinforced by the way technology levels are calibrated. Be-
cause technology is proportional to country size, larger countries are also more productive
and will have higher domestic expenditure shares.
The triangles show the gains from trade in the case in which the measure of goods is
proportional to country size. All triangles lie above the stars, indicating that across all
country sizes the gains from trade in the size-proportional New Goods model are larger
than in the EK model. This is also true for the squares, which show the gains from trade
in the symmetric case of the New Goods model.
While the increase in the gains from trade from access to new goods outweighs the
losses due to the reduced specialization gains for all countries and in both model speci-
15I document the numbers corresponding to the data points in all graphs of this section in Appendix
C.2.
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Figure III.2: Country Size and the Gains from Trade
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fications, the assumptions about the relationship between country size and the measure
of producible goods matter for the distribution of the additional gains from trade across
countries. As the relative position of the triangles and the squares indicates, large coun-
tries gain more in the symmetric case than in the size-proportional case because the
measure of new goods is larger for them in the symmetric case. Small countries gain more
when gains from new goods are particularly strong for them in the size-proportional case.
III.3.4.2 The Change in the Gains from Trade
Having established that the interaction of gains from new goods with Ricardian specializa-
tion unambiguously increases the gains from trade relative to the standard model, Figure
III.3 assesses the relative change in the gains from trade compared to the EK model across
countries and assumptions about the distribution of producible goods measures.
For example, the data points on the very right-hand side of the graph show the U.S.,
whose gains from trade are about 23% higher compared to the standard model in the
size-proportional case, while those of Iceland, the smallest country, increase by 82%. In
the symmetric case, the relationship is reversed. The U.S. gains from trade increase by
about 73%, while those of Iceland only increase by about 39%.
More generally, the plot shows that the smallest countries attain the largest percentage
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Figure III.3: Country Size and the Change in Gains from Trade
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Note: The bold line is fitted to the triangles and the thin line is fitted to the squares.
increases in their gains from trade relative to the EK model in the size-proportional
case, when the gains from new goods are largest for them. The elasticity of the relative
increase in the gains from trade with respect to country size for the size-proportional case
is −0.2022 and is significant at the 5%-level.
In the symmetric case, on the other hand, the relationship between the relative increase
in the gains from trade and country size is slightly positive with an elasticity of 0.0881
but insignificant (p-value 0.29). This reflects the fact that the gains from new goods are
distributed more evenly across countries in the symmetric case.
Despite the fact that underlying assumptions matter for the distribution of the gains
from new goods across countries, on average the increase in the gains from trade relative
to the EK model is quite similar in both models. In the size-proportional case the gains
from trade increase by 43.42% on average and by 39.71% at the median, while the average
increase in the gains from trade in the symmetric case is 46.69% and an increase by 38.77%
at the median. The increase in the gains from trade relative to the standard model seems
to be quite robust.
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Figure III.4: Decomposition of the Gains from Trade
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III.3.4.3 Gains from Trade Decomposition
Finally, it is of interest to decompose the contributions of gains from specialization and
gains from new goods in this model. Figure III.4 plots the share of gains from trade that
are derived from pure specialization (i.e. from sourcing autarky-consumed goods from
abroad) against the log of relative country size following the decomposition in equation
(III.17).
The share of the gains from specialization in total gains is strongly correlated with
country size in the size-proportional case. The elasticity is 1.0023 and significant at
the 1%-level. The source of this strong positive relationship is the proportionality of
the measure of producible goods with country size. With this assumption, the fraction
of goods for which standard Ricardian specialization is possible increases directly with
country size, thereby also increasing the share this type of gains accounts for in overall
gains from trade. To see this, note that following equation (III.17), it is possible to write
the share of the gains from trade derived from specialization on comparative advantage
goods as (
GTi,SP
GTi
)
prop.
=
(
Pi,T
Pi,SP
)
prop.
.
From this equation it is clear that the price index of the producible goods under trade Pi,SP
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is smaller for larger countries simply because it contains the prices of a larger measure
of goods. Love of variety in preferences causes this effect. It follows that the price index
Pi,SP is already relatively close to the (even smaller) full price index Pi,T so that the share
of the gains from trade accounted for by standard specialization is relatively large.
In the symmetric case, the relationship between country size and the share of spe-
cialization gains from trade is reversed. The elasticity is −0.2830 and significant at the
1%-level as well. The absolute value of the slope is reduced by more than two thirds com-
pared to the size-proportional case reflecting the even distribution of producible goods
across countries. Still, the share of total gains from trade derived from specialization on
comparative advantage goods is smaller for larger countries. To understand this relation-
ship, express the share of total gains attributable to specialization gains as unity minus
the share of gains from trade coming from new goods. It is then possible to write
(
GTi,SP
GTi
)
symm.
= 1−
[∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)Nπii(c)
1−σ
θ
] 1
1−σ
,
where it is understood that the right-hand side variables λ(c) and πii(c) generally dif-
fer from their counterparts in the size-proportional case. Because all countries produce
equally-sized measures of goods, the only source of variation in the shares of specialization
gains across countries are the domestic production shares
πii(c) =
µiLi
1/N
w−θi
Φi(c)
.
In contrast to the size-proportional case, the symmetric case features the technological
scale effect implied by the microfoundation in Eaton and Kortum (2001) and used in
the calibration instead of the love of variety scale effect as in the symmetric case. Larger
countries therefore enjoy a higher average productivity. This means that the attractiveness
of domestic production increases in country size. Higher πii(c) then reduce the gains from
specialization for larger (and hence more productive) countries and also the share of total
gains derived from it.
In this model the share of specialization gains as measured by the decomposition
formula (III.17) lie below 10% of total gains. It is important to keep in mind that the
remaining 90% or more that are allocated to the ‘new goods’ bin by the formula also
contain gains from the possibility to buy the new goods from the cheapest producer,
measuring not only ‘pure’ new goods gains, but also their interaction with Ricardian
specialization.
It is also important to note that this ratio is in part driven by the choice of the
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goods share each country is able to produce. With the share 1/N of goods produced
by each country, the total measure of consumable goods in the economy is given by
1 −
∏
i
(
1− 1
N
)
= 0.64 with N = 26 under analysis here.16 If each country were able
to produce a fraction 1/10 of all goods, say, the measure of consumable goods would be
1 −
∏
i
(
1− 1
10
)
= 0.94. In the standard EK model the value of this exogenous constant
does not matter for the gains from trade. Results are identical whether the measure of
producible goods is unity as in EK or some other number as it would simply cancel out.
In this model, however, this exogenous constant matters because it influences the share of
‘pure’ specialization gains, i.e. the gains derived from buying goods that are producible
at home from a cheaper supplier from abroad. In the case analyzed above, each country is
able to produce 6.01% of all producible goods. In the example just above, this percentage
is at 10.64%. The share of producible goods each country contributes increases in the
overall measure of producible goods. This implies that also the share of the gains from
trade that is derived from pure specialization is increasing in the measure of producible
goods. Intuitively, in the limit, when all countries produce all goods, the model returns to
the EK case in which 100% of the gains from trade come from pure specialization. As a
consequence there is a decreasing share of goods left to which the interaction of gains from
new goods and specialization gains applies. In the limit, the gains from trade therefore
also fall back to the level predicted by EK.
III.3.5 Discussion
A key issue of the model is the missing data counterpart for the measure Si of producible
goods for each country. In this paper, I deal with the issue by considering two instruc-
tive cases of the model. First, taking guidance from theory, I assume that the measure
of producible goods is proportional to country size as given by the free entry result in
Krugman (1980). To assess the effect of this strong skewness in the distribution of new
goods gains towards small countries I consider a symmetric case in which all countries
produce an equally-sized measure of (randomly drawn) goods.
I present three further options that can be considered in future work. The first ap-
proach would be to look at highly detailed product-level production data to assess the
extent to which various products are produced across countries. This would give a direct
data counterpart to this new variable. I have probed this possibility by looking into trade
data at the HS6-level from Comtrade (not reported). In these data, all OECD economies
under study export at least one unit of an HS6 code to at least one destination for more
than 90% of all possible HS6 codes. The coverage rate at the production level is probably
16The formula takes the size of the unit continuum of goods and subtracts the share of goods that is
not produced by any country, i.e. the probability that no country is able to produce a given good.
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higher. This implies that production-level data at even finer levels would be needed to
get a sensible measure of Si. To my knowledge, such detailed product-level production
data are not widely available. An exception are the 10-digit HS10 codes used by Broda
and Weinstein (2006). Additionally, even if such data existed, the number of detailed
products produced in each economy is already endogenous to trade.
The second approach borrows a strategy to avoid having to estimate the technology
parameters Ti from Fieler (2011). In her paper, she matches the wages to observed
wage levels around the world and lets the computer choose appropriate values for Ti
to match the calibration target. In principle, it is possible to extend this approach to
identify the adjusted technology parameter Ti
Si
in the calibration given observed wages.
The disadvantage is that both parameters can only be identified jointly, which creates
a difficulty in updating the goods shares λ(c) as the algorithm searches for a solution
because those do not depend on Ti.
A third way forward would be a microfoundation of Si through some augmented
process of research and innovation as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). Though I have
adapted the microfoundation of the Fréchet distribution, Si is exogenous in this model.
III.4 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a quantitative Ricardian trade model that interacts two im-
portant sources of gains from trade: gains from the reallocation of resources to the most
efficient producers and gains from access to new goods. I introduced gains from new goods
into the standard quantitative Ricardian model of trade by letting countries produce ran-
domly drawn and potentially differently sized measures of goods. In the model, goods
are then produced by different producer sets. When opening up to trade, consumers in
each country gain from the possibility to buy previously consumed goods from low-cost
suppliers abroad. In addition, they gain access to new goods that they were not able
to consume in autarky. Gains from new goods and from specialization interact because
consumers are able to choose the lowest-cost supplier for each new good.
Two forces affect the size of the gains from trade relative to the standard model. First,
gains from trade increase because consumers get access to new goods when a country opens
up to trade. This channel is absent in the standard model. Second, because countries
produce different measures of goods, not all countries are available as a sourcing option
for each good. That reduces the gains from Ricardian specialization.
In the quantitative exercise, I calibrated the model to match aggregate trade flows be-
tween 26 OECD economies. I considered two cases of the model. In the size-proportional
case, smaller countries benefit more from access to new goods because they are only able
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to produce few goods in autarky. In the symmetric case, gains from new goods are more
evenly distributed as countries produce different but equally-sized measures of goods.
While these assumptions affect the distribution of the gains from trade across countries,
both models predict similarly sized and considerable increases in the gains from trade
relative to the standard model.
Chapter A
Appendix Chapter I
A.1 Theory Appendix
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition I.1
Derivation of the supplier cutoff For unethical production to be preferred, we need
the total cost savings from unethical production ∆C to be larger than the expected ethical
revenue premium E [∆RS].
∆C > E [∆RS]
(cem − cum)m(ω)ek > (1− φk) (R(ω)ek − E [R(ω)uk ])
(cem − cum)m(ω)ek > (1− φk) (1− γ)R(ω)ek
(cem − cum) (1− β)Aα
1
1−α
1− φk
cem
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β]− α1−α
> (1− γ) (1− φk)Aα
α
1−α
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β]− α1−α
cem − cum
cem
(1− β)α > 1− γ
Solving for β using the fact that cum = µc
e
m gives that when
β < βS = 1−
1− γ
(1− µ)α
, (A.1)
122
CHAPTER A. APPENDIX CHAPTER I 123
the supplier will prefer unethical production.
A.1.1.1 Comparative statics
Differentiating w.r.t. 1− µ, 1− γ, and 1
α
delivers
∂βS
∂ (1− µ)
=
1− γ
α (1− µ)2
> 0. (A.2)
∂βS
∂ (1− γ)
= − 1
α (1− µ)
< 0. (A.3)
∂βS
∂ 1
α
= − 1− γ
(1− µ)
< 0. (A.4)
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition I.2
The cutoff βl is the value of β that solves
Θl(βl) =
[(
φV
φO
)βl (1− φV
1− φO
)1−βl] α1−α γ − α (1− βl)µ+ φV α [µ− βl (1 + µ)]
γ − α (1− βl)µ+ φOα [µ− βl (1 + µ)]
= 1
(A.5)
with γ, µ ∈ (0, 1) delivering the unethical cutoff βu. In the corner case of γ = µ = 1, the
β that solves the equation is βe.
A.1.2.1 Existence
To show existence of the two cutoffs, we will derive conditions under which the corner
cases Θl(β = 1) > 1 and Θl(β = 0) < 1 are true, implying that there exists some βe for
which Θe(βe) = 1 and some βu for which Θ
u(βu) = 1.
Case 1: β = 0 Θl(β) reduces to(
1− φV
1− φO
) α
1−α
[
γ − αµ (1− φV )
γ − αµ (1− φO)
]
. (A.5’)
Case 2: β = 1 Θl(β) becomes (
φV
φO
) α
1−α γ − φV α
γ − φOα
. (A.5”)
Here, again, γ, µ ∈ (0, 1) deliver Θu and γ = µ = 1 deliver Θe.
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Numerator and denominator of each of the two cases differ only in the value of φk.
Substituting x for 1 − φk in (A.5’) and for φk in (A.5”) and recalling that 12 < φk < 1,
the two cases only differ in the value of µ. Numerator and denominator of any of the two
cases can be expressed in general form as
x
α
1−α (γ − αµx) . (A.6)
Because φV > φO (and thus 1−φV < 1−φO), conditions that ensure that equation (A.6)
has a positive slope in x also ensure that Θl(β = 0) < 1 and Θl(β = 1) > 1.
∂
∂x
x
α
1−α (γ − αµx) = α
1− α
x
α
1−α
(γ
x
− µ
)
Because x ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1), the last factor determines the sign of the derivative.
We must cover four cases, each of Cases 1 and 2 from above for ethical (γ = µ = 1) and
unethical production, i.e. with γ, µ ∈ (0, 1).
ethical production, β = 0:
1
x
− 1
ethical production, β = 1:
1
x
− 1
unethical production, β = 0:
γ
x
− µ
unethical production, β = 1:
γ
x
− 1

!
> 0 (A.7)
For ethical production, the condition always holds because 1
x
> 1 in both cases. To ensure
existence of βu, both conditions under unethical production must hold, i.e. we must have
γ > µ (1− φO) and γ > φV . As γ > φV is the stricter condition, it is also a sufficient
condition for existence.
Therefore, with ethical production, Θe(β = 1) > 1 and Θe(β = 0) < 1, and hence, βe
exists. With unethical production, if γ > φV , then Θ
u(β = 1) > 1 and Θu(β = 0) < 1,
therefore βu exists. QED.
A.1.2.2 Uniqueness
To establish uniqueness, we show under which conditions the derivative of Θl(β) with
respect to β is larger than zero for all β ∈ [0, 1]. The proof follows the structure of
Appendix 2 in Antràs (2003).
Recall that φV = φO + δ
α (1− φO), where δ is the share of the intermediate the
headquarter can continue to use in an integrated firm in case bargaining breaks down.
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Using this relationship, Θl(β) can be written as
Θl(β) =
[
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
] αβ
1−α
(1− δα)
α
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F1
·
[
1 +
αδα (1− φO) [µ− β (1 + µ)]
γ − α (1− β)µ+ φOα [µ− β (1 + µ)]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F2
.
As before, γ, µ ∈ (0, 1) deliver Θu and γ = µ = 1 deliver Θe. The derivative of Θl(β) with
respect to β is positive if
Θl′(β) =
∂F1
∂β
F2 +
∂F2
∂β
F1 > 0,
with
∂F1
∂β
= (1− δα)
α
1−α ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
α
1− α
[
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
] αβ
1−α
∂F2
∂β
=
−αδα (1− φO) (1 + µ) [γ − α (1− β)µ+ φOα [µ− β (1 + µ)]]
(γ − α (1− β)µ+ φOα [µ− β (1 + µ)])2
− αδ
α (1− φO) [µ− β (1 + µ)] [αµ− φOα (1 + µ)]
(γ − α (1− β)µ+ φOα [µ− β (1 + µ)])2
.
Θl′(β) > 0 can be simplified to give
ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
Ω (β, µ, γ) > [γ (1 + µ)− αµ] (1− α) (1− φO) δα
where
Ω (β, µ, γ) = [γ − αµ (1− φV ) + αβ [µ− (1 + µ)φV ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
τV
· [γ − αµ (1− φO) + αβ [µ− (1 + µ)φO]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
τO
.
The strategy is now to show that Ω strictly decreases in β and then to plug in the
minimum value Ω (β = 1, µ, γ) and show that the relationship still holds at this point.
The two multiplicative terms τV and τO in Ω are symmetric except for the bargaining
power parameter φk, so that
∂τk
∂β
= α [µ− (1 + µ)φk] < 0, k ∈ {V,O} .
To see this note that ∂(µ−(1+µ)φk)
∂µ
= 1− φk > 0. The term therefore reaches its maximum
at µ = 1, where it becomes 1− 2φk, which is negative because φk > 12 by assumption. To
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determine the sign of ∂Ω
∂β
, we need to determine the sign of τk, which can be rewritten as
τk = γ − α [βφk + (1− β)µ (1− φk)] .
The term in brackets can be shown to be smaller than φk because φk >
1
2
. Therefore
the assumption that γ > φV from the existence proof is sufficient to ensure a positive τk.
Maintaining γ > φV , it follows that under both ethical and unethical production, τk is
positive. This implies that
∂Ω (β, µ, γ)
∂β
=
∂τV
∂β
τO +
∂τO
∂β
τV < 0.
It follows that Ω attains its smallest value within the admissible range of β at β = 1.
Plugging in β = 1 into Ω eliminates µ from the function and yields
Ω (β = 1, γ) = (γ − αφV ) (γ − αφO) .
Note that the assumption γ > φV ensures that both factors are positive because φO < φV .
Expressing φV in terms of φO and inserting this for Ω in Θ
l(β) and rearranging then yields
ϑ(δ) = ln
(
1 +
δα
(1− δα)φO
)
− [γ (1 + µ)− αµ] (1− α) (1− φO) δ
α
[γ − α (φO + δα (1− φO))] (γ − αφO)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Ω(β=1,γ)
!
> 0.
To show that ϑ(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0, 1), note that ϑ(δ = 0) = 0 so that ϑ(δ) > 0 if
ϑ′(δ) > 0. The first derivative of ϑ with respect to δ can be expressed as
∂ϑ
∂δ
=
αδα−1
(1− δα) [δα + φO (1− δα)]
− [γ (1 + µ)− αµ] (1− α) (1− φO)
(γ − αφO) [γ − α (φO + δα (1− φO))]2
·
(
αδα−1
)
{[γ − α (φO + δα (1− φO))] + αδα (1− φO)}
!
> 0.
This can be simplified further to give
(γ − αφV )2
!
> [γ (1 + µ)− µα] (1− α) (1− φV )φV ≡M(µ).
Now note that ∂M
∂µ
= (γ − α) (1− α) (1− φV )φV . The sign of the derivative depends on
the relationship between γ and α.
Case 1 Consider case 1 where γ < α and so ∂M
∂µ
< 0. This implies that for µ ∈ (0, 1),
M(µ) attains a maximum in the corner case of µ = 0. For the inequality above to hold it
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is therefore sufficient to prove that
(γ − αφV )2 > γ (1− α) (1− φV )φV . (A.8)
Simplifying and solving for α equivalently gives
α2φ2V − αγφV (1 + φV ) + γ [γ − (1− φV )φV ] > 0.
The discriminant term of this quadratic equation is given by
(1 + φV )
2 φ2V γ
2 − 4φ2V γ [γ − φV (1− φV )] .
Simplification shows that the discriminant term is negative if γ > 4φV
3+φV
so that (A.8) has
no roots and is thus always positive. Because 4φV
3+φV
> φV ∀ φV ∈ (0, 1), the inequality
(A.8) holds for all α ∈ (0, 1) when γ > 4φV
3+φV
> φV and γ < α.
We have previously imposed γ > φV to guarantee existence of βu. Now consider values
of γ between φV and
4φV
3+φV
. (A.8) has roots in this parameter range. For (A.8) to hold for
all α for some γ < 4φV
3+φV
, we would need the smaller of the two roots of (A.8) to be larger
than 1, which requires
γ (1 + φV )− 2φV >
√
(1 + φV )
2 γ2 − 4γ [γ − (1− φV )φV ]. (A.9)
The right-hand side is the discriminant term and is positive because we consider values
of γ < 4φV
3+φV
. The left-hand side is only positive if γ > 2φV
1+φV
, which is larger than 4φV
3+φV
.
This implies that in the range of values of γ we consider here, the left-hand side is always
negative and so (A.9) never holds for these values. In the rest of the proof, we must
therefore impose the stricter condition γ > 4φV
3+φV
.
Case 2 Consider case 2 where γ > α and so ∂M
∂µ
> 0. This implies that for µ ∈ (0, 1),
M(µ) attains a maximum at the corner case µ = 1. The relationship to be shown now is
(γ − αφV )2 − (2γ − α) (1− α) (1− φV )φV > 0. (A.10)
Note first that for the left-hand side to be increasing in γ, it has to hold that γ >
φV [1− φV (1− α)]. Because the term in brackets is smaller than 1, this is true for all
γ > 4φV
3+φV
≥ φV . It is therefore sufficient to show that (A.10) holds at the minimum level
of γ. In this case we assume γ > α and impose γ > 4φV
3+φV
> φV . Three sub-cases have to
be covered.
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Case 2a: γ > α > 4φV
3+φV
The minimum value γ can take here is α. Plugging in α
for γ in (A.10) and simplifying gives that (A.10) holds when α > φV , which is true in this
sub-case because 4φV
3+φV
> φV .
Case 2b: γ > 4φV
3+φV
> α > φV The minimum value γ can take here is
4φV
3+φV
. Case
2a has shown that if α > φV , (A.10) holds for γ > α which also holds in this case.
Case 2c: γ > 4φV
3+φV
> φV > α Plugging in φV for γ in (A.10) results in the necessary
condition of α < φV for (A.10) to hold, which is true here. (A.10) therefore holds for
γ > φV when φV > α. This includes
4φV
3+φV
> φV . QED.
A.1.2.3 Relative Size of the Two Integration Cutoffs
We prove that βu > βe by showing that (1)
∂βu
∂µ
< 0 for all µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
and that (2) ∂βu
∂γ
< 0 for all µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
. This includes the corner case
of µ = γ = 1, in which βu = βe. This implies that starting from the case βu = βe, any
marginal decrease in either µ or γ increases βu and continues to do so over the admissible
range of the two parameters. We prove this using implicit differentiation of
Θu(βu) = F1 · F2 =
[
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
]αβu
1−α
(1− δα)
α
1−α
·
[
1 +
αδα (1− φO) [µ− βu (1 + µ)]
γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)]
]
= 1
with respect to µ and γ.
Derivative of βu with respect to µ First note that
∂F1
∂µ
= (1− δα)
α
1−α ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)[
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
]αβu
1−α α
1− α
∂βu
∂µ
,
∂F2
∂µ
=
αδα (1− φO)
[
1− ∂βu
∂µ
−
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)]
[γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)]]
{γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)]}2
−
αδα (1− φO) [µ− βu (1 + µ)]
[
α
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)
− α + φOα
[
1− ∂βu
∂µ
−
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)]]
{γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)]}2
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and that ∂1
∂µ
= 0. Combining the terms to write ∂F1
∂µ
F2 + F1
∂F2
∂µ
= 0 and simplification by
multiplying through with the denominator term from ∂F2
∂µ
gives that
ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
Ω (βu, γ, µ)
∂βu
∂µ
= δα (1− φO) (1− α) ·{[
α
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)
− α + αφO
[
1− ∂βu
∂µ
−
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)]]
[µ− βu (1 + µ)]
−
[
1− ∂βu
∂µ
−
(
βu + µ
∂βu
∂µ
)]
[γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)]]
}
,
where Ω (βu, γ, µ) is defined as above. The term in braces can then be simplified and the
expression becomes
ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
Ω (βu, γ, µ)
∂βu
∂µ
=δα (1− φO) (1− α)
{
∂βu
∂µ
[γ (1 + µ)− αµ]− γ (1− βu)− αβ2u (1− µ)
}
,
which can be rearranged to
∂βu
∂µ
[
δα (1− φO) (1− α) [γ (1 + µ)− αµ]− ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
Ω (βu, γ, µ)
]
=δα (1− φO) (1− α)
[
γ (1− βu) + αβ2u (1− µ)
]
.
Notice that the term on the right-hand side is positive for the admissible ranges of the
parameters. In particular, it is also positive for γ, µ ∈ (0, 1]. To get ∂βu
∂µ
< 0, we need
that the term in square brackets on the left-hand side is negative, or equivalently that
δα (1− φO) (1− α) [γ (1 + µ)− αµ] < ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
Ω (βu, γ, µ) .
Because we assume φk >
1
2
, we know from the uniqueness proof in Section A.1.2.2 that
Ω (βu, γ, µ) has a minimum at βu = 1. Plugging in βu = 1 and rearranging shows that we
need
ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
− δ
α (1− φO) (1− α) [γ (1 + µ)− αµ]
Ω (βu = 1, γ, µ)
≡ ϑ (δ) > 0
to obtain ∂βu
∂µ
< 0. In the uniqueness part in Section A.1.2.2 above it has been shown
that the condition above holds if γ > 4φV
3+φV
, and in particular this holds when µ = γ = 1.
∂βu
∂µ
< 0 for µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
implies that βu is increasing in the unethical cost
advantage 1− µ for any of these values of µ and γ.
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Derivative of βu with respect to γ First note that
∂F1
∂γ
= F1 ln
(
1 +
δα
φO (1− δα)
)
α
1− α
∂βu
∂γ
and
∂F2
∂γ
=
−αδα (1− φO) [µ− βu (1 + µ)]− αδα (1− φO) [γ (1 + µ)− αµ] ∂βu∂γ ]
(γ − α (1− βu)µ+ φOα [µ− βu (1 + µ)])2
.
Combining those two derivatives in the equation F1
∂F2
∂γ
+ F2
∂F1
∂γ
= 0 and solving for ∂βu
∂γ
gives
∂βu
∂γ
=
(1− α) δα (1− φO) [µ− βu (1 + µ)]
ln
(
1 + δ
α
φO(1−δα)
)
Ω (βu, µ, γ)− δα (1− φO) (1− α) [γ (1 + µ)− αµ]
.
The sign of the derivative is ambiguous. The denominator is positive, including the case
of µ = γ = 1, as can be seen from the uniqueness proof in Section A.1.2.2. The numerator
is only negative if βu >
µ
1+µ
, where µ
1+µ
reaches its maximum of 1
2
at µ = 1. Therefore,
∂βu
∂γ
< 0 iff βu >
1
2
.
The strategy is now to show that βe >
1
2
. This will then imply that when µ = γ = 1
and thus βu = βe, the numerator is negative and thus
∂βu
∂γ
< 0. This then proves that
starting from βu = βe, any decrease in γ increases βu and does so for the whole range
of admissible parameter values, i.e. µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
. To see this, consider
the parameter condition needed to produce βe =
1
2
as the ethical integration cutoff.
Θe
(
βe =
1
2
)
= 1 after some algebra simplifies considerably to
φO = D(δ) ≡
1− δα
2− δα
.
As δ, α ∈ (0, 1), D(δ) reaches its maximum of 1
2
as δ → 0. This means that to have
βe =
1
2
, we need φO = D(δ) with D(δ) <
1
2
. This is ruled out by the initial assumption
that φO >
1
2
, which we carry over from Antràs (2003). We have now merely shown
that βe =
1
2
is impossible under the imposed parameter restrictions. The proof is only
complete if we show that any βe <
1
2
requires a value of φO whose maximum also lies
below 1
2
. Therefore, we show that ∂βe
∂φO
> 0, implying that a decrease in βe requires a
reduction in φO, c.p. Implicit differentiation yields that
∂βe
∂φO
=
Ω(βe)βeδα
φO[φO(1−δα)+δα]
+ δα (1− α) [1− 2βe] [1− αβe]
ln
(
1 + δ
α
φO(1−δα)
)
Ω (βe)− δα (1− φO) (1− α) [2− α]
.
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The sign of the derivative is again determined by the sign of the numerator. The denomi-
nator is positive as has been shown in the uniqueness part of the proof in Section A.1.2.2.
If βe ≤ 12 , the numerator is positive. Therefore, for βe ≤
1
2
, a marginal decrease in βe
would require a decrease in φO. So in order to have a βe <
1
2
we require φO < D(δ), which
is ruled out by the initial assumption of φO >
1
2
. QED.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition I.3
For the proofs of Cases 2 and 3 note that the existence part of the proof of Proposition
I.2 specifies conditions for which Θu(βu) and Θ
e(βe) are smaller than 1 and larger than
0, respectively. Therefore, as long as these conditions hold, βe ∈ (0, 1) and βu ∈ (0, 1).
Showing that βS ≤ 0 and βS = 1 are possible within the admissible range of the parameters
determining the cutoff proves the existence of Cases 2 and 3. With these preliminaries,
it is unnecessary to consider partial derivatives of βe and βu with respect to µ and γ,
because by Proposition I.2, βe, βu ∈ (0, 1).
Case 3 For this case we show that as the unethical cost advantage goes to zero (µ→ 1),
βS → −∞ so that unethical production is never chosen.
lim
µ→1
βS = lim
µ→1
[
1− 1− γ
α (1− µ)
]
= −∞. (A.11)
Case 2 For this case we show that βS → 1 as the threat of a consumer boycott goes to
zero (γ → 1) so that ethical production is never chosen.
lim
γ→1
βS = lim
γ→1
[
1− 1− γ
α (1− µ)
]
= 1− 0
α (1− µ)
= 1. (A.12)
Case 1 Consider some βS ∈ (−∞, 1). Case 1 trivially exists if βe < βS < βu. Case 1
also exists starting from any value of βS < βe or βS > βu. If βS < βe, increasing γ → 1
will necessarily move βS → 1, while βe, βu ∈ (0, 1). For some values of γ given µ and α, it
must be the case that βe < βS < βu. If βS > βu, increasing µ → 1 will necessarily move
βS → −∞, while βe, βu ∈ (0, 1). For some values of µ given γ and α, it must be the case
that βe < βS < βu. QED.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition I.4
It has been shown in the proof of Proposition I.2 in Section A.1.2.3 that ∂βu
∂µ
< 0 for
µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
. It follows directly that ∂βu
∂(1−µ) > 0 for these parameter
values. It has been shown in the proof of Proposition I.1 in Section A.1.1 that ∂βS
∂(1−µ) > 0.
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Moreover, it can be seen from equation (I.19) that βe does not depend on µ or γ. There-
fore, ∂βe
∂µ
= 0. QED.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition I.5
The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition I.1 in terms of structure. When the
headquarter can also set the technology of the match in addition to the organizational
form, the key difference is that the headquarter takes the overall surplus into account when
deciding between ethical and unethical production. The headquarter again compares
the total cost savings from unethical production ∆C to the expected ethical revenue
premium, which we now label E [∆R], which is given by the sum of the suppliers and
the headquarters revenue premium. Therefore, the term (1− φk) on the right-hand side,
which denoted the revenue share allocated to the supplier in the proof of Proposition I.1
is now replaced by unity.
∆C > E [∆R]
(cem − cum)m(ω)ek > (R(ω)ek − E [R(ω)uk ])
(cem − cum)m(ω)ek > (1− γ)R(ω)ek
(cem − cum) (1− β)Aα
1
1−α
1− φk
cem
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β]− α1−α
> (1− γ)Aα
α
1−α
[(
ch
φk
)β (
cem
1− φk
)1−β]− α1−α
cem − cum
cem
(1− φk) (1− β)α > 1− γ
Solving for β using the fact that cum = µc
e
m gives that when
β < βH,k = 1−
1− γ
(1− µ)α (1− φk)
< βS, (A.13)
the headquarter will prefer unethical production. Note that this cutoff now depends on
the organizational form of the firm. βH,O > βH,V because φV > φO. Because 1− φk < 1,
both cutoffs are smaller than βS from the baseline model.
A.1.5.1 Existence of the described pattern
From Section A.1.3 we know that by letting γ → 1, βS → 1 and by letting µ → 1,
βS → −∞. Because the new cutoffs βH,k with k ∈ {V,O} differ from βS only by a positive
factor in the denominator, the results from Proposition I.3 can be directly applied to the
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cutoffs derived above. Therefore, there is a non-empty set of admissible values of γ, α and
µ that ensures that for any φk >
1
2
, there exists a range of β ∈ (βH,O, βS) ∧ β ∈ (βe, βu).
QED.
A.1.6 Proof of ambiguous effects of α and γ on β̄
It has been shown in the proof of Proposition I.2 in Section A.1.2.3 that ∂βu
∂γ
< 0 for
µ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈
(
4φV
3+φV
, 1
]
. It follows directly that ∂βu
∂(1−γ) > 0 for these parameter
values. It has been shown in the proof of Proposition I.1 in Section A.1.1 that ∂βS
∂(1−γ) < 0.
Therefore, the effect of 1− γ on the outsourcing cutoff is ambiguous.
We show the ambiguity of the effect of 1/α on the outsourcing cutoff with two numer-
ical examples. Consider the following set of parameter values: φO = 0.6, δ = 0.5, α = 0.8
and γ = 0.88. This implies that φV = 0.8297. Note that
4φV
3+φV
= 0.8666 and therefore
it holds that γ > 4φV
3+φV
. Setting µ = 0.3 and using numerical solution methods implies
that β̄ = βS and therefore
∂β̄
∂(1/α)
< 0. Changing the value of µ to µ = 0.5 implies that
β̄ = βc. Using numerical solution methods, it can also be shown that an increase in 1/α
leads to an increase in β̄, where βc remains the outsourcing cutoff. Therefore, in this case,
∂β̄
∂(1/α)
> 0. QED.
A.1.7 Solving the Microfounded Model
We solve the microfounded model by backward induction. As we have seen above, in
period t5, all firms not having faced a boycott in period t3 set the same price and generate
the same revenues as in equation (I.5) of the baseline model. Bargaining takes place
in period t4 and also delivers the same outcome as in the baseline model. In period t3
nature decides which of the unethical firms face a boycott. A fraction 1 − γ of firms is
investigated. The unethical firms among them are boycotted. In period t2, production of
intermediates takes place, again with the same quantities as in the baseline model.
These quantities are chosen in period t1(b) and are given by (I.9) for the headquarter
and by (I.10) for the supplier. Firms who choose to produce ethically and those who would
like to be unethical but only have the ethical technology available reach these investment
quantities in the investment game with continuous best response functions. Firms who
have the unethical technology available and whose suppliers choose to use it, optimally
mimic the firms who are forced to be ethical.
In period t1(a), the supplier finds out whether it is able to use the unethical technology
in the production of the variety ω it has been matched with. It then maximizes expected
profits by comparing expected unethical profits of mimicking E(πuS,k) to the certain profits
of ethical production πeS,k (as well as the outcome of zero demand in case of openly
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unethical production, which is never optimal). This comparison is identical to the baseline
model. Although only a fraction κ of firms are able to use the unethical technology, from
the perspective of an unethical firm the probability of being investigated and being hit
by a boycott is 1 − γ. Therefore, as in the baseline model, the supplier would prefer
unethical production whenever β < βS = 1 − 1−γα(1−µ) . Only a fraction κ of suppliers is
able to use the unethical technology, the others must choose ethical production even if
β < βS. Investments are then made simultaneously and non-cooperatively, where the
headquarter spends chh(ω)
e
k on headquarter services and the supplier spends c
e
mm(ω)
e
k in
case of ethical production and cumm(ω)
e
k otherwise.
In period t0, the headquarter chooses the organizational form and extracts a transfer
payment before knowing whether the supplier will be able to use the unethical technology.
As in the baseline model, the headquarter intensity β determines the organization of
production. If β > βS, the supplier will implement the ethical technology in period
t1(a). The headquarter then chooses outsourcing for β < βe and integration otherwise
and extracts a transfer payment amounting to the full profits of the supplier under ethical
production πeS,k given by equation (I.14) in the baseline model.
If β < βS, the headquarter anticipates that the supplier will choose the unethical
technology if it is able to do so and mimic ethical firms. At t0, this happens with proba-
bility κ from the perspective of both supplier and headquarter. The headquarter therefore
extracts the supplier’s future expected profits, which are now different from the baseline
model and given by
(1− κ)πek,S + κ E(πuk,S),
where E(πuk,S) is given by equation (I.15) in the baseline model. Accordingly, the organi-
zational decision is now also slightly modified compared to the baseline model. Even with
β < βS, there is still a probability 1 − κ that ethical production takes place. Therefore,
the ratio of profits under integration relative to outsourcing is in this case given by
Θ̃u(β) =
(1− κ) ΠeV + κE (ΠuV )
(1− κ) ΠeO + κE (ΠuO)
,
where Πek and E (Π
u
k) are given by equations (I.17) and (I.18) from the baseline model.
Simplification yields
Θ̃u(β) =
[(
φV
φO
)β (
1− φV
1− φO
)1−β] α1−α
γ′ − (1− β)αµ′ + φV α [µ′ − β (1 + µ′)]
γ′ − (1− β)αµ′ + φOα [µ′ − β (1 + µ′)]
,
where γ′ ≡ 1 − κ (1− γ) and µ′ ≡ 1 − κ (1− µ). The integration cutoff under unethical
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production β̃u is implicitly defined by
Θ̃u(β̃u) = 1. (A.14)
Corollary 2 to Lemma I.1 summarizes the organization of production with the ethical
technology in the extended model.
Corollary 2 In the extended model, βe is unchanged and still defined by equation (I.19).
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma I.1.
For production using the unethical technology, we can state the following proposition
paralleling Proposition I.2 from the baseline model.
Proposition A.2 In the extended model, there exists a unique βe below which the head-
quarter chooses outsourcing irrespective of the technology choice of the supplier. Inte-
gration is always chosen for headquarter intensities above β̃u and it always holds that
βe < β̃u. A sufficient condition for a unique interior solution β̃u ∈ (βe, 1) to exist is given
by γ > 1− 3(1−φV )
(3+φV )κ
. For any β ∈ (βe, β̃u) the headquarter chooses integration if and only if
the supplier produces ethically and chooses outsourcing if and only if unethical production
is anticipated.
Proof: In the text.
Setting κ = 1 reduces Θ̃u(β) to Θu(β) from the baseline model. Inspection of the def-
initions of γ′ and µ′ reveals that ∂γ
′
∂γ
> 0 with 0 < γ < γ′ < 1 and that ∂µ
′
∂µ
> 0 with
0 < µ < µ′ < 1. This implies that the proofs we provide for existence and uniqueness of
the integration cutoff βu as well as the relative size of βe and βu in Appendices A.1.2.1,
A.1.2.2, and A.1.2.3 continue to hold qualitatively for β̃u. It also follows directly that
βe < β̃u < βu. To see this, note that βu and β̃u are both decreasing in γ, and for any value
of γ, κ ∈ (0, 1) it holds that γ′ > γ. In terms of parameter constraints, we now require
γ′ > 4φV
3+φV
for existence and uniqueness. Inserting the definition of γ′ and solving for γ
gives the parameter constraint stated in Proposition A.2. It is straightforward to show
that the condition is less strict on γ than the condition in the baseline model.
Next, we can state the following proposition about the different cases that may arise
in the extended model paralleling Proposition I.3 from the baseline model.
Proposition A.3 There exist three possible equilibria in the extended model characterized
by βe < βS < β̃u (Case 1); βe < β̃u < βS (Case 2) and βS < βe < β̃u (Case 3).
Unethical outsourcing and ethical integration are equilibrium outcomes in all three cases.
Unethical integration and ethical outsourcing can also occur in equilibrium in Cases 2 and
3, respectively.
Proof: In the text.
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The existence of the three cases follows directly from the proof of Proposition I.3 in
Appendix A.1.3 together with the parameter constraint from Proposition A.2, which
ensures that β̃u ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, we can state the following about the effect of unethical production on the
international organization of production in the extended model. This parallels Proposition
I.4. Define β̃ as the headquarter intensity above which integration actually takes place
in the extended model. This cutoff is given by β̃ = βS in Case 1; β̃ = β̃u in Case 2; and
β̃ = βe in Case 3. With β̃u > βe, the integration cutoff is given by
β̃ =
min{βS; β̃u} if βS > βeβe otherwise. (A.15)
Proposition A.4 In the extended model, outsourcing is weakly increasing in the unethical
cost advantage, i.e. ∂β̃
∂(1−µ) ≥ 0.
Proof: In the text.
It has been shown above that βS and βe remain unchanged in the extended model. Con-
cerning β̃u, Proposition A.2 implies that the Proposition I.2 can be applied in the ex-
tended model with the appropriate parameter condition. In the proof of Proposition I.2,
it is shown in Appendix A.1.2.3 that βu is increasing in 1− µ. Because µ′ is increasing in
µ, it therefore follows that also ∂β̃u
∂1−µ > 0.
A.2 Data Appendix
A.2.1 Robustness Checks
In this section we analyze the robustness of our main results. We add more control
variables in Tables A.1 and A.2. We show the results with a constant (small) sample size
in Table A.3.
A.2.1.1 Additional Control Variables
Antràs and Chor (2013) have recently documented the importance of the average rela-
tive position of an industry in production chains as a determinant of intrafirm trade. In
particular, they show in their model that headquarters tend to integrate more upstream
stages of production when demand is relatively inelastic and outsource downstream stages.
Conversely, when demand is relatively elastic, upstream stages are outsourced and more
downstream stages are integrated. We construct the measure DUse TUse developed by
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Antràs and Chor (2013) to account for the average relative position of an industry in
production chains using the detailed BEA 2007 Input-Output Use table following the
implementation laid out in their paper.1 Of all output an industry produces for interme-
diate use in other industries, DUse TUse is the share of that output that is used in the
production of final output (direct use over total use). A larger DUse TUse value therefore
indicates a greater average ‘downstreamness’ of an industry.
Table A.1: Robustness I - Downstreamness
Dependent Variable: Intrafirm Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Intensity Definition: Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Sales Total Sales Total Sales Payroll Payroll Payroll
log ECSP -0.0223** -0.0396*** -0.0225** -0.0412*** -0.0235** -0.0270**
(0.0107) (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.0139) (0.0100) (0.0135)
log ECSP 0.00844** 0.00868** 0.00149
X EPSI (0.00427) (0.00433) (0.00408)
log other machinery intensity 0.0196* 0.0297*** 0.0421*** 0.0177* 0.0275*** 0.0342** 0.0169* 0.0295*** 0.0330**
(0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0137) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0145) (0.00929) (0.00978) (0.0138)
log skill intensity 0.0426** 0.0420** 0.0639*** 0.0320*** 0.0327*** 0.0363** 0.0481* 0.0521** 0.0415
(0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0152) (0.0264) (0.0254) (0.0356)
log R&D intensity 0.0216*** 0.0202*** 0.0266*** 0.0224*** 0.0208*** 0.0280*** 0.0212*** 0.0194*** 0.0275***
(0.00371) (0.00371) (0.00472) (0.00367) (0.00370) (0.00483) (0.00424) (0.00416) (0.00526)
log material intensity 0.0744 0.0594 0.137** 0.0287 0.0199 0.0208 -0.00216 0.00512 -0.00679
(0.0598) (0.0594) (0.0551) (0.0240) (0.0255) (0.0338) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0115)
dispersion 0.0830*** 0.0784*** 0.0875*** 0.0839*** 0.0789*** 0.0889*** 0.0815*** 0.0764*** 0.0872***
(0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0158)
log building intensity -0.00833 -0.00683 -0.00793 -0.00854 -0.00732 -0.00885 -0.0112** -0.00900 -0.0107
(0.00572) (0.00570) (0.00730) (0.00583) (0.00577) (0.00713) (0.00566) (0.00570) (0.00745)
log auto intensity -0.0116*** -0.0119*** -0.0183*** -0.0128*** -0.0127*** -0.0207*** -0.0108** -0.0110*** -0.0191***
(0.00435) (0.00419) (0.00588) (0.00436) (0.00421) (0.00604) (0.00437) (0.00415) (0.00615)
log computer intensity -0.00899 -0.0121* 0.00231 -0.00808 -0.0117* 0.00305 -0.0112* -0.0144** 0.000475
(0.00646) (0.00648) (0.0100) (0.00628) (0.00647) (0.0103) (0.00638) (0.00624) (0.0102)
1(sigma<median) -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.167*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.173***
X DUse TUse (0.0332) (0.0318) (0.0453) (0.0336) (0.0321) (0.0465) (0.0338) (0.0320) (0.0462)
1(sigma>median) -0.122*** -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.109*** -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.134***
X DUse TUse (0.0291) (0.0294) (0.0372) (0.0318) (0.0312) (0.0379) (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0367)
1(sigma>median) -0.0348 -0.0308 -0.0196 -0.0391 -0.0333 -0.0248 -0.0390 -0.0345 -0.0220
(0.0279) (0.0272) (0.0354) (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0354) (0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0354)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IO2007 industry clusters 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211
Observations 130,920 130,337 35,416 130,920 130,337 35,416 130,920 130,337 35,416
R-squared 0.188 0.190 0.182 0.188 0.190 0.181 0.188 0.190 0.180
Note: Estimation by OLS with standard errors clustered at the industry level reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. log ECSP is the log of expenditure on waste and hazardous materials removal over total cost, industry sales or payroll. sigma is the estimate of the import
demand elasticity from Broda and Weinstein (2006). DUse TUse measures the share of output of an industry used in production of final output relative to total demand
for that industry’s output as an intermediate input.
In Table A.1, we add the interaction of DUse TUse with the import demand elasticity
estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006) to our baseline specification. The level effect of
the dummy variable 1(sigma > median) already controls for the elasticity of substitution
from the baseline regression in the main paper. Therefore log sigma is omitted in here
as well as in Table A.2. In column 1, we introduce the new variables into our preferred
1They construct the measure from the 2002 IO table. Details on our construction are provided in
Appendix A.2.2.6.
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specification with total cost as the normalization variable. We then introduce our measure
of the environmental cost savings potential (ECSP) in column 2 and find that our effect is
negative and significant at the 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficient only changes at
the fourth decimal place compared to our baseline results in Table I.1. The effects of the
downstreamness interactions remain stable as well. In column 3 we add the interaction
with the environmental policy stringency index (EPSI) and find a positive and significant
effect as before. Compared to Table I.1 also the magnitudes do not change much. Turning
to the intensity definition with total sales in columns 4 to 6, we find that our previous
results continue to hold here as well when the variables from Antràs and Chor (2013) are
introduced. Both the level effect of the ECSP and the interaction effect with the EPSI
remain at magnitudes very similar to the ones estimated in Table I.1.
In columns 7 to 9 we report the results with the payroll normalization. Compared to
Table I.1, the level effect in column 8 changes only in the fourth decimal place. When
the environmental stringency index is added in column 9, the level effect continues to be
significant and the interaction effect is positive and insignificant, as in Table I.1.
In Table A.2, we add additional controls that have been suggested as determinants
of intrafirm trade in the literature to our preferred specification. In columns 1 and 2 we
introduce the value added share in total sales, in columns 3 and 4 we add the ‘importance’
of an input measured as the total use of an industry’s output as an intermediate input
relative to total input purchases by all its buyers. Intermediation in columns 5 and 6 comes
from Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2013) and is a measure of the importance
of intermediaries in the form of wholesalers in a given industry calculated from firm-level
data. In columns 7 and 8 we add a measure of industry contractibility based on Nunn
and Trefler (2008).2 Finally, in columns 9 and 10, we add all of the new controls jointly.
In column 1, the value added share makes the level effect of the ECSP insignificant,
but when we add the interaction with the EPSI in column 2, both the coefficients are
significant and at comparable levels to our main specification in Table I.1 in terms of
magnitude. In column 3, the level effect remains significant at 10% when input importance
is introduced. The specification with the interaction effectively replicates the result from
Table I.1. The intermediation and contractibility variables render the level effect of the
unethical cost advantage insignificant. Our results return, however, when we add the
interaction effect. The magnitude of the level effect is diminished and significance reduced
to 10% and 5%, respectively. The interaction effect continues to be significant at the 5%
level at a stable magnitude. When we add all of the additional controls in columns 9
and 10, the level effect of the unethical environmental cost advantage disappears, but the
interaction effect continues to be significant.
2The construction of all these variables is described in the Appendix A.2.2 below.
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Table A.2: Robustness II - Additional Controls - Total Cost Definition
Dependent Variable: Intrafirm Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intensity Definition: Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost
log ECSP -0.0215* -0.0386*** -0.0224** -0.0400*** -0.0143 -0.0294** -0.0137 -0.0261* -0.00679 -0.0176
(0.0112) (0.0142) (0.0105) (0.0141) (0.0102) (0.0142) (0.0108) (0.0139) (0.0112) (0.0142)
log ECSP 0.00846** 0.00857** 0.00875** 0.00814* 0.00844*
X EPSI (0.00427) (0.00428) (0.00426) (0.00434) (0.00434)
log other machinery intensity 0.0308*** 0.0434*** 0.0303*** 0.0422*** 0.0218** 0.0305** 0.0310*** 0.0476*** 0.0244** 0.0359***
(0.0112) (0.0141) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0135) (0.0107) (0.0132)
log skill intensity 0.0444** 0.0663*** 0.0493*** 0.0673*** 0.0383** 0.0573*** 0.0290 0.0450** 0.0315* 0.0399**
(0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0165) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0214) (0.0223) (0.0172) (0.0199)
log R&D intensity 0.0202*** 0.0266*** 0.0197*** 0.0265*** 0.0158*** 0.0204*** 0.0193*** 0.0253*** 0.0153*** 0.0197***
(0.00369) (0.00471) (0.00363) (0.00465) (0.00417) (0.00467) (0.00360) (0.00455) (0.00395) (0.00447)
log material intensity 0.0498 0.127* 0.0790 0.145*** 0.0489 0.119** 0.0650 0.144*** 0.0686 0.132**
(0.0627) (0.0646) (0.0505) (0.0536) (0.0551) (0.0523) (0.0613) (0.0547) (0.0537) (0.0600)
dispersion 0.0781*** 0.0873*** 0.0853*** 0.0916*** 0.0840*** 0.0996*** 0.0796*** 0.0890*** 0.0891*** 0.100***
(0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0117) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0156) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0160)
log building intensity -0.00646 -0.00752 -0.00728 -0.00841 -0.00561 -0.00659 -0.00397 -0.00368 -0.00298 -0.00253
(0.00570) (0.00709) (0.00564) (0.00727) (0.00547) (0.00696) (0.00529) (0.00666) (0.00514) (0.00627)
log auto intensity -0.0120*** -0.0186*** -0.00864** -0.0162*** -0.00752* -0.0114* -0.0139*** -0.0207*** -0.00821** -0.0140**
(0.00421) (0.00592) (0.00401) (0.00616) (0.00408) (0.00630) (0.00432) (0.00608) (0.00414) (0.00661)
log computer intensity -0.0117* 0.00274 -0.0125* 0.00221 -0.0114* 0.00342 -0.0135* -0.000120 -0.0130* 0.00117
(0.00650) (0.0101) (0.00637) (0.00998) (0.00651) (0.00976) (0.00686) (0.00991) (0.00691) (0.00982)
1(sigma<median) -0.169*** -0.172*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.137*** -0.126*** -0.178*** -0.184*** -0.154*** -0.142***
X DUse TUse (0.0321) (0.0457) (0.0328) (0.0458) (0.0328) (0.0467) (0.0305) (0.0422) (0.0338) (0.0455)
1(sigma>median) -0.121*** -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.135*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.145*** -0.175*** -0.124*** -0.149***
X DUse TUse (0.0320) (0.0388) (0.0286) (0.0368) (0.0299) (0.0376) (0.0285) (0.0363) (0.0307) (0.0382)
1(sigma>median) -0.0321 -0.0213 -0.0360 -0.0233 -0.0236 -0.00844 -0.0229 -0.00151 -0.0205 0.00758
(0.0272) (0.0351) (0.0275) (0.0356) (0.0271) (0.0358) (0.0265) (0.0338) (0.0260) (0.0329)
value added share -0.0380 -0.0391 -0.00244 0.0117
(0.0908) (0.107) (0.0829) (0.0900)
input importance 1.732** 1.081 1.078 0.0330
(0.812) (0.904) (0.778) (0.921)
intermediation -0.166*** -0.241*** -0.137*** -0.218***
(0.0488) (0.0601) (0.0499) (0.0616)
contractibility -0.0624*** -0.0927*** -0.0605*** -0.0876***
(0.0178) (0.0234) (0.0178) (0.0217)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IO2007 industry clusters 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Observations 130,337 35,416 130,337 35,416 130,337 35,416 127,484 34,547 127,484 34,547
R-squared 0.190 0.182 0.191 0.183 0.193 0.189 0.193 0.190 0.196 0.196
Note: Estimation by OLS with standard errors clustered at the industry level reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. log ECSP
is the log of expenditure on waste and hazardous materials removal over total cost. sigma is the estimate of the import demand elasticity from Broda and Weinstein (2006). DUse TUse
measures the share of output of an industry used in production of final output relative to total demand for that industry’s output as an intermediate input.
A.2.1.2 Holding the Sample Constant
Because the OECD environmental stringency index is only available for 32 countries (ex-
cluding the U.S.) and for the period 2007 to 2012, the sample size in our main specification
drops considerably when we add the interaction of the index with our measure of the envi-
ronmental cost savings potential. In this section we report the specifications without the
interaction effect, but with the smaller subsample. Table A.3 shows our results. Columns
3, 6, and 9 replicate the respective columns from Table I.1 in the main text. In column
2, the total cost specification, the level effect of the ECSP is negative as expected, but
insignificant. The same holds for the coefficient in the total sales specification in column
5. When we normalize with payroll, the coefficient is negative and significant at the
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5%-level. For our preferred specifications with total cost and total sales, the insignificant
coefficients in columns 2 and 5 are consistent with our theory. In Section I.4.5 we argue
that the prediction of our model holds in the specification without the interaction effect if
most of the countries and territories have more lenient regulation than the U.S. Here we
reduce the sample to OECD economies with similar levels of regulation to the U.S. plus
six emerging economies. In light of our theoretical argument, it is therefore not surprising
that we cannot find a significant level effect.
Table A.3: Robustness III - Constant Sample
Dependent Variable: Intrafirm Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Intensity Definition: Total Cost Total Cost Total Cost Total Sales Total Sales Total Sales Payroll Payroll Payroll
log ECSP -0.0193 -0.0401*** -0.0173 -0.0387*** -0.0229** -0.0270*
(0.0120) (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0143) (0.0115) (0.0140)
log ECSP 0.00892** 0.00917** 0.00174
X EPSI (0.00429) (0.00435) (0.00410)
log sigma -0.00236 -0.00232 -0.000150 -0.000124 -0.00194 -0.00194
(0.00888) (0.00889) (0.00865) (0.00865) (0.00907) (0.00907)
log other machinery intensity 0.0466*** 0.0559*** 0.0558*** 0.0417*** 0.0504*** 0.0503*** 0.0358*** 0.0490*** 0.0490***
(0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0138)
log skill intensity 0.0606*** 0.0578*** 0.0578*** 0.0379** 0.0375** 0.0375** 0.0468 0.0489 0.0490
(0.0214) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0382) (0.0373) (0.0373)
log R&D intensity 0.0277*** 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0288*** 0.0279*** 0.0278*** 0.0283*** 0.0269*** 0.0269***
(0.00478) (0.00483) (0.00483) (0.00493) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00548) (0.00544) (0.00544)
log materials intensity 0.141** 0.131** 0.131** 0.0497 0.0452 0.0455 -0.0179 -0.00950 -0.00949
(0.0589) (0.0581) (0.0582) (0.0313) (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0118)
dispersion 0.0898*** 0.0858*** 0.0858*** 0.0904*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0894*** 0.0846*** 0.0846***
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0149)
log building intensity -0.0130* -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0110 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0167** -0.0146* -0.0146*
(0.00778) (0.00776) (0.00776) (0.00743) (0.00745) (0.00746) (0.00773) (0.00780) (0.00780)
log auto intensity -0.0184*** -0.0180*** -0.0181*** -0.0217*** -0.0210*** -0.0211*** -0.0188*** -0.0181*** -0.0181***
(0.00614) (0.00594) (0.00594) (0.00625) (0.00614) (0.00614) (0.00654) (0.00626) (0.00626)
log computer intensity 0.00339 0.000705 0.000841 0.00615 0.00322 0.00338 0.000983 -0.00230 -0.00229
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IO2007 industry clusters 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
Observations 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434 35,434
R-squared 0.167 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.165 0.167 0.167
Note: Estimation by OLS with standard errors clustered at the industry level reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. log ECSP is the log of expenditure on waste and hazardous materials removal over total cost, total sales, or payroll. sigma is the estimate of the import demand
elasticity from Broda and Weinstein (2006).
A.2.2 Data Sources
In this section we provide more details about our measure of the environmental cost
savings potential (ECSP). We also describe our data sources and cleaning procedures.
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A.2.2.1 Industries with Highest and Lowest Environmental Cost Saving Po-
tential
Table A.4 documents the sectors with the lowest and the highest ECSP based on the
payroll definition in the left panel and based on the total cost definition on the right.
Our measures generate rankings of industries that are arguably in line with common
preconceptions about environmentally ‘dirty’ industries, such as the chemical or textile
industries. On the other end of the spectrum our measures put industries that are mainly
involved in assembling parts and thus do not produce a lot of (hazardous) waste.
Table A.4: Lowest to Highest ECSP
Industry IO2007 code Payroll Definition Industry IO2007 code Cost Definition
334517 Irradiation apparatus manufacturing 0.0027 334517 Irradiation apparatus manufacturing 0.00055
333313 Office machinery manufacturing 0.0036 333112 Lawn and garden equipment manufacturing 0.00060
339116 Dental laboratories 0.0039 336112 Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing 0.00070
336411 Aircraft manufacturing 0.0041 336411 Aircraft manufacturing 0.00076
333993 Packaging machinery manufacturing 0.0044 333313 Office machinery manufacturing 0.00081
335314 Relay and industrial control manufacturing 0.0045 336120 Heavy duty truck manufacturing 0.00083
334220 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 0.0047 336360 Motor vehicle seating and interior trim manufacturing 0.00084
33451A Watch, clock, and other measuring and controlling device manufacturing 0.0050 336213 Motor home manufacturing 0.00086
336414 Guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing 0.0052 311119 Other animal food manufacturing 0.00090
333511 Industrial mold manufacturing 0.0053 334210 Telephone apparatus manufacturing 0.00093
...
...
...
...
...
...
312120 Breweries 0.0877 313300 Textile and fabric finishing and fabric coating mills 0.00892
325211 Plastics material and resin manufacturing 0.0890 325180 Other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing 0.00944
325320 Pesticide and other agricultural chemical manufacturing 0.0923 312120 Breweries 0.00954
31122A Soybean and other oilseed processing 0.1042 325130 Synthetic dye and pigment manufacturing 0.00957
331314 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum 0.1076 322130 Paperboard mills 0.00984
324110 Petroleum refineries 0.1132 327992 Ground or treated mineral and earth manufacturing 0.01041
325110 Petrochemical manufacturing 0.1337 327993 Mineral wool manufacturing 0.01334
325120 Industrial gas manufacturing 0.1683 311221 Wet corn milling 0.01339
311221 Wet corn milling 0.2657 325120 Industrial gas manufacturing 0.02160
325190 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing 0.4224 325190 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing 0.02445
Note: The ranking is based on industries for which intrafirm trade data are available. They are ranked by their ECSP measured as expenditure on hazardous waste removal over payroll in the left panel, and measured as
expenditure on hazardous waste removal over total cost in the right panel. Each industry value is an average over 2007-2014.
A.2.2.2 Intrafirm Trade
Data on intrafirm trade flows cover the years 2007 to 2014. Up to and including the year
2012, the data are coded in NAICS 2007 industry codes. The other two years are coded
in NAICS 2012. We use the NAICS 2007 concordance with IO2007 industry provided by
the BEA with its Input-Output tables and the NAICS 2007 to NAICS 2012 concordance
from the U.S. Census Bureau to recode the import flows.
A.2.2.3 Industry Characteristics
Data used to construct the ECSP measure, capital intensity and its components, skill
intensity and material intensity come from from the Annual Survey of Manufactures
(ASM). We use data from 2007 to 2014 and exploit variation across industries and over
time. The ASM data are slightly more aggregated than 6-digit NAICS 2007 codes for the
years 2007 to 2011 and are coded as NAICS 2012 in the remaining three years. We use
the concordance between IO2007 and NAICS 2007 provided by the BEA with its 2007
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Input-Output tables as well as the NAICS 2012 to NAICS 2007 concordance provided by
the U.S. Census Bureau to achieve a consistent aggregation.
Within-industry dispersion is taken from the dataset provided by Antràs and Chor
(2013) who in turn take the data from Nunn and Trefler (2008), who constructed disper-
sion as the standard deviation of the HS10 log exports within each HS6 code across U.S.
port locations and destination countries from the year 2000. The aggregation of these
original estimates to IO2002 codes is described in Antràs and Chor (2013), Appendix B,
p. 2201. We take their data and convert them to IO2007 codes.
R&D data come from Compustat. We downloaded information on sales and R&D
expenditure of listed U.S. firms available in Compustat for the years 2007 to 2014. Each
firm-year was provided with the NAICS 2007 industry in which the firm operates. The
firm-level observations were aggregated at the NAICS 2007 level and then recoded to
IO2007 using the concordance from the BEA Input-Output table.
A.2.2.4 Import Demand Elasticities
For the construction of the IO2007-level import demand elasticities we follow the Antràs
and Chor (2013) methodology. First, we combine the original estimates at the HS10-
level with a full list of HS10 industry codes from Pierce and Schott (2012). We then
employ HS10-level US imports summed over the years 2007 to 2014 from Schott (2008)
to generate trade-weighted elasticities for HS10 codes that do not have an estimate. In
the first round, we use HS10 codes that share the same first nine digits to generate the
missing elasticities. We repeat the procedure using the first eight digits, then seven, up
until two digits to fill in as many elasticities as possible. Because there are two different
estimates for the same HS10 code 2103204020, we drop the observation. We then use a
concordance table built from the BEA IO2002-HS10 concordance and a IO2002-IO2007
crosswalk to aggregate the HS10 codes to IO2007 industries, again using total imports
from 2007 to 2014 as weights. We are left with three IO2007 codes without an assigned
elasticity: 112120, 323120, and 333295. Those are assigned the values of the nearest
neighbors 1121A0, 323110, and 33329A.
A.2.2.5 Environmental Policy Stringency Index
We downloaded the data from the OECD.stat website from 2007 up to the most recent
year for which all countries were assigned an index value, which was 2012 at the time
of the download. The data are available from /https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=EPS.
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A.2.2.6 Data Used for Robustness Checks
DUse TUse DUse TUse measures the share of industry output used as intermediates
that is used in final good production. In the construction of this variable we follow closely
the description of the implementation in Antràs and Chor (2013), pp. 2160 and 2161,
who construct the measure from the 2002 IO Use Table. We use the 2007 IO Use Table
from the BEA to make the data compatible with our observation period. Regressing the
data provided by Antràs and Chor (2013) on our self-constructed values of DUse TUse,
we find an R-squared of 76.8%, a constant term of −0.02689 and slope coefficient of
0.96902. Because we expect the vertical relationships within an economy to be relatively
slow moving over time, these values make us confident about the correctness of our own
implementation of the construction.
Other Controls We calculate input importance from the detailed BEA IO Use Ta-
bles after redefinitions. We first isolate intermediate sales to all other industries and
intermediate purchases from all other industries for each industry. Next we construct an
IO matrix of zeros and ones, where a one indicates a vertical relationship between two
industries. By associating the intermediate sales and purchases with this IO matrix, we
can recover total intermediate purchases of the industries a particular industry is selling
to (its buyer industries). Dividing total intermediate sales of a selling industry by total
intermediate purchases of its buyer industries thus gives us a measure of how important
the selling industry’s output is as an input.
Contractibility is a measure of industry contractibility suggested by Nunn and Tre-
fler (2008). We follow Antràs and Chor (2013) and Nunn (2007) in the construction of this
measure. We download the original Rauch (1999) data in SITC rev. 2 codes and associate
the product classification of the 4-digit codes with HS10 codes from Pierce and Schott
(2012). These HS10 codes are then mapped to IO2007 industries via the IO2002-HS10
concordance provided by the BEA and the NAICS 2002 to NAICS 2007 concordances
from the U.S. Census Bureau. For each IO2007 industry, we then calculate the share of
HS10 codes within each IO2007 code that are classified as neither reference-priced nor
traded on an organized exchange (the ‘liberal’ classification). Contractibility is defined as
1 minus this share.
The value added share in industry sales was calculated directly from the Annual
Survey of Manufactures. The data contain a variable giving the dollar value of value
added in an industry-year. We divide this value by industry sales measured by total value
of shipments in the ASM data.
The intermediation variable was taken from the Antràs and Chor (2013) dataset
who in turn took their data from Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2013). They
CHAPTER A. APPENDIX CHAPTER I 144
measure the importance of wholesalers as intermediaries in 1997 at the industry level
from establishment-level data on wholesale employment shares. Antràs and Chor (2013)
describe how they map the data from the original HS2 level to IO2002 industries in their
paper in Appendix B, p. 2202. We take their data off the shelf and convert the IO2002
industries to IO2007 industries using the Input-Output tables from the BEA and NAICS
2002 to NAICS 2007 concordances provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Chapter B
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B.1 Theory Appendix
B.1.1 Derivation of equation (II.4)
Starting from
Ūi =
∫ ∞
0
UdGi(U) =
∫ ∞
0
−U−εεΨi exp
{
−U−εΨi
}
dU,
using the change of variable y = ΨiU
−ε so that dy = −ΨiεU−(ε+1)dU and U =
(
y
Ψi
)− 1
ε
in
evaluating the integral gives equation (II.4)
Ūi =
∫ ∞
0
Ψ
1
ε
i y
− 1
ε exp {y} dy = δΨ
1
ε
i ,
where δ = Γ
(
ε−1
ε
)
, Γ (·) is the Gamma function and Ψi =
∑
nBnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε
.
B.1.2 Derivation of equation (II.5)
Starting from
λni = Pr [Uni ≥ max {Uki} ∀ k] =
∫ ∞
0
∏
k 6=n
Gki(U)dGni(U),
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across the distribution of bilateral utility Gni(U), the integral evaluates the probability
that all countries other than n jointly offer a lower utility than U , so that it is country n
that is chosen as the utility maximizing migration destination. Simplification yields
λni =
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−U−εΨi
}
εU−(1+ε)ΨnidU.
Using again the change of variable y = ΨiU
−ε so that dy = −ΨiεU−(ε+1)dU and noting
that the integration limits switch because of the inverse relationship between y and U
λni =
∫ 0
∞
− exp {−y} Ψni
Ψi
dy =
∫ ∞
0
exp {−y} Ψni
Ψi
dy
gives equation (II.5) as
λni =
Ψni
Ψi
=
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε
∑
k Bkκ
−ε
ki
(
νk
Pαk R
1−α
k
)ε .
B.1.3 Derivation of equation (II.14)
Starting from equation (II.5), inserting equation (II.10) for Rn and Rk in the denominator,
respectively, and simplifying gives
λni =
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
Pn
)αε (
Hn
Ln
)(1−α)ε
∑
k Bkκ
−ε
ki
(
νk
Pk
)αε (
Hk
Lk
)(1−α)ε .
Now note that νn = wn + tn = wn +
Tn
Ln
. Using goods market clearing (II.11), Tn =
Xn − wnLn gives that ν = XnLn so that, using (II.12),
νn =
wn∑
i
πni
1+τni
.
It follows directly that
νn
Pn
=
wn
Pn
(∑
k
πnk
1 + τnk
)−1
.
Using standard methods from Eaton and Kortum (2002) the real wage in terms of goods
can be expressed as a function of the domestic expenditure share so that equation (II.14)
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is given by
λni =
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
µnL
β
n
πnn
)αε
θ
(
Hn
Ln
)(1−α)ε (∑
k
πnk
1+τnk
)−αε
∑
lBlκ
−ε
li
(
µlL
β
l
πll
)αε
θ
(
Hl
Ll
)(1−α)ε (∑
m
πlm
1+τlm
)−αε .
B.1.4 Derivation of equation (II.26)
Median utility of workers from country i is defined as
Ũi = G
−1
i
(
1
2
)
,
where G−1i is the inverse function of the distribution of maximum utility of workers from
i. The median of this distribution is the value Ũi, for which exactly half of country i’s
citizens have utility less than that value. Starting from
Gi(U) = exp
{
−ΨiU−ε
}
with Ψi =
∑
nBnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε
, taking the natural log on both sides and solving for U
gives
U = −
(
Ψi
lnGi(U)
) 1
ε
.
Setting Gi(U) =
1
2
implies that the left-hand side of the equation above becomes the
median Ũi. Simplification gives equation (II.26) as
Ũi = δ
′
[∑
n
Bnκ
−ε
ni
(
νn
PαnR
1−α
n
)ε] 1ε
,
where δ′ = (ln 2)−
1
ε . Because Ũi differs from Ūi only in the constant term δ
′ (as opposed to
δ for mean utility), it follows directly that both statistics predict identical welfare changes
in percentage terms in response to a trade or migration policy shock.
B.2 Data Appendix
B.2.1 Migration Data
The OECD DIOC-E dataset for the reference year 2000/2001 contains several missing
values. Instead of replacing them with zeros, I employ several strategies to impute values.
First, I aggregate Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands into one country (BNL). I
then fill the numbers based on migration shares of similar countries. For example, I lack
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information for the number of Estonians and Latvians living in Spain in the reference
year. I compute the share of Lithuanians living there and impute a number for Estonia
and Latvia that produces the same migration share as for Lithuanians. Other “similar”
country groups for which I employ this strategy are Portugal and Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia
and Croatia, as well as Ireland and the U.K.
For citizens of Finland, Denmark and Sweden, I am missing the numbers of those who
live in Germany. I replace their values with numbers generating a migration share that is
equal to the average share of citizens living in Germany for all other countries. I employ the
same strategy for fill up information for numbers of citizens of Spain, Portugal, the Baltic
and Skandinavian countries living in Romania. Finally, I calculate migration shares and
renormalize by their sum to correct for totals above or below unity and convert them back
to numbers. I take the size of the worldwide labor force from World Bank development
indicators and impute it for the number of workers from ROW working and living in
ROW after accounting for the other countries in the sample.
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B.2.2 Robustness Checks - Simple Average Tariffs
Figure B.1: Eastern Enlargement - Migration Liberalization Only
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
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Table B.1: Eastern Enlargement - Migration Liberalization Only
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force EU Weight
——— change in percent ——— pct. pts.
Austria AUT 0.015 0.016 -0.196 0
Bulgaria BGR 3.255 0.475 -7.602 0
Benelux BNL 0.011 0.013 0.000 0
Czech Rep. CZE 2.789 -0.230 2.369 0
Germany DEU 0.013 0.015 -0.118 0
Denmark DNK 0.009 0.011 -0.019 0
Spain ESP 0.002 0.002 0.041 0
Estonia EST 1.850 0.108 -1.501 0
Finland FIN 0.009 0.010 -0.012 0
France FRA 0.006 0.007 -0.007 0
U.K. GBR -0.336 -0.363 4.800 36.94
Greece GRC -0.394 -0.426 7.966 40.75
Croatia HRV 0.004 0.000 -0.036 -
Hungary HUN 1.495 -0.226 2.156 0
Ireland IRL -0.013 0.039 0.173 2.13
Italy ITA -0.036 -0.037 0.533 5.84
Lithuania LTU 5.171 0.791 -9.135 0
Latvia LVA 2.480 -0.012 -0.066 0
Poland POL 1.630 0.270 -3.192 0
Portugal PRT -0.004 -0.005 0.093 0.74
Romania ROU 2.666 0.516 -5.807 0
Rest of World ROW 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -
Slovakia SVK 10.867 1.178 -12.037 0
Slovenia SVN 1.392 0.231 -2.695 0
Sweden SWE 0.012 0.014 -0.052 0
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the
labor force as well as the implied pro-European welfare weight of the government objective
function for each country in the sample.
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Figure B.2: Eastern Enlargement - Migration and Trade Liberalization
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
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Table B.2: Eastern Enlargement - Migration and Trade Liberalization
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force EU Weight
——— change in percent ——— pct. pts.
Austria AUT 0.008 0.040 0.173 0
Bulgaria BGR 1.714 -1.220 -7.500 0
Benelux BNL -0.045 -0.024 0.303 9.48
Czech Rep. CZE 2.517 -0.499 2.362 0
Germany DEU -0.056 -0.016 0.453 11.44
Denmark DNK -0.026 0.003 0.236 5.74
Spain ESP -0.045 -0.032 0.218 9.40
Estonia EST 1.592 -0.068 -0.758 0
Finland FIN -0.003 0.013 0.090 0.74
France FRA -0.034 -0.021 0.279 7.23
U.K. GBR -0.446 -0.414 5.195 50.72
Greece GRC -0.536 -0.527 8.422 55.29
Croatia HRV -0.330 -0.267 0.613 -
Hungary HUN 1.025 -0.701 2.179 0
Ireland IRL -0.129 -0.016 0.396 22.91
Italy ITA -0.083 -0.057 0.719 16.02
Lithuania LTU 5.101 0.793 -8.697 0
Latvia LVA 1.991 -0.464 0.386 0
Poland POL 1.592 0.260 -3.023 0
Portugal PRT -0.134 -0.061 0.488 23.55
Romania ROU 2.006 -0.175 -5.828 0
Rest of World ROW -1.048 -1.057 -0.042 -
Slovakia SVK 10.543 0.869 -11.592 0
Slovenia SVN 1.427 0.289 -2.321 0
Sweden SWE -0.023 -0.003 0.281 5.09
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the
labor force as well as the implied pro-European welfare weight of the government objective
function for each country in the sample.
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Figure B.3: Eastern Enlargement and U.K. Single Market Exit
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Note: The countries plotted as squares are Austria, Benelux, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. Rest of the World is not plotted.
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Table B.3: Eastern Enlargement and U.K. Single Market Exit
Country Code Avg. Utility Real Income Labor Force Diff. to Scen. 2
——— change in percent ——— pct. pt. change
Austria AUT 0.003 0.035 0.258 -0.005
Bulgaria BGR 0.781 -1.322 -5.340 -0.933
Benelux BNL -0.069 -0.049 0.301 -0.024
Czech Rep. CZE 0.912 -0.808 6.061 -1.605
Germany DEU -0.071 -0.032 0.519 -0.015
Denmark DNK -0.049 -0.028 0.242 -0.022
Spain ESP -0.046 -0.034 0.222 -0.001
Estonia EST 0.467 -0.226 1.424 -1.125
Finland FIN -0.020 0.005 0.095 -0.016
France FRA -0.043 -0.031 0.281 -0.009
U.K. GBR -0.086 -0.025 0.374 0.360
Greece GRC -0.525 -0.516 8.660 0.011
Croatia HRV -0.329 -0.262 0.639 0.001
Hungary HUN -0.563 -1.042 5.712 -1.588
Ireland IRL -0.158 -0.110 0.199 -0.029
Italy ITA -0.088 -0.063 0.737 -0.006
Lithuania LTU 3.782 0.566 -6.124 -1.319
Latvia LVA 0.755 -0.626 2.925 -1.236
Poland POL 0.342 0.019 -0.184 -1.251
Portugal PRT -0.124 -0.050 0.483 0.010
Romania ROU 1.549 -0.261 -4.783 -0.466
Rest of World ROW -1.050 -1.059 -0.041 -0.001
Slovakia SVK 9.065 0.627 -9.003 -1.478
Slovenia SVN 0.727 0.169 -0.859 -0.699
Sweden SWE -0.043 -0.024 0.312 -0.020
Note: The table shows the percent changes in average utility, real income, the size of the labor
force and the difference in the change in average utility relative to Scenario 2 in percentage points.
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C.1 Theory Appendix
C.1.1 The Technology Frontier
Appealing to a partial equilibrium version of the research and innovation process from
Eaton and Kortum (2001), I show how the technology frontier in equation (III.1) can be
microfounded.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2001), I assume that time is continuous and that at time t
there are Rit researchers who draw ideas about how to produce the set of available goods
at a Poisson rate αi. Each idea that is drawn applies to some good j ∈ Si and has an
efficiency z(j) attached to it. The good j to which the efficiency applies is drawn from
a uniform distribution over Si, while the efficiency is drawn from a Pareto distribution
H(z) = 1− z−θ. The stock of ideas at time t is then defined as Tit = αi
∫ t
0
Risds.
The key departure from Eaton and Kortum (2001) is that this stock of ideas Tit does
not apply to a continuum of unit measure but to the randomly drawn measure Sit of
goods. In expectation, there are Tit
Sit
ideas per variety at time t. With ideas arriving at
rate αi, the probability if having k ideas for variety j in country i by date t is(
Tit
Sit
)k
exp
{
−Tit
Sit
}
/k!.
Having k ideas and independent draws, the probability that the best idea has an efficiency
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below z is H(z)k. Summing over all possible numbers of ideas gives the technology frontier
in country i at time t: the probability that a good j is produced with an efficiency below
z.
F̃it(z) = exp
{
−Tit
Si
}[ ∞∑
k=0
[(Tit/Si)H(z)]
k
k!
]
Using the power series definition of the exponential function and inserting H(k) yields
F̃it(z) = exp
{
−Tit
Si
z−θ
}
, z ≥ 1.1 (C.1)
Fit(z) is the probability that a good j producible in i at time t has a productivity of less
than z. In the remainder of the paper, I will analyze the static model at some point in
time so that the time subscript is dropped from here on.
While F̃it(z) is the distribution of productivity for goods producible in i, the goods
for which i does not possess the technology, have productivity zero, so the probability of
having a productivity lower than z is unity. Applying this gives equation (III.1) in the
main part of the paper.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemma III.1
Because productivity draws for producible goods are random and there is a continuum of
goods, the bilateral price distributions can be arbitrarily compressed and will still contain
all possible prices due to the law of large numbers.
To show that
∑
c λ(c) = 1 and
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) =
Si
J
I proceed in two steps. First, I show
three useful properties of the summation over producer set weights. Second, I use the
these properties to show
∑
c λ(c) = 1 and
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) =
Si
J
.
Recall that the set of all countries is C = {1, . . . , N} and there are |P(C)| = 2N
producer sets, where c indexes the elements of P(C).
C.1.2.1 Properties of the Summation
Decomposition Without loss of generality, it is possible to decompose the sum over
all producer set weights into two sums, those in which country 1 is active and those in
which it is not. ∑
c
λ(c) =
∑
c:1∈c
λ(c) +
∑
c:1/∈c
λ(c). (C.2)
It follows from the properties of the power set that both summations on the right-hand
side of equation (C.2) each have 2N/2 elements.
1The exponential function can be defined as exp(x) =
∑∞
k=0
xk
k! .
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Extraction From each of the two summations on the right-hand side of (C.2) the term
containing the fraction of goods produced by country 1 can be extracted, so that
∑
c:1∈c
λ(c) =
∑
c:1∈c
S1
J
λ−1(c) =
S1
J
∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c)
∑
c:1/∈c
λ(c) =
∑
c:1/∈c
J − S1
J
λ−1(c) =
J − S1
J
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c),
where λ−1(c) denotes the usual λ(c) without the factor containing S1. Note that the
elements of a power set can be matched in pairs such that the two paired elements differ
only in the presence of one element of the original set. For example, the power set of the
set {1, 2, 3} can be sorted as
{} , {1}
{2} , {1, 2}
{3} , {1, 3}
{2, 3} , {1, 2, 3} .
Therefore, after the factors accounting for e.g. country 1 have been taken out, the two
summations from above are equivalent, in particular∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c) =
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c). (C.3)
Compression A third useful property is the fact that
∑
c:1/∈c λ−1(c) is itself a summation
over all weights of elements of the power set of a set of countries C1 = {2, . . . , N}, which
has 2N−1 elements, indexed by c1, i.e.∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c) =
∑
c1
λ(c1). (C.4)
C.1.2.2 Proof that
∑
c λ(c) = 1
Using equation (C.2), it is possible to write w.l.o.g.
∑
c
λ(c) =
S1
J
∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c) +
J − S1
J
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c)
∑
c
λ(c) =
S1
J
(∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c)−
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c)
)
+
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c).
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Using the extraction property (C.3), this gives∑
c
λ(c) =
∑
c:1/∈c
λ−1(c) =
∑
c1
λ(c1),
where the second equality follows from (C.4) and c1 indexes the elements of C1 =
{2, . . . , N}.
Applying decomposition (C.2), extraction (C.3), and compression (C.4) on
∑
c1
λ(c1)
using country 2 gives that ∑
c1
λ(c1) =
∑
c2
λ(c2)
with c2 indexing C2 = {3, . . . , N}. This procedure can be applied iteratively so that with
CN−1 = {N}, ∑
c
λ(c) =
∑
cN−1
λ(cN−1) =
SN
J
+
J − SN
J
= 1. (C.5)
C.1.2.3 Proof that
∑
c:i∈c λ(c) = Si/J
Considering again country 1 w.l.o.g.
∑
c:1∈c
λ(c) =
S1
J
∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c).
Using compression (C.4) once to arrive at
∑
c2
λ(c2) and then applying decomposition,
extraction and compression iteratively as above, it holds that
∑
c:1∈c
λ(c) =
S1
J
∑
c:1∈c
λ−1(c) =
S1
J
∑
cN−1
λ(cN−1) =
S1
J
(
SN
J
+
J − SN
J
)
=
S1
J
. (C.6)
QED.
C.1.3 Derivation of Goods Shares π̄ni
The share of goods n buys from i is also the probability that i is the lowest-cost producer
for some good j. Formally,
π̄ni = Pr [pni(j) ≤ min {pns(j) ∀ s 6= i}] . (C.7)
This implies that I need to calculate the probability that a good j is produced by a
particular producer set and that all countries s 6= i charge a price greater than p while at
the same time country i charges a price lower than p for all possible values of p and all
producer sets c. For some particular producer set c in which country i is active, this is
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given by
λ(c)πni(c) =
∫ ∞
0
∏
s∈c,s 6=i
Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)]
∏
s∈c
J − Ss
J
d
Si
J
Gni(p),
where λ(c) is the probability that a randomly chosen good j is produced by the countries
in c. For a producer set c′ in which i is not active, πni(c) is intuitively zero.
λ(c′)πni(c
′) =
∫ ∞
0
∏
s∈c
Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)]
∏
s∈c,s 6=i
J − Ss
J
d
J − Si
J
· 0 = 0,
because for goods that i cannot produce, the probability that it charges a price lower
than p is zero as prices go to infinite for these goods. It is therefore sufficient to consider
producer sets in which i is active to arrive at the aggregate goods share π̄ni.
π̄ni =
∑
c:i∈c
∫ ∞
0
∏
s∈c,s 6=i
Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)]
∏
s∈c
J − Ss
J
d
Si
J
Gni(p).
Using the definition of λ(c) together with the fact that
gni(p) =
dGni(p)
dp
= [1−Gni(p)] θpθ−1
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ ,
it is possible to write that
π̄ni =
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
∫ ∞
0
θpθ−1 exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}
dp.
Changing variables such that t = pθΦn(c) and thus θp
θ−1dp = Φn(c)
−1dt and noting that
the integration limits remain, the integral can be solved and simplified to give equation
(III.6) in the paper,
π̄ni =
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Ti (dniwi)
−θ
Φn(c)
.
C.1.4 Derivation of the Price Index Pn
The CES price index that is dual to the utility function from (III.2) is given by
P 1−σn =
∫ J
0
pn(j)
1−σdj.
Expressed in terms of country n’s price distribution Gn(p) it is given by
P 1−σn
∫ ∞
0
p1−σdGn(p),
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where Gn(p) is given by equation (III.5). With
dGn(p) =
∑
c
λ(c) exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}
θpθ−1Φn(c)dp
and substituting u = pθΦn(c) so that p
1−σ = (u/Φn(c))
1−σ
θ and θpθ−1dp = du
Φn(c)
the
left-hand side simplifies to
P 1−σn =
∑
c
Φn(c)
σ−1
θ λ(c)
∫ ∞
0
u
1−σ
θ exp−u du.
The Gamma function is given by Γ(a) =
∫∞
0
xa−1 exp {−x} dx so that
P 1−σn = γ
1−σ
∑
c
λ(c)Φn(c)
σ−1
θ
as given in equation (III.7) with γ ≡ Γ
(
θ+1−σ
θ
) 1
1−σ .
C.1.5 Proof of Lemma III.2
First, I show that goods shares equal expenditure shares at the level of a producer set.
Next, I proceed to show that this result does not obtain when the aggregate price distri-
bution is considered. In a third step, I derive the expenditure allocated to a producer set
from utility maximization.
C.1.5.1 Independence at the Producer Set Level
EK show the independence of the price distribution across sourcing locations by showing
that price distributions are identical across sourcing locations after accounting for the
fraction of goods that is sourced from them. Analogous to their approach I show that
Gn(p, c) =
1
πni(c)
∫ p
0
∏
s∈c,s 6=i
Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)]
∏
s/∈c
Ss − J
J
d
Si
J
Gni(q), (C.8)
where Gn(p, c) = λ(c)
[
1− exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}]
is the distribution of prices that n pays in
producer set c and I assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ c. Note that Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)] is the appropriate
bilateral price distribution to use in this context, although it covers goods that lie outside
the range λ(c) under analysis here. Because productivity draws are random and there
is a continuum of goods, each bilateral distribution Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)] can be arbitrarily
compressed - in this case to λ(c) [1−Gns(p)] as will become clear below - and will still
contain all possible prices.
CHAPTER C. APPENDIX CHAPTER III 161
With gni(q) =
dGni(q)
dq
= [1−Gni(q)] θqθ−1 TiSi (dniwi)
−θ and using the definition of λ(c)
the integral can be written as ∫ p
0
λ(c)
∏
s∈c
[1−Gns(p)] θqθ−1
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ dq
= λ(c)
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
∫ p
0
θqθ−1 exp
{
−qθ
∑
s∈c
Ts
Ss
(dnsws)
−θ
}
dq
= λ(c)
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
∫ p
0
θqθ−1 exp
{
−qθΦn(c)
}
dq.
Defining the change of variables t = qθΦn(c) so that θq
θ−1dq = dtΦn(c)
−1 and accounting
for the changed limits gives
λ(c)
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
∫ pθΦn(c)
0
exp {−t} dt
Φn(c)
,
which simplifies to
λ(c)
Ti (dniwi)
−θ
SiΦn(c)
[
1− exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}]
. (C.9)
Inserting (C.9) for the integral in (C.8) gives the result immediately.
C.1.5.2 No Independence in the Aggregate Price Distribution
At the aggregate level, independence of the price distribution of the country of origin
would require that
Gn(p) =
1
π̄ni
∫ p
0
∑
c:i∈c
∏
s∈c,s 6=i
Ss
J
[1−Gns(p)]
∏
s/∈c
J − Ss
J
d
Si
J
Gni(q), (C.10)
where π̄ni is the fraction of goods bought by n from i as given by equation (III.6). Applying
analogous steps to the integral as above gives∫ p
0
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
∏
s∈c
[1−Gns(p)] θqθ−1
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ dq.
The places of the sum and the integral can be swapped and terms not depending on q
can be taken out of the integral to give
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ
∫ p
0
θqθ−1 exp
{
−qθΦn(c)
}
dq.
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Using the change of variables from above and simplifying gives∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)πni(c)
[
1− exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}]
. (C.11)
Inserting this into equation (C.10) and simplifying gives
1−
∑
c:i∈c λ(c)πni(c) exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}∑
c:i∈c λ(c)πni(c)
(C.12)
for the right hand side of (C.10), while Gn(p) = 1 −
∑
c λ(c) exp
{
−pθΦn(c)
}
. From
equation (C.12) it becomes clear that the price distribution depends on characteristics of
the source because countries are active in different producer sets and in particular, they
are only active in a subset of them while the aggregate price distribution Gn(p) naturally
depends on all producer sets.
C.1.5.3 Allocation of Expenditure to Producer Sets
Because the independence result does not hold in the aggregate, expenditure shares al-
located to producer sets need to be accounted for to arrive at the right country-level
expenditure shares.
Defining aggregate expenditure in country n as Xn, standard utility maximization
of the CES utility function (III.2) subject to the appropriate budget constraint gives
variety-level expenditure as
pn(j)qn(j) =
(
pn(j)
Pn
)1−σ
Xn.
Denote j ← c as all goods j which are produced by the countries in producer set c. Then∫
j←c
pn(j)qn(j)dj =
Xn
P 1−σn
∫
j←c
pn(j)
1−σdj
Xn(c) =
Xn
P 1−σn
∫ ∞
0
p1−σn dGn(p, c)
Xn(c) =
Xn
P 1−σn
γ1−σλ(c)Φn(c)
σ−1
θ
Xn(c) =
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
Xn,
where Pn(c) is the CES price index for goods produced by producer set c and Xn(c) is
country n’s expenditure on goods produced by producer set c.
Taken together the three above results imply that πni =
∑
i∈c
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
πni(c). QED.
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C.1.6 Derivation of the Gravity Equation
Bilateral trade flows from equation (III.9) can be written as
Xni =
Ti
Si
(widni)
−θXn
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
Φn(c)
−1.
Total sales Qi are obtained by summing over all destination countries m to get
Qi =
Ti
Si
w−θi
N∑
m=1
Xmd
−θ
mi
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pm(c)
Pm
)1−σ
Φm(c)
−1.
Inserting Qi into Xni gives
Xni =
d−θni
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pn(c)
Pn
)1−σ
Φn(c)
−1∑N
m=1Xmd
−θ
mi
∑
c:i∈c
(
Pm(c)
Pm
)1−σ
Φm(c)−1
XnQi.
It follows from the definition of Pm(c) that Φn(c)
−1 = γ−θPn(c)
θλ(c)
θ
σ−1 . Using this and
multiplying the numerator by (Pn/Pn)
−θ and the denominator by (Pm/Pm)
−θ gives equa-
tion (III.10).
C.1.7 Derivation of the Real Wage
With labor as the only factor of production, the real wage in country i is given by wi
Pi
.
From the model, the fraction of expenditure spent by n on goods by i is
πni =
Ti
Si
(dniwi)
−θ P σ−1n
∑
c:i∈c
Φn(c)
−1Pn(c)
1−σ.
From this, the wage can be expressed as
wi = d
−1
ni
(
Ti
Si
P σ−1n π
−1
ni
) 1
θ
(∑
c:i∈c
Φn(c)
−1Pn(c)
1−σ
) 1
θ
.
Inserting this into the real wage and setting n = i gives
wi
Pi
= P
−1+σ−1
θ
i
Ti
Si
1
θ
π
− 1
θ
ii
(∑
c:i∈c
Φi(c)
−1Pi(c)
1−σ
) 1
θ
.
CHAPTER C. APPENDIX CHAPTER III 164
Using the price index of producer set c in i, Φi(c)
−1 can be written as
Φi(c)
−1 = γ−θλ(c)−
θ
1−σPi(c)
θ.
Inserting this then gives the expression in equation (III.14)
wi
Pi
= γ−1
(
Ti
Siπii
) 1
θ
(∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
θ
σ−1
(
Pi(c)
Pi
)θ+1−σ) 1θ
.
C.1.8 Proof of Proposition III.1
The gains from trade are given by the relative change in the real wage when moving from
autarky to finite trade costs. Using the result for the real wage in autarky from equation
(III.15), the gains from trade can be written as
GT σ−1i =
(wi/Pi)
σ−1
T
γ1−σµ
σ−1
θ
i (Si/J)
. (C.13)
The price index in the trade case can be decomposed into a price index which contains
the goods that i can produce by itself in autarky, Pi,SP for specialization, and one that
contains all other goods, Pi,NG for new goods.
P 1−σi,T =
∑
c:i∈c
Pi(c)
1−σ +
∑
c:i/∈c
Pi(c)
1−σ = P 1−σi,SP + P
1−σ
i,NG,
where it is understood that from now on Pi and wi denote the price index and the nominal
wage in the trade case. It follows that
GT σ−1i =
P 1−σi,SP + P
1−σ
i,NG
w1−σi γ
1−σµ
σ−1
θ
i (Si/J)
.
and
GT σ−1i =
∑
c:i∈c λ(c)Φi(c)
σ−1
θ µ
1−σ
θ
i w
σ−1
i
Si/J
+
P 1−σi,NG
GT 1−σi P
1−σ
i,T
It follows from equation (III.6) that µ
1−σ
θ
i w
σ−1
i = [πii(c)Φi(c)]
(1−σ)/θ so that
GT σ−1i
[
1−
(
Pi,NG
Pi,T
)1−σ]
=
∑
c:i∈c
λ(c)
Si/J
πii(c)
1−σ
θ .
Applying the fact that P 1−σi,T = P
1−σ
i,SP + P
1−σ
i,NG and solving for GTi gives equation (III.17).
QED.
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C.2 Data Appendix
In this section, I report the numbers corresponding to the data points for Figures III.2,
III.3, and III.4.
Table C.1: Datapoints for Figure III.2
New Goods New Goods
Country Country Size Eaton Kortum symmetric size-proportional
Australia 0.0608 1.65 3.67 3.53
Austria 0.0225 27.23 33.99 35.44
Benelux 0.0715 24.21 26.31 25.33
Canada 0.1075 8.17 10.68 9.84
Switzerland 0.0277 28.18 34.07 35.04
Denmark 0.0173 30.19 37.78 40.17
Spain 0.0827 8.19 12.18 11.53
Finland 0.0158 19.26 26.68 28.54
France 0.1543 11.09 13.67 12.41
Germany 0.2593 8.03 10.03 8.72
Greece 0.0223 16.42 23.39 24.58
Hungary 0.0189 29.47 36.93 39.03
Ireland 0.0080 41.85 52.39 59.06
Iceland 0.0008 66.95 93.07 122.13
Italy 0.1286 7.39 10.81 9.90
Japan 0.5097 0.89 1.76 1.38
Korea 0.1233 3.20 5.42 4.95
Mexico 0.1276 2.71 5.27 4.72
Norway 0.0170 23.57 31.25 33.26
New Zealand 0.0114 4.68 9.47 10.43
Poland 0.0774 10.81 15.15 14.43
Portugal 0.0190 18.32 25.82 27.39
Sweden 0.0300 16.32 22.22 22.62
Turkey 0.0832 8.15 12.52 11.88
United Kingdom 0.1601 9.94 12.60 11.39
United States 1.0000 0.94 1.62 1.16
Note: Country Size is measured as equipped labor from Klenow and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2005)
relative to the U.S. Columns 3 to 5 report the utility gains of moving from autarky to trade in
percent.
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Table C.2: Datapoints for Figure III.3
New Goods New Goods
Country Country Size symmetric size-proportional
Australia 0.0608 122.55 114.39
Austria 0.0225 24.83 30.12
Benelux 0.0715 8.67 4.61
Canada 0.1075 30.78 20.44
Switzerland 0.0277 20.91 24.33
Denmark 0.0173 25.15 33.07
Spain 0.0827 48.63 40.77
Finland 0.0158 38.52 48.20
France 0.1543 23.23 11.86
Germany 0.2593 24.87 8.55
Greece 0.0223 42.40 49.67
Hungary 0.0189 25.29 32.44
Ireland 0.0080 25.20 41.12
Iceland 0.0008 39.02 82.42
Italy 0.1286 46.14 33.93
Japan 0.5097 98.31 55.65
Korea 0.1233 69.35 54.70
Mexico 0.1276 94.31 73.91
Norway 0.0170 32.60 41.11
New Zealand 0.0114 102.24 122.64
Poland 0.0774 40.13 33.48
Portugal 0.0190 40.97 49.51
Sweden 0.0300 36.16 38.65
Turkey 0.0832 53.75 45.82
United Kingdom 0.1601 26.76 14.59
United States 1.0000 73.27 23.03
Note: Country Size is measured as equipped labor from Klenow and
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2005) relative to the U.S. Columns 3 and 4 report the
change in the gains from trade when moving from the EK model to the
respective version of the New Goods model in percent.
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Table C.3: Datapoints for Figure III.4
New Goods New Goods
Country Country Size symmetric size-proportional
Australia 0.0608 0.70 0.25
Austria 0.0225 2.02 0.23
Benelux 0.0715 1.94 0.88
Canada 0.1075 1.56 0.81
Switzerland 0.0277 2.11 0.30
Denmark 0.0173 2.20 0.18
Spain 0.0827 1.12 0.66
Finland 0.0158 1.69 0.12
France 0.1543 1.27 1.69
Germany 0.2593 1.07 3.06
Greece 0.0223 1.57 0.17
Hungary 0.0189 2.13 0.20
Ireland 0.0080 2.90 0.09
Iceland 0.0008 4.78 0.01
Italy 0.1286 1.05 1.14
Japan 0.5097 0.56 3.89
Korea 0.1233 0.98 0.76
Mexico 0.1276 0.88 0.73
Norway 0.0170 1.89 0.15
New Zealand 0.0114 1.05 0.04
Poland 0.0774 1.23 0.69
Portugal 0.0190 1.71 0.15
Sweden 0.0300 1.51 0.25
Turkey 0.0832 1.11 0.68
United Kingdom 0.1601 1.22 1.70
United States 1.0000 0.56 11.39
Note: Country Size is measured as equipped labor from Klenow and
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2005) relative to the U.S. Columns 3 and 4 report the
share of specialization gains in total gains from trade for the respective New
Goods model in percent.
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